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Abstract
In this thesis I address the relationship between arguments and explana-
tions. In particular, I consider three notions of explanation and the way they
relate to arguments. I argue that arguments and explanations should be con-
sidered in tandem rather than in isolation. I provide support for this contention
throughout the thesis. Specifically, I show how research on argumentation in-
cludes considerations of explanation and informs useful distinctions regard-
ing the different notions of explanation (Chapter 1). I then explore the close
relationship between arguments and explanations on a specific pattern of rea-
soning called ‘explaining away’ where I show how explanations can affect the
strength of an argument (Chapter 2). In Chapter 3 I provide further theoretical
background regarding the different notions of explanations and I discuss fac-
tors that constitute ‘good’ explanations. These factors are then explored with
respect to the notion of explanations as inference processes and in the context
of arguments viewed as causal Bayesian networks. In Chapter 4 I focus on one
of the aspects of explanations when embedded in a social context. Here, I take
a concern that has been prominent in recent argumentation work, namely the
role of the argument source, and pursue it in the context of explanation by ex-
amining how the provision of explanations affects the perceived reliability of
the explainer. Finally, in Chapter 5 I summarize the results of the thesis and
discuss the implications and potential directions for future research.
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank my supervisor Ulrike Hahn for her enduring and per-
sistent support and encouragement. I would also like to thank my second su-
pervisor David Lagnado for his guidance and support. Many thanks to Alice
Liefgreen who was a collaborator on three experiments in Chapter 2. I am
grateful to the BARD project, the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation, and
the Department of Psychological Sciences, Birkbeck for their financial support.




List of Figures 10
List of Tables 21
1 Introduction 24
1.1 Explicating arguments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
1.1.1 Classical logic as the standard of argumentation . . . . . . 27
1.1.2 Bayesian argumentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
1.2 Explanations and/as arguments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
1.3 Three dimensions of explanation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
1.3.1 Explaining evidence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
1.3.2 Explaining the argument . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
1.3.3 Social explanation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
1.4 Prospectus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
2 Argument and explanation in causal reasoning 47
2.1 Explaining away: Accounting for a single common effect . . . . . 51
2.1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
5
2.1.2 Causal Bayesian networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
2.1.3 Explaining away: normative account . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
2.1.4 Explaining away: empirical account . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
2.1.5 Limitations of previous studies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
2.1.6 Motivations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
2.1.7 Experiment 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
2.1.8 Experiment 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
2.1.9 Experiment 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
2.1.10 General discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
2.2 Extending explaining away: Learning (about) multiple pieces of
evidence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167
2.2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169
2.2.2 Experiment 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178
2.2.3 Experiment 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195
2.2.4 General discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 209
2.3 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 212
3 Explaining the argument: The case of causal Bayesian networks 214
3.1 Theoretical background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 219
3.1.1 Explaining evidence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 220
3.1.2 Explaining reasoning processes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 224
3.1.3 Good explanation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 231
3.2 A case study on human-generated explanation of inferences in
CBNs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 237
3.2.1 Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 239
3.2.2 Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 239
6
3.2.3 Results and Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 244
3.3 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 249
4 Social explanation: The effects of explanation on reliability and con-
fidence 252
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 255
4.1.1 Explanations: connecting claims with evidence . . . . . . . 255
4.1.2 Effects of explanations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 256
4.1.3 Explanations as communicative acts . . . . . . . . . . . . . 259
4.1.4 Everyday explanations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 261
4.2 Overview of experiments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 263
4.3 Experiment 6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 263
4.3.1 Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 264
4.3.2 Results and Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 269
4.4 Experiment 7a . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 271
4.4.1 Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 271
4.4.2 Results and Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 274
4.5 Experiment 7b . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 280
4.5.1 Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 280
4.5.2 Results and Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 281
4.6 Experiment 8 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 284
4.6.1 External expertise and perceived expertise . . . . . . . . . 285
4.6.2 Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 286
4.6.3 Results and Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 289
4.7 General discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 293
4.8 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 299
7
5 General discussion 301
5.1 Brief overview of experimental data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 302
5.1.1 Argument and explanation in causal reasoning . . . . . . . 302
5.1.2 Explaining the argument . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 304
5.1.3 Social explanation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 305
5.2 Implications and future directions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 306
5.2.1 Diagnostic split, propensity interpretation, and other
probability interpretations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 306
5.2.2 Extending algebra . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 307
5.2.3 Explanations, arguments, and AI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 308
5.2.4 Explanations and trust . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 310
5.2.5 Trust and fidelity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 311
5.2.6 Further research avenues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 312
5.3 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 314
Appendices 315
A Calculations and experimental material used in studies in Chapter 2 316
A.1 Explaining away with one or more inhibitory causes . . . . . . . . 317
A.2 Normative predictions based on data from Rottman and Hastie
(2016) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 319
A.3 The decomposition conditions for an explaining away CBN with
two effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 320
A.4 Order effects with mutually exclusive and exhaustive causes . . . 322
A.5 Stimuli used in Experiment 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 324
A.6 Ratio of the posterior odds for the full and the split model . . . . 336
8
A.7 Stimuli used in Experiment 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 338
B Experimental materials used in the case study in Chapter 3 348
C Experimental materials used in studies in Chapter 4 357
C.1 Stimuli used in Experiment 6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 357
C.2 Stimuli used in Experiments 7a and 7b . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 361




1.1 The three dimensions of explanation. The small cubes colored
green, orange, and yellow are the points of intersection of these
three dimensions that are discussed in this thesis. . . . . . . . . . 42
2.1 The three dimensions of explanation. This chapter discusses the
intersection that corresponds to the green cube. . . . . . . . . . . . 48
2.2 An example of CBN model. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
2.3 An example of a CBN model with a common cause. . . . . . . . . 58
2.4 An example of a CBN model of a causal chain. . . . . . . . . . . . 60
2.5 An example of a CBN model with a common cause and three
effects. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
2.6 A CBN model of explaining away . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
2.7 The difference ∆1 = P(Ci | E) − P(Ci | E, Cj) and ∆2 =
P(Ci | E,∼Cj)− P(Ci | E) as a function of the priors (P(Ci)). The
prior probabilities of the causes are assumed to be equal in this
figure. Further, the figure assumes deterministic set-up, i.e.,
P(E | C1, C2) = P(E | Ci,∼Cj) = 1 (where i, j ∈ {1, 2}), and
P(E | ∼C1,∼C2) = 0. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
10
2.8 Left: the difference between the normative diagnostic reason-
ing (Pnorm(Ci | E)) and the constant diagnostic split prediction
of 1/2 in the case of equal priors. Right: the difference be-
tween the normative diagnostic reasoning (Pnorm(C1 | E) and
Pnorm(C2 | E)) and the constant diagnostic split predictions of
2/3 and 1/3 for 2 : 1 ratio of the priors. Both figures assume de-
terministic set-up, i.e., P(E | C1, C2) = P(E | Ci,∼Cj) = 1, and
P(E | ∼C1,∼C2) = 0. We can see that as priors are getting closer
to 0 the diagnostic split hypothesis is better approximating the
normative diagnostic reasoning. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
2.9 The difference between the normative diagnostic reasoning
(Pnorm(Ci | E)) and the prior probability of the causes in the case
of equal priors. The figure assumes deterministic set-up, i.e.,
P(E | C1, C2) = P(E | Ci,∼Cj) = 1 (where i, j ∈ {1, 2}), and
P(E | ∼C1,∼C2) = 0. We can see that as priors are getting closer
to 1 the propensity interpretation is better approximating the
normative diagnostic reasoning. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
2.10 Graphical representations of the cover stories presented to par-
ticipants in Experiment 1. The top image was featured in the
coins cover story, the middle one in the balls and container cover
story, and the bottom one in the dinner party cover story. . . . . . 97
2.11 Distribution of participants’ responses to qualitative questions
in Experiment 1. Asterisks above the bars indicate normative
answers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
11
2.12 Participants’ responses to quantitative questions in Experiment
1. Red horizontal lines are correct (normative) answers. Gray
lines between data points depict how participants changed their
probability estimates from one questions to another, with curved
lines indicating that a participant did not change (within ± .02)
their probability estimate. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
2.13 Variance in participants responses to the priors questions who
provided estimates that are within ±.05 of the correct answer as
a function of different epsilons (ε). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
2.14 Box plots of participants’ quantitative relational explaining
away responses in three groups along with the normative esti-
mates in Experiment 1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
2.15 Distribution of participants’ responses to qualitative questions
in Experiment 2. Asterisks above the bars indicate normative
answers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
12
2.16 Participants’ responses to quantitative questions in Experiment
2. Red horizontal lines are correct (normative) answers. Gray
lines between data points depict how participants changed their
probability estimates from one questions to another, with curved
lines indicating that a participant did not change (within ± .02)
their probability estimate. Note that the order of questions in
this figure does not correspond to the order of question in the ex-
periment. It starts with participants’ estimates for P(C2) rather
than P(C1). This is done purely to aid the visual inspection of
the data as the priors of the two causes were not equal. Specifi-
cally, it aids the inspection of participants’ estimates that did not
change from one question to another. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
2.17 A common-effect CBN model with three causes. . . . . . . . . . . 142
2.18 Graphical representations of the cover stories presented to par-
ticipants in Experiment 3. The top image was featured in the
balls and container cover story and the bottom one in the dinner
party cover story. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
2.19 Distribution of participants’ responses to qualitative questions
in Experiment 3. Asterisks above the bars indicate normative
answers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
13
2.20 Participants’ responses to quantitative questions in Experiment
3. Red horizontal lines are correct (normative) answers. Gray
lines between data points depict how participants changed their
probability estimates from one questions to another, with curved
lines indicating that a participant did not change (within ± .02)
their probability estimate. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
2.21 CBN with 2 independent causes and 2 common effects. . . . . . . 170
2.22 ‘Split’ CBN from E1 to E2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174
2.23 Responses of the participants who answered all 10 comprehen-
sion questions correctly to priors and test questions in Exper-
iment 4. Red horizontal lines are correct (normative) answers
according to the full BN model. Green and purple horizontal
lines correspond to the predictions of the split CBN model. Gray
lines between data points depict how participants changed their
probability estimates from one questions to another, with curved
lines indicating that a participant did not change (within ± .02)
their probability estimate. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183
14
2.24 Responses of the participants who answered some of the com-
prehension questions incorrectly to priors and test questions
in Experiment 4. Red horizontal lines are correct (normative)
answers according to the full BN model. Green and purple
horizontal lines correspond to the predictions of the split CBN
model. Gray lines between data points depict how participants
changed their probability estimates from one questions to an-
other, with curved lines indicating that a participant did not
change (within ± .02) their probability estimate. . . . . . . . . . . 184
2.25 Responses of all 271 participants to priors and test questions
in Experiment 4. Red horizontal lines are correct (normative)
answers according to the full BN model. Green and purple
horizontal lines correspond to the predictions of the split CBN
model. Gray lines between data points depict how participants
changed their probability estimates from one questions to an-
other, with curved lines indicating that a participant did not
change (within ± .02) their probability estimate. . . . . . . . . . . 185
2.26 The distribution of all the test question estimates around the 21
clustering points (bins) (± .02) in Experiment 4. . . . . . . . . . . . 188
2.27 The frequency of participants’ responses around the five focal
points (bins) (± .02) in Experiment 4. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189
15
2.28 Responses of participants to priors and test questions in Exper-
iment 5. Blue triangles are means and error bars are 95% con-
fidence intervals. Gray lines between data points depict how
participants changed their probability estimates from one ques-
tions to another, with curved lines indicating that a participant
did not change (within ± .02) their probability estimate. . . . . . . 202
2.29 The distribution of all the test question estimates around the 21
clustering points (bins) (± .02) in Experiment 5. . . . . . . . . . . . 206
3.1 The three dimensions of explanation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 217
3.2 A CBN model of explaining away. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 219
3.3 An example of a Markov blanket. All nodes within the dashed
circle constitute a set of nodes that is a Markov blanket of
node A. The illustration is publicly available via Wikimedia
Commons. URL: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:
Diagram of a Markov blanket.svg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 223
3.4 A CBN of a fictional scenario used in BARD testing phase. Four
pieces of evidence are available: Emerson Report=Yes, Quinns Re-
port=Yes, AitF Sawyer Report=Yes, and Comms Analyst Winter Re-
port=No. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 229
3.5 A summary report generated by the BARD algorithm applied
on the CBN from Figure 3.4. In addition to the natural language
explanation, it provides sets with nodes that are HighImpSet,
NoImpSet and OppImpSet. For the purposes of this chapter we
can ignore MinHIS and CombMinSet. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 229
16
3.6 An AgenaRisk implementation of the ‘Wet Grass’ CBN model
used in the case study. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 241
3.7 An AgenaRisk implementation of the ‘Wet Grass’ CBN model
used in the case study when it is known that the neighbor’s grass
is wet. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 243
4.1 The three dimensions of explanation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 255
4.2 (a) The estimated marginal means (EMMs) from the LMM built
for Experiment 6 with 95% confidence intervals. Gray points are
raw data values (jittered along the x-axis for visibility) with vi-
olin plots showing the frequency of the raw data. (b) The ob-
served data means (with 95% confidence intervals) and violin
plots for each scenario broken down for each explanation condi-
tions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 270
4.3 (a) The estimated marginal means (with 95% confidence inter-
vals) from the LMM built on participants’ confidence estimates in
Experiment 7a. Gray points are raw data values (jittered along
the x-axis for visibility) with violin plots showing the frequency
of the raw data. (b) The observed data means (with 95% confi-
dence intervals) and violin plots for each scenario broken down
for each explanation conditions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 275
17
4.4 (a) The estimated marginal means (with 95% confidence inter-
vals) from the LMM built on participants’ reliability estimates in
Experiment 7a. Gray points are raw data values (jittered along
the x-axis for visibility) with violin plots showing the frequency
of the raw data. (b) The observed data means (with 95% confi-
dence intervals) and violin plots for each scenario broken down
for each explanation conditions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 276
4.5 (a) The raw data values of participants’ reliability and confidence
estimates from Experiment 7a and a linear regression model
(with the 95% confidence band). (b) The same data and a lin-
ear regression model as in (a) broken down for each explanation
condition. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 278
4.6 Reliability as a mediator between explanation and confidence.
b1, with the related p-value, is the coefficient in a LMM with
explanation as a predictor and confidence as a dependent vari-
able (Section 4.4.2.1); b2 is the coefficient in a LMM with ex-
planation as a predictor and reliability as a dependent variable
(Section 4.4.2.2); b3 and b4 are coefficients for explanation and
reliability respectively in a LMM with explanation and reliabil-
ity as predictors and confidence as a dependent variable (Sec-
tion 4.4.2.3). In contrast to b1, b3 is minimal and non-significant
which suggests that reliability (fully) mediates the effect of ex-
planation on confidence. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 279
18
4.7 (a) The estimated marginal means (with 95% confidence inter-
vals) from the LMM built on participants’ confidence estimates in
Experiment 7b. Gray points are raw data values (jittered along
the x-axis for visibility) with violin plots showing the frequency
of the raw data. (b) The observed data means (with 95% confi-
dence intervals) and violin plots for each scenario broken down
for each explanation conditions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 282
4.8 (a) The estimated marginal means (with 95% confidence inter-
vals) from the LMM built on participants’ reliability estimates in
Experiment 7b. Gray points are raw data values (jittered along
the x-axis for visibility) with violin plots showing the frequency
of the raw data. (b) The observed data means (with 95% confi-
dence intervals) and violin plots for each scenario broken down
for each explanation conditions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 283
4.9 (a) The estimated marginal means (with 95% confidence inter-
vals) from the LMM built on participants’ confidence estimates in
Experiment 8. (b) The EMMs (with 95% confidence intervals)
from the LMM built on participants’ reliability estimates in Exper-
iment 8. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 290
4.10 (a) The observed data means (with 95% confidence intervals) for
participants’ confidence estimates in each scenario in the low relia-
bility condition. (b) The observed data means (with 95% confi-
dence intervals) for participants’ confidence estimates in each sce-
nario in the high reliability condition. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 291
19
4.11 (a) The observed data means (with 95% confidence intervals) for
participants’ reliability estimates in each scenario in the low reliabil-
ity condition. (b) The observed data means (with 95% confidence
intervals) for participants’ reliability estimates in each scenario in
the high reliability condition. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 293
4.12 (a) The contrasts for the different combinations of the explana-
tion and reliability conditions for participants’ mean confidence
estimates. (b) The contrasts for the participants’ mean reliabil-
ity estimates. NE: no explanation; E: explanation; LR: low reli-
ability; HR: high reliability. P-value indicators: ns := p > .05,
∗ := p ≤ .05, ∗∗ := p ≤ .01, ∗ ∗ ∗ := p ≤ .001. All p-values
were corrected for multiple comparisons using Benjamini and
Hochberg’s false discovery rate (FDR) procedure (Benjamini &
Hochberg, 1995). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 294
A.1 CBN with mutually exclusive and exhaustive causes . . . . . . . . 322
A.2 ‘Split’ CBN from E1 to E2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 323
B.1 Wet Grass BN used in the case study. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 349
B.2 Chest Clinic BN used in the case study. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 351
B.3 False Barrier BN used in the case study. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 353
B.4 Car Diagnosis BN used in the case study. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 355
20
List of Tables
2.1 Inference types and questions found in the questionnaire for Ex-
periment 1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
2.2 Quantitative differences in diagnostic reasoning inferences per
group in Experiment 1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
2.3 Within-group explaining away in Experiment 1. . . . . . . . . . . 116
2.4 A cross-tabulation for correct/incorrect (yes/no) quantitative di-
agnostic reasoning and quantitative relation explaining away as
well as for in line/not in line with (yes/no) the diagnostic split
hypothesis and the (quantitative) propensity hypothesis predic-
tions in Experiment 1. Total N = 386. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
2.5 A cross-tabulation for correct/incorrect (yes/no) qualitative di-
agnostic reasoning and both direct and relational qualitative ex-
plaining away as well as for in line/not in line with (yes/no) the
(qualitative) propensity hypothesis predictions in Experiment 1.
Total N = 386. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
21
2.6 A cross-tabulation for correct/incorrect (yes/no) quantitative
direct explaining away as well as for in line/not in line with
(yes/no) the (quantitative) propensity hypothesis predictions in
Experiment 1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
2.7 Quantitative differences in diagnostic reasoning inferences per
group in Experiment 2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
2.8 Relational explaining away in Experiment 2. . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
2.9 A cross-tabulation for correct/incorrect (yes/no) quantitative di-
agnostic reasoning and quantitative relation explaining away as
well as for in line/not in line with (yes/no) the diagnostic split
hypothesis and the (quantitative) propensity hypothesis predic-
tions in Experiment 2. Total N = 208. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
2.10 A cross-tabulation for correct/incorrect (yes/no) qualitative di-
agnostic reasoning and both direct and relational qualitative ex-
plaining away as well as for in line/not in line with (yes/no) the
(qualitative) propensity hypothesis predictions in Experiment 2.
Total N = 208. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
2.11 A cross-tabulation for correct/incorrect (yes/no) quantitative
direct explaining away as well as for in line/not in line with
(yes/no) the (quantitative) propensity hypothesis predictions in
Experiment 2. Total N = 208. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
2.12 Inference types and questions found in the questionnaire for Ex-
periment 2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
22
2.13 A cross-tabulation for correct/incorrect (yes/no) quantitative di-
agnostic reasoning as well as for in line/not in line with (yes/no)
the diagnostic split hypothesis and the (quantitative) propensity
hypothesis predictions in Experiment 3. Total N = 100. . . . . . . 155
2.14 A cross-tabulation for correct/incorrect (yes/no) qualitative di-
agnostic reasoning as well as for in line/not in line with (yes/no)
the (qualitative) propensity hypothesis predictions in Experi-
ment 3. Total N = 100. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
2.15 Linear mixed effect model results for test questions in Experi-
ment 4 A=Algebra; EL=Evidence learning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186
2.16 MSEs for the full CBN, ‘split’ CBN, and ‘.50’ model in the full
and sequential algebra conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190
2.17 Linear mixed effect model results for test questions in Experi-




People argue. They put forward arguments in virtually all spheres of life.
Ranging from everyday situations (the bacon is burnt because it was cooked for
too long), over political contexts (think of Brexit), to scientific ones (arguing for
the existence of gravitational waves), and a plethora of other domains, people
devise arguments to convince others (and/or themselves) (Hahn & Oaksford,
2012; Mercier & Sperber, 2011). It is then important to consider what consti-
tutes a ‘good’ argument. Why are some arguments better than others? What
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are the standard(s) for evaluating the quality of arguments? A lot of effort has
been put into addressing these questions, with answers coming from different
fields such as philosophy, psychology, linguistics, cognitive science, computer
science (Hahn, 2020).
Explanations, like arguments, are also ubiquitous. They are sought by chil-
dren and adults, in everyday and professional contexts, and are an integral
part of science. We ask ourselves and others why certain events have hap-
pened: why is the road closed?; why is the bacon burnt?; why is the dog bark-
ing?; why is the Zoom meeting not starting?; why is Amazon recommending
this book to me? A doctor may ask why a child is in pain. A lawyer may ask
why a suspect is guilty of the crime that they’ve been accused of. A physicist
may ask why general relativity is a good explanation of the changes in orbits of
a binary pulsar. The propositions that address these requests are explanations
(Lombrozo, 2012). For instance, an explanation for why a child is in pain could
be that it has pulled a muscle; and an explanation for why a Zoom meeting has
not started could be that the host has forgotten that there is one. The impor-
tant question regarding explanations is what constitutes a ‘good’ explanation.
Why are some explanations seem better than others? Are there any features
that are markers of these good explanations? Answers to these questions have
also come from a variety of fields, including philosophy, psychology, cognitive
science, and computer science (Lombrozo, 2012; Tešić & Hahn, in press).
Ubiquity and prevalence are not the only features that are shared between
arguments and explanations. Indeed, arguments and explanations are some-
times thought of as two sides of the same coin (Hempel, 1965). They both may
have the same form and both provide reasons to answer ‘why’ question (Hahn,
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2011). They are both exemplified in reasoning schemes such as the inference to
the best explanation (Harman, 1965). Despite their similarities, arguments and
explanations have often been studied in isolation.
In this thesis I study arguments and explanations in tandem. I explore
(i) some of the impacts of explanations on the confidence we have in certain
claims, distinctly a feature of arguments, (ii) how we explain arguments, and
(iii) how some of the aspects of arguments such as their social nature translate
into explanations and influence the effects of explanations. The contention of
this thesis is that studying arguments and explanations in tandem rather than
in isolation enriches our understanding of both, not least because the aspects
of one can translate into the other and suggest fruitful research avenues.
In this introductory chapter I introduce arguments and explanations and
their relationship. Specifically, I look into what makes a good argument and
how some of the features of arguments translate in the context of explanations.
1.1 Explicating arguments
The main goal of argumentation is changing someone’s beliefs about a partic-
ular standpoint (Hahn, 2011; Van Eemeren, Grootendorst, Johnson, Plantin, &
Willard, 2013). However, even given this unique goal there are different ways
to understand arguments. Much of the philosophical and psychological re-
search on argumentation explicates arguments in terms of rational debate or
an activity of reason where propositions are put forward to justify a specific
standpoint from a perspective of rational evaluation criteria (Hahn & Oaks-
ford, 2012; Van Eemeren et al., 2013). The emphasis here is on rationality and
the rational evaluation criteria where belief changes are due to arguments being
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in line with the rational criteria, implying that the belief change was rational as
well.
Another way to understand arguments is through their actual ability to
change beliefs and persuade people, regardless of whether the argument
changing the beliefs are deemed rational by a particular rationality criterion
or not. This way of explicating arguments is relevant to the psychological re-
search on persuasion (e.g. Maio, Haddock, & Verplanken, 2018).
In this thesis, however, I adopt the former notion of arguments where the
stress is on the rationality and the rational status of arguments. The idea that
arguments have a rational status implies that there is (are) a standard(s) of ra-
tionality against which one can compare the arguments to evaluate their ratio-
nal status. These standards of rationality, or normative frameworks as they are
also called, allow us to judge whether the change in belief that resulted from
there being an argument for a particular standpoint was rational or not. I next
describe two of these normative frameworks.
1.1.1 Classical logic as the standard of argumentation
Consider the following the following argument:
All pigs have a snout.
Snowball is a pig.
Therefore:
Snowball has a snout.
From the perspective of classical logic this argument is valid: namely, it
is impossible for the conclusion (‘Snowball has a snout.’) to be false and the
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premises (a collection of sentences preceding the conclusion, i.e. ‘All pigs have
a snout.’ and ‘Snowball is a pig.’) to be true. If we take logical validity as
the standard of rationality against which we evaluate the quality of arguments,
then the above argument would qualify as a good argument.
Logical validity, however, is a more general concept that deems certain ar-
guments valid not because of the content of the argument, but because of the
structural form the argument takes. The above argument is valid as it is a par-
ticular instantiation of a valid argument form:




Any argument that has the above form would be a valid argument, regardless
of the content of that argument.
The lack of logical validity is, thus, considered to be a marker of bad argu-
ments (Hahn, 2020). Some of the famous logical ‘fallacies’ (Hamblin, 1970) are
often labels as ‘fallacies’ since they lack logical validity.
However, intuitively it is neither the case that all good arguments are valid
arguments nor that all valid arguments are good arguments. For example, if
after a number of laboratory tests one says
The drug is safe because we have no evidence that it is not.
we would consider this a good argument (Hahn & Oaksford, 2007). However,
the argument is not valid: it is possible that the conclusion (‘the drug is safe’)
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is false and the premise (‘no toxic effects of the drug were found in any of the
tests’) is true. Similarly, there are valid arguments that we would not consider
as good arguments. For instance, we would not consider the following argu-
ment as a good argument:
To allow everyone a freedom of speech is advantageous to the State,
because it is highly conducive to the interest of the State that each in-
dividual enjoys a freedom of speech. (adapted from Hansen, 2015)
The argument, however, is valid—the premise and the conclusion have the
same meaning, so whenever the premise is true, the conclusion is also true
(for a discussion on circular arguments see Hahn, Oaksford, & Corner, 2005;
Hahn & Oaksford, 2007). Logical validity, thus, does not seem to capture the
intuitions we have about good arguments. The above examples further suggest
that the quality of arguments does not depend just on their formal structure,
but also on the content of arguments.
The limitations of classical logic as a normative standard for argument eval-
uation was already extensively discussed by Toulmin (1958/2003). To over-
come these limitations, he proposed an influential framework that proved use-
ful in identifying the different components of an argument (see Chapter 3 for
further details). Nonetheless, Toulmin’s framework provides little guidance
on what the evaluating criteria for arguments are and in what way the content
of arguments makes a difference in terms of argument quality, something that
seems lacking in the logic framework as well (Hahn, 2020).
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1.1.2 Bayesian argumentation
We have seen that focusing only on the structural relationships of arguments
does not seem to capture their quality. Thus, a framework that goes be-
yond structural relationships whilst accounting for the content of arguments
is needed. The Bayesian probabilistic framework of argumentation has been
specifically developed with a goal to account for the effects of the content of ar-
guments on their quality (Hahn & Oaksford, 2006, 2007, 2012; Hahn & Hornikx,
2016; Hahn, 2020). The general idea is that argument evaluation is akin to ev-
idence learning: different arguments, just like different pieces of evidence, can
have differential impact on our beliefs depending on how strong an argument
or a piece of evidence is. The greater the impact of an argument on our beliefs
the stronger the argument.
The two cornerstones of Bayesian argumentation (and Bayesianism in gen-
eral, see Hájek & Hartmann, 2010; Hartmann & Sprenger, 2011) are the fol-
lowing. First, probabilities represent degrees of belief. The probability that
some proposition h is true (i.e. P(h)) is representing our degree of belief in h
being true. One of the early consequences of this frameworks is that people
can assign different probabilities to the same propositions. If two people have
different degrees of belief in a certain proposition, then they will assign differ-
ent probabilities to that proposition. Second, people should change their beliefs
about h (i.e. P(h)) in light of evidence e by conditionalizing on e. That is, one’s
new degree of belief in h (i.e. Pnew(h), also known as ‘the posterior probability
of h’) is one’s old degree of belief in h given evidence e (i.e. Pold(h | e)). Bayes’s
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theorem then tells us how to compute Pold(h | e):
Pold(h | e) =
Pold(h) Pold(e | h)
Pold(h) Pold(e | h) + Pold(∼h) Pold(e | ∼h)
(1.1)
In the context of argumentation, e could represent a reason for believing
the proposition/claim/decision h; or in other words, e could be viewed as a
premise (or a set of premises) and h as a conclusion of an argument. How good
an argument from e to h is depends then on the extent to which e increases
one’s degree of belief in h: whenever Pnew(h)(= Pold(h | e)) > Pold(h), then
the premise(s) e provide some support for the conclusion h. The strength of
an argument could then be defined as the posterior probability of the conclu-
sion Pnew(h). To compare the strength of arguments across different claims one
could specify the force of an argument, which could be measured in terms of the
ratio of Pold(e | h) and Pold(e | ∼h) (also called ‘the likelihood ratio’) (Hahn &
Oaksford, 2007), or using some other measures of confirmation (Fitelson, 1999;
Tentori, Crupi, Bonini, & Osherson, 2007).
The framework of Bayesian argumentation has been successfully applied in
different domains of argumentation. It has been particularly useful in expli-
cating the ‘fallacies’ of argumentation, pointing to the aspects of these ‘falla-
cies’ that affect their argument quality, which often varies in different contexts
(Bhatia & Oaksford, 2015; Corner, Hahn, & Oaksford, 2011; Haigh, Wood, &
Stewart, 2016; Hahn & Oaksford, 2006, 2007; Hahn, 2011; Hahn & Hornikx,
2016; Harris, Hsu, & Madsen, 2012; Harris, Corner, & Hahn, 2013; Hoeken,
Timmers, & Schellens, 2012; Hsu, Horng, Griffiths, & Chater, 2017; Jarvstad &
Hahn, 2011).
1.1 Explicating arguments 32
1.1.2.1 The argument from sign
Another approach for evaluating the quality arguments with a specific look at
the content of arguments is the scheme-based approach (for an overview of
this approach see Walton, Reed, & Macagno, 2008). This approach has both
a descriptive and a normative component. The descriptive component aims
to identify different types of arguments or argument schemes. The normative
component seeks to formulate appropriate ‘critical questions’ for each argu-
ment scheme. These critical questions then provide scheme-specific norms in
the sense that the quality of a specific argument is dependent on the responses
an arguer gives to these questions.
I describe both the scheme-based and the Bayesian argumentation approach
in explicating an argument scheme called ‘the argument from sign’. The argu-
ment from sign has the following form (Walton et al., 2008):
A (a finding) is true in this situation.
B is generally indicated as true when its sign, A, is true.
B is true in this situation.
For example, the following is an instantiation of the argument from sign (Hahn
& Hornikx, 2016):
In this situation, there are a large number of people with digital cameras on
the street.
A city, like London, is generally indicated to be a tourist destination when
there are a large number of people with digital cameras on the street.
London is a tourist destination.
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The scheme thus seems to be about the relationship between A and B; more
specifically, about the co-occurrence between A and B. The critical questions
for this argument scheme make the point about the specific relationship be-
tween A and B very clear:
CQ1: What is the strength of the correlation of the sign with the event signi-
fied?
CQ2: Are there other events that would more reliably account for the sign?
The first critical question implies that the correlation between A and B is im-
portant in determining the strength of the argument from sign. Specifically, the
higher the correlation between the two event the stronger the argument. How-
ever, it is not clear from the scheme-based approach how this correlation is to
be attached to the conclusion ‘B is true in this situation’. There are no off-the-
shelf formal tools within the scheme-based approach that would address this.
The second critical questions also calls for a more graded and probabilistic ap-
proach. Namely, the critical question asks the arguer to identify other possible
events that could account for the sign. However, even if one finds these events,
they may plausibly vary in their likelihood. The challenge then is to reflect this
likelihood onto the conclusion.
These challenges are readily addressed by the Bayesian framework (Hahn
& Hornikx, 2016). The correlation between A and B can be expressed using
the conditional probabilities P(B | A) and P(B | ∼A) where one is able to
map the degree of correlation on the (likelihood) ratio of these two conditional
probabilities. The likelihood ratio would then allows us to calculate the force
of an argument from sign, which further enables us to determine the strength
of the argument itself, i.e. the posterior probability of the conclusion.
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In addition, the possibility of other events that could account for the sign
and their likelihood can also be captured within the Bayesian framework.
Bayesian probabilistic inference allows and can account for the interaction of
multiple events (or variables). In the case of CQ2 one is required to compute
the impact of other potential events (let’s label them C) that can explain sign A
on event B. To this end, one could build a Bayesian belief network model of the
phenomenon called ‘explaining away’ (Pearl, 1988). Explaining away occurs
in situations where multiple (independent) causes all compete to account for
a common effect. There, knowing that the common effect holds true, further
learning that one of the causes happened reduces the probability of the other
causes. This reduction in the probability will depend on the prior likelihood of
the causes as well as the force with which they produce there effect (explaining
away and Bayesian networks are discussed in detail in Chapter 2). Explaining
away seems to exactly capture the intention of CQ2. If we think of B and C as
causes of a sign A, then learning there are other events C that could explain sign
A would reduce the strength the conclusion B. Furthermore, one would be able
to quantify the likelihood of events C as well as their impact on the strength of
the conclusion B using Bayesian inference in the Bayesian belief model of the
argument from sign.
This discussion of the argument from sign illustrates some of the short-
comings of the scheme-based approach that are readily addressed within the
Bayesian framework. It demonstrates how one can explicate the force and the
strength of an argument in probabilistic terms. Further, it shows the strength of
an argument depends on the likelihood we assign to particular events, which
in turn depends on the content of the argument itself. It also provides an ex-
1.1 Explicating arguments 35
ample of how arguments could be represented using Bayesian networks mod-
els, specifically the Bayesian network model of explaining away in the case of
the argument from sign. Bayesian networks have also been used to represent
other argument schemes (Hahn, Oaksford, & Harris, 2013; Hahn & Hornikx,
2016; Harris, Hahn, Madsen, & Hsu, 2016) as well as some of the ‘fallacies’ of
argumentation (Hahn & Oaksford, 2006, 2007; Jarvstad & Hahn, 2011) other ar-
guments schemes have also been used. Lastly, through modeling the argument
from sign using the Bayesian network model of explaining away we have al-
ready seen hints of some of the relations between arguments and explanations.
1.1.2.2 Why adopt Bayesian framework as a normative standard?
We have seen that one is able to represent arguments using the Bayesian frame-
work. However, why should one accept the Bayesian framework as a norma-
tive rational standard of argument quality? Why should one change one’s be-
liefs regarding the strength of arguments in line with the Bayesian framework?
The Bayesian framework has its foundation in probability theory. Probabil-
ity theory ensures that our beliefs are coherent with each other and that we do
not end up with an inconsistent set of beliefs. Coherence, however, is not the
only outcome of aligning one’s beliefs with the probability theory. Namely, the
so-called Dutch book theorems show that if one’s degrees of belief obey the ax-
ioms of probability, then if we place bets in line with our degrees of belief, there
is not a set of bets that will incur a sure loss (Ramsey, 2016; Vineberg, 2016). In
other words, making sure that our beliefs align with the axioms of probability
will ensure that we do not place bets against the nature that would results in a
sure loss (Hahn, 2020).
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Furthermore, using conditionalization to update our beliefs in light of new
evidence (i.e. the premises of an argument) will uniquely minimize the inac-
curacy of our beliefs across all possible worlds (that is, regardless of how the
world turns out), on the condition that inaccuracy is measured with a proper
scoring rule, such as the Brier score, and that those worlds are finite (see, e.g.,
the formal results outlined in Pettigrew, 2016). That is, the Bayesian frame-
work specifies how we should change our beliefs, if we wish those beliefs to be
accurate.
The rationality and the normativity of the Bayesian framework then comes
from the fact that a Bayesian agent’s beliefs will be coherent, never resulting in
a sure loss if the agent is to place a bet, and minimally inaccurate.
1.2 Explanations and/as arguments
At the start of this chapter I suggested that explanations and arguments are
similar in that they share certain features. They are both often answers to the
‘why’ questions and include ‘because’ which precedes the provision of argu-
mentative support and the provision of an explanation, and they both consti-
tute reasons (Hahn, 2011). For example,
The LATEX file won’t compile, because there is a bug in my code.
could be considered as an argument for the conclusion that the LATEX file will
not compile as well as an explanation for why the file is not compiling.
It is thus often hard to distinguish between arguments and explanations.
Indeed, some have even identified explanations with arguments. For instance,
one of the most detailed and influential accounts of explanations is due to Carl
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Hempel (Hempel & Oppenheim, 1948; Hempel, 1965). Explanations according
to Hempel are logically valid arguments where premises are sentences which
are “adduced to account for the phenomenon” (also called ‘explanans’) and the
conclusion is a sentence “describing the phenomenon to be explained” (also
called ‘explanandum’) (Hempel, 1965, p. 247). The logically valid argument
from the start of this chapter could also be considered an explanation according
to Hempel:
All pigs have a snout.
Snowball is a pig.
Therefore:
Snowball has a snout.
The above argument would be an explanation for why Snowball has a snout
(explanandum), which is accounted by a set of sentences ‘All pigs have a snout’
and ‘Snowball is a pig’ (explanans).
The close relationship between arguments and explanations is also exem-
plified in non-deductive types of reasoning, such as inference to the best ex-
planation (IBE) (Harman, 1965; Lipton, 2003). IBE plays a crucial role in both
everyday and scientific reasoning contexts, with some even going as far as to
suggest that IBE is the quintessential way of arguing for theories in science (e.g.
Lipton, 2003; Psillos, 2005; Williamson, 2016). To illustrate IBE, imagine that
you leave a piece of cheese on the kitchen table in the evening. The next morn-
ing, you find that the cheese is gone (except for a few crumbs), and you see that
there is a small hole in the bottom of the wall. The best explanation for these
observations is that a mouse visited the kitchen in the night, and you subse-
quently infer the truth of this hypothesis on the basis of its explanatory power
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(the example is due to Van Fraassen, 1980, pp. 19–20). Similarly, Halley (1752)
argued that the best explanation of the observed comets of 1531, 1607, and 1682
was that these observations were all due to a single comet (later named ‘Hal-
ley’s comet’) that made three revolutions in an elliptical orbit around the sun
with a period of 75–76 years.1 That the one-comet hypothesis best explains the
evidence raises our confidence in that hypothesis. The general idea is thus the
following: explanatory considerations are truth-conducive and that a hypothe-
sis is the best explanation is a mark of the truth of that hypothesis. The decades
long debate on whether an explanation exhibiting certain explanatory consid-
erations that other explanations do not should be considered more likely to be
true is still quite present (Douven, 2013; Harman, 1967; Henderson, 2013; Lip-
ton, 2003; Thagard, 1978). Likewise, both the theoretical and empirical work on
explanatory virtues, markers of good explanations, is still ongoing (Douven &
Schupbach, 2015; Lombrozo, 2007; Thagard, 1989; Wojtowicz & DeDeo, 2020).2
IBE is thus another example where arguments and explanation come to-
gether and are difficult to distinguish. However, despite their similarities, there
are also differences between arguments and explanations. For one, the goals of
arguments and explanations seem to be different. Arguments seek to increase
conviction or confidence in a claim or to remove doubt about a claim that has
not been university accepted. Explanations seek to increase understanding of
something that has already been accepted as a fact (Antaki & Leudar, 1992;
Hahn, 2011; Walton, 2004a). Let us consider again the following statement:
1In other words, the one-comet hypothesis is a common cause that is able to explain or
screen off all three events (see ’The principle of the common cause’ or ’conjunctive fork’ in
Reichenbach, 1953/1991; Salmon, 1984).
2Explanatory virtues are discussed in detail in Chapter 3.
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The LATEX file won’t compile, because there is a bug in my code.
If the above is considered an argument, then we do not know yet whether the
file will compile and the goal is to convince someone that it will not. If, on the
other hand, the above statement is considered an explanation, then we already
know that the file does not compile and the goal is to provide understanding
for why that is the case. Antaki and Leudar (1992), however, argue that even
this distinction is sometimes blurred, particularly because whether or not a
statement is interpreted as an argument or as an explanation may depend on
the perceived intentions and assumptions of the speaker.
1.3 Three dimensions of explanation
Arguments and explanations thus often seem similar and closely related, albeit
with some potential differences. What, if anything, can we learn from this re-
lationship between arguments and explanations? What are some of the ways
that arguments and explanations interact?
The answer to these questions will inevitably depend on how someone in-
terprets what an explanation is. The way we understand explanations seems to
vary across different parts of the explanation literature. We have seen that an
explanation is variously a hypothesis or a claim, or evidence that can support
other claims, or an answer to a question. A conceptual map of the different
notions of explanation, thus, could then be useful in helping us better place
the discussion on the relationship between explanations and arguments. I pro-
vide one such map by looking at three distinctions found in the literature on
explanation.
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The first distinction comes from the cognitive science and psychology lit-
erature on explanations. There one can find the view that we can understand
explanations either as products or as processes (see Lombrozo, 2012). From the
product perspective, an explanation is a hypothesis or a claim that accounts for
evidence (explanandum) when prompted to do so. All the explanations that I
have introduced thus far can be considered as products. In contrast, explana-
tions can also be viewed as a cognitive activity (process) that has as its goal to
generate explanation ‘products’. Here the focus is not on the very product of
explanation, but rather on engaging in the particular cognitive activity of try-
ing to explain something. The work on explanations in philosophy and in part
in psychology has mostly focused on explanations as products. The empirical
work in psychology has also studied explanations as processes, mostly focus-
ing on the characterises and consequences of engaging in such a processes on,
for instance, learning (for an overview see Lombrozo, 2012).
Another distinction, mostly stemming from the work in computer science
on expert systems, is between explanations of outputs (evidence) and explana-
tions of inference processes (Lacave & Dı́ez, 2002, provide a detailed overview).
Explanations of outputs or evidence relate to identifying specific factors that
can account for the observed evidence. For example, an explanation of evi-
dence in a medical context would consist of determining (a set of) diseases that
best account for the symptoms, test results, etc. Explanations of inference or
reasoning processes pertain to providing an account of how specific factors (in-
puts) lead to the observed evidence (output). More specifically, they provide
accounts of which inferential steps have been taken (by an AI system) so that
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the factors (input) produce the observed evidence (output).3
Finally, the vast majority of the work on explanation in philosophy, psychol-
ogy, and partly computer science has focused on studying explanation from an
intrapersonal point of view. In other words, explanations have been studied
mostly in isolation and from the perspective of an individual which does not
interact with others in the society. However, in both the everyday and scientific
contexts, we provide explanations to someone else or we receive explanations
from someone else (Hilton, 1990; Lacave & Dı́ez, 2002). In other words, expla-
nations also have a clear interpersonal dimension.4
We can summarize these three distinctions using a graphical representation.
Figure 1.1 provides an illustration. The three distinctions are represented as
the three dimensions of an explanation space. This conceptual representation
of explanations helps us to more easily navigate the discussion regarding the
relationship between arguments and explanations.
The three colored intersection points between the three explanation dimen-
sion in Figure 1.1 are points that are being addressed in this thesis. Each of the
three intersection points is explored in one of the chapters of this thesis. I next
describe each of the intersection points.
1.3.1 Explaining evidence
The discussion regarding the argument from sign has already suggested a po-
tential way in which arguments and explanations relate. The Bayesian treat-
ment of CQ2, which asked for other events (C) that would be able account for
3Chapter 3 provides a detailed discussion of this distinction, with a specific focus on
Bayesian networks.
4Chapter 4 discusses in detail this interpersonal aspect of explanations.
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Figure 1.1: The three dimensions of explanation. The small cubes colored green, or-
ange, and yellow are the points of intersection of these three dimensions that are dis-
cussed in this thesis.
the sign, included modeling the argument from sign using the Bayesian net-
work model of explaining away. The intuition of CQ2 captured by this model
is that learning that some other events C can account for or explain the presence
of the sign affects the probability of the original event B. In other words, by
explaining the sign using other events C, one can change the strength of the ar-
gument for B, implying that explanations can affect the strength of arguments.
We can explicate the notion of explanation in the context of the argument
from sign using the three dimensions of explanation. These explanations are
events or claims and hypotheses in the same manner that the original event B
is a claim or a hypothesis. In that sense, these explanations are products rather
than cognitive processes. Further, the explanations in the context of the argu-
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ment from sign are explanations of the sign which itself is considered to be ev-
idence (or outcome) in the Bayesian argumentation framework, making them
explanations of outcomes. Lastly, the argument from sign is often considered
in an intrapersonal context where the social aspects such as the relationship
between the person providing an argument and the person receiving an argu-
ment is not explicitly accounted for. Therefore, the explanations employed in
the argument from sign are products which explain outcomes (evidence) and
are often made in an intrapersonal context. In Figure 1.1 this intersection is
colored green.
The argument from sign is, however, an instantiation of an even more gen-
eral pattern of causal-probabilistic reasoning, namely explaining away. Ex-
plaining away is potentially then a fruitful ground for the investigation of the
relationships between arguments and explanations as specified in this section.
In Chapter 2 I do exactly that: I discuss explaining away and explore the ways
in which explanations have an effect on confidence in our beliefs.
1.3.2 Explaining the argument
The argument from sign not only illustrates one potential way in which ex-
planations and arguments interact, but it also provides an illustration of how
arguments can be modeled using (causal) Bayesian networks; in particular, the
causal Bayesian network for explaining away can be used to model the argu-
ment from sign.
Now, causal Bayesian networks are considered experts systems (Lacave
& Dı́ez, 2002) where another aspect of explanations is clearly demonstrated.
Namely, often simply finding factors (or variables in the case of Bayesian net-
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works) that account for the evidence or outcomes is not sufficient. What is
sometimes required is an explanation of the reasoning processes, that is an ex-
planation of how certain factors (inputs) lead to evidence or outcomes. This
is sometimes achieved by providing a chain of inference that shows how an
outcomes follows from the inputs (Moulin, Irandoust, Bélanger, & Desbordes,
2002; Scott, Clancey, Davis, & Shortliffe, 1977; Walton, 2004a). To use argu-
mentation terminology, these kinds of explanations show how the evidence
impacts the hypotheses by connecting the evidence and hypotheses via infer-
ential steps, i.e. they explain the inference in an argument.
The explanations of inference processes could still be considered as expla-
nation products, as they are still claims or hypotheses rather then cognitive
processes that people engage in to produce explanation products. Also, sim-
ilarly to the notion of explanations discussed in the previous section they are
often made in an intrapersonal context. In Figure 1.1 the location of these ex-
planation in an explanation space is marked with an orange cube.
In Chapter 3 I explore explanations of reasoning processes in causal
Bayesian networks. As casual Bayesian networks could also be considered
tools for representing, generating and evaluating arguments, the insights
regarding explanations of reasoning processes in causal Bayesian networks
should translate to arguments.
1.3.3 Social explanation
In the previous section explanations of inference processes are considered in an
intrapersonal context, i.e. a context where the social exchange of explanations
is not present. However, argumentation is a social activity. It is present in
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a discourse between two or more people (Van Eemeren et al., 2013). Often,
people provide arguments for a particular claim in order to convince others and
change beliefs of others about the claim. Further, it is not uncommon that some
people are more and some are less convinced by the same arguments. These
are all aspects of the social character of arguments and are explicitly captured
by the Bayesian argumentation framework (Oaksford & Chater, 2020).
If explanations are in many aspects similar to arguments, one would ex-
pect that explanations also have a social aspect. Indeed, both the psychology
and the computer science literature agree that explanations have an important
social aspect (Hilton, 1990; Miller, 2019; Moulin et al., 2002; Tešić & Hahn,
in press). Whether they explain inferences of an AI system or some other in-
ference processes, providing an explanation is a communicative act in that it
includes an explainer (a person or a machine providing an explanation) and an
explainee (a person receiving an explanation). This notion of explanation still
accounts for the inference processes and thus can be considered as an expla-
nation product, but in contrast to the notion of explanations from the previous
section, explanations viewed in this way are distinctly immersed in a social
context. The location of these explanations in the 3-dimensional explanation
space is marked by the yellow cube in Figure 1.1. In Chapter 4 I consider some
of the effects of understanding explanations of reasoning processes in a social
context on our beliefs about particular claims.
1.4 Prospectus
In this thesis I will address the three notions of explanation and their relation-
ship to argument. In Chapter 2 I explore the effects of explaining evidence in
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the context of causal-probabilistic reasoning. I investigate how providing an
explanation of evidence affects the confidence people have in the claims in two
causal models of explaining away. In Chapter 3 I provide further theoretical
background regarding the different notions of explanations. I discuss factors,
such as explanatory virtues, that make explanations ‘good’ explanations. I ex-
plore these factors with respect to the notion of explanations as inference pro-
cesses in the context of causal Bayesian networks. In Chapter 4 I focus on one
of the aspects of explanations when embedded in a social context, namely the
reliability of the explainer. I explore how providing an explanation, the reli-
ability of an explainer, and confidence in beliefs relate and affect each other.
Finally, in Chapter 5 I discuss the findings of this thesis, pointing to some of
the implications and potential directions for future research.
2
Argument and explanation in causal
reasoning
Chapter 1 introduced the three dimensions of explanation: (1) explanations as
products or processes, (2) explanations of outcome or inference, and (3) expla-
nations in an intrapersonal or interpersonal context (see Figure 2.1). In this
chapter, I discuss product explanations made in an intrapersonal context that
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Figure 2.1: The three dimensions of explanation. This chapter discusses the intersec-
tion that corresponds to the green cube.
account for specific outcomes. More specifically, I am going to discuss causal
explanations whereby effects (outcomes) are explained by appealing to causes
that can account for these effects.
One of the most common, and the simplest, way of explaining something is
to appeal to its cause (see Lombrozo & Vasilyeva, 2017, for a review on causal
explanations). For example, a doctor may appeal to a particular class of viruses
(cause) to explain a rash (effect) on a patient’s body or an engineer may appeal
to defects in cast iron (cause) to explain the bridge collapse (effect). However,
it is not uncommon that there may be multiple causes that can account for the
same effect. A rash could be caused both by a viral and a bacterial disease; a
bridge may collapse both because of the defects in cast iron and because the
structure of the bridge was not able to withstand an earthquake. Furthermore,
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the same effect could be caused by multiple independent causes. For instance,
asthma and flu are independent, that is, having asthma does not make one
more or less likely to have flu and vice versa; but both asthma and flu can
cause a cough.
The situations where multiple independent causes can account for the same
effect are particularly pertinent to the question of how explanations and argu-
ment are related. This is because in these situations a pattern of causal reason-
ing called ‘explaining away’ emerges. Namely, learning that one of the inde-
pendent causes happened (whilst knowing that the effect is present) will de-
crease the probability of (confidence in) the other cause even though the causes
are (initially) probabilistically and causally independent. The fact that one of
the cases has happened is sufficient to explain the effect makes the other case
less likely to occur.
In Chapter 1 we have seen how the argument from sign scheme has similar
characteristics to explaining away. What is more, one can even model argument
from sign as an explaining away reasoning (Hahn & Hornikx, 2016). Explain-
ing away is thus a good example of a reasoning schema where explanation and
argument come together. It incorporates diagnostic reasoning—the reasoning
from effect to causes, that is the assessment of the probability of a cause of after
the effect is known to have happened—and intercausal reasoning where addi-
tionally learning that one cause has happened is (i) sufficient to explain away the
effect (evidence) and (ii) it has as a consequence that the probability of (confi-
dence in) the other cause is affected. That is, in explaining away there is a clear
impact of explanations on confidence, where explanations could be thought of
as a certain kind of evidence or premises in an argument. Because explanation
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and argument come together in explaining away, the situations exemplifying
explaining away lend themselves to studying the relationships between expla-
nations and arguments.
The explanations in explaining away have the following simple form: a
cause has happened and as such it has (partially) accounted for the effect. Here,
the explanations account for a specific outcome (i.e. the effect). They are also
products in a sense that these explanations can be thought of as propositions
or judgements that address an explicit request for why the effect happened.
Lastly, explaining away has often been studied in the context of individual and
intrapersonal reasoning rather than social and interpersonal reasoning. In this
chapter, I will also be looking at explaining away from the individual reason-
ing point of view. In the 3-dimensional explanation cube, the explanations in
explaining away situations that I will be focusing on in this chapter are then
viewed as products that account for specific outcomes and are made in an in-
trapersonal context (see Figure 2.1).
The chapter has two parts. In the first part I focus on explaining away in the
form that is often studied in the literature: two causes and one common effect.
There, I introduce explaining away as a pattern of reasoning and provide an
overview of empirical work on explaining away. I further empirically test two
hypothesis that aim to account for the empirical findings regarding explaining
away. In the second part, I discuss an extension of explaining away to situations
where multiple effects could be accounted for by the same causes. In particular,
I focus on a (causal) structure where there are two causes and two common
effects. Here, I discuss different ways to model these kinds of situations. The
prediction of the different models are then empirically tested.
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2.1 Explaining away: Accounting for a single com-
mon effect1
2.1.1 Introduction
Every day we make numerous judgements and inferences that rely on our
beliefs about how events or items of information are causally related to each
other. For example, on the way to work people may think of possible causes
that could lead them to be late to an important meeting such as heavy traffic,
a broken elevator, or adverse weather conditions. It is not rare that there may
be many possible causes and effects that are interconnected in a ‘causal web’,
which makes these judgments difficult to make (see e.g. Cruz et al., 2020).
The complexity of causal webs is not the only aspect of causal reason-
ing that makes it hard. Many of the causal judgment also occur under uncer-
tainty and getting the causal-probabilistic judgements right is then exceedingly
hard. However, having correct causal judgements is important, particularly in
specialized contexts where getting them wrong can lead to deleterious conse-
quences. Consider, for instance, a real-world scenario in which a social worker
is trying to ascertain whether action should be taken to remove a child display-
ing bruises from the custody of his parents under the suspicion that he is being
physically abused. From her experience, the social worker knows that bruises
could also be the product of alternative independent causes, one of which is a
rare blood disorder ‘haemophilia’. Since she does not know for certain whether
1This section is based on work from Tešić, Liefgreen, and Lagnado (2020) and Liefgreen and
Tešić (in press).
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the child was physically abused and/or whether he suffers from haemophilia,
but she knows of the presence of bruises, she increases the probability of each
potential cause. If after a medical examination the social worker found out
that the child definitely suffers from haemophilia, then the probability of the
child being physically abused would decrease, since haemophilia is sufficient
to explain the bruises. If on the other hand the medical examination revealed
that the child definitely does not suffer from haemophilia, then the probability
of the child being abused would further increase as a result.2 This scenario il-
lustrates a pattern of reasoning known that I have mentioned in the beginning
of this chapter, i.e. explaining away.3 In more general terms, explaining away
describes a situation in which multiple independent causes (e.g. physical abuse
and haemophilia) compete to explain a common effect (e.g. bruises). After ob-
serving the occurrence of the effect, the probability of the two causes increases.
Subsequently, after learning of the occurrence of one cause (the child suffers
from haemophilia) the probability of the alternative cause(s) decreases (phys-
ical abuse). If, conversely, we learned that a cause did not happen (the child
does not suffer from haemophilia), the probability of the other cause(s) further
increases (physical abuse).
2The importance of understanding explaining away relationships in these contexts is clearly
reflected in the American Academy of Pediatrics’ (AAP) clinical report where conducting lab-
oratory evaluations with the understanding that presence of a bleeding disorder does not rule
out physical abuse is highly emphasized (Anderst, Carpenter, & Abshire, 2013). Furthermore,
the AAP also warns physicians that inappropriate diagnostics of child abuse can lead to the
potential prosecution of an innocent person.
3A related concept to explaining away is discounting. For the distinction between the two
concepts see Khemlani and Oppenheimer (2011), Rehder and Waldmann (2017), Rottman and
Hastie (2014).
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The above example of causal-probabilistic reasoning involves only two
causes and one common effect; but even this causal situation with a seemingly
simple causal web leads many people to erroneous reasoning. In this part of
Chapter 2, I will discuss why people get the causal-probabilistic judgements
in explaining away situations wrong. I start by briefly introducing Causal
Bayesian Networks (CBNs), a tool for graphical representation of causal-
probabilistic relations and causal-probabilistic reasoning. I will then present a
CBN model for explaining away. Next, I will outline previous empirical work
on explaining away in the psychological literature and point to the potential
shortcomings of this work. Finally, I will discuss motivations and details of the
experimental work presented in this part.
2.1.2 Causal Bayesian networks
Bayesian networks are a tool for graphical representation of probabilistic re-
lationships among a number of variables and for making inference regarding
these variables (Neapolitan, 2003; Pearl, 1988). They are directed acyclic graphs
(DAGs) with nodes representing random variables4 and arrows pointing only
in one direction (hence directed) and encoding probabilistic (in)dependency re-
lations between variables. Furthermore, in Bayesian networks there cannot be
a path that, following the arrows, starts and finishes at the same node (hence
acyclic). When arrows also have a causal interpretation, that is when an arrow
between two nodes implies not just that one variable (say variable B) is proba-
4In this thesis, all random variables in CBNs are binary: a random variable X (denoted by
italicized letters) can take exactly two values X or∼X (denoted by non-italicized letters), where
X indicates that X is present and ∼X indicates that X is absent.
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bilistically dependent on the other (say variable A), but also that B is causally
dependent A (or A is a cause of B), then we say that Bayesian network is a
causal one (i.e. a CBN).
PCRSARS-CoV-2
Figure 2.2: An example of CBN model.
For example, the network in Figure 2.2 is a causal Bayesian network. It has
two nodes representing two random variables SARS-CoV-2 and PCR, each tak-
ing two values: SARS-CoV-2 (indicating that a person does have SARS-CoV-2
virus) and∼SARS-CoV-2 (indicating that a person does not have the virus) and
PCR (indicating a positive PCR test result) and ∼PCR (indicating a negative
PCR test result). The arrow between the two variables indicates the causal-
probabilistic relationship between them: the results of a PCT test are proba-
bilistically and causally dependent on whether someone has the virus.
In order to perform quantitative computations using a CBN, one needs to
fully parameterize the CBNs by specifying (i) the prior probabilities (or pri-
ors) of all root nodes, i.e. nodes that do not have incoming arrows and (ii)
the conditional probabilities of each remaining node given all the values of
their direct causes, i.e. nodes they are directly linked to. In the network in
Figure 2.2, the node SARS-CoV-2 is a root and one thus needs to specify the
prior probability of a person having SARS-CoV-2, that is, the probability that
a person has the virus before seeing the PCR test results (formally written as
P(SARS-CoV-2)). This could be a proportion of people in the population that
have the virus (which is hard to estimate), but it can also be a clinician’s be-
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lief that a specific person has the virus before seeing their test results.5 As
the SARS-CoV-2 variable is binary, the prior probability that a person does not
have the virus is simply 1− P(SARS-CoV-2). To complete the parameteriza-
tion of the network in Figure 2.2 one would also need to specify the probability
that a person receives a positive PCR test given that they have the virus: this
is known as the true positive or sensitivity rate and is formally written as
P(PCR | SARS-CoV-2); and the probability that the person receives a posi-
tive PCR test given that they do not have the virus: this is known as the false
positive rate rate and is formally written as P(PCR | ∼SARS-CoV-2). The prob-
ability that a person receives a negative PCR test given that they have the virus
i.e. P(∼PCR | SARS-CoV-2) (known as the false negative rate) and the proba-
bility that a person receives a negative PCR test given that they do not have the
virus, i.e. P(∼PCR | ∼SARS-CoV-2) (known as the true negative or specificity
rate) are simply 1− P(PCR | SARS-CoV-2) and 1− P(PCR | ∼SARS-CoV-2)
respectively.
The true positive and false positive rates describe the operating characteris-
tics of a test and can be used to assess the strength of a test. When the ratio of
P(PCR | SARS-CoV-2) and P(PCR | ∼SARS-CoV-2)—also known as the like-
lihood ratio—is greater than 1, the higher the ratio, the stronger the evidence
for the virus from a positive test. A likelihood ratio that is equal to 1 would
indicate that a positive (or a negative) test is completely uninformative with
regards to whether the person has the virus or not; and a positive result from
a test with the likelihood ratio that is lower than 1 would make it more likely
5For example, Watson, Whiting, and Brush (2020) provide advice to clinicians on the vari-
ably of priors among different people and their importance in interpreting COVID-19 test re-
sults.
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that a person does not have the virus.
After all the parameters are specified, one can perform quantitative compu-
tations. For instance, one can calculate the probability that a person has SRAS-
CoV-2 after receiving a positive PCR test (known as the posterior probability of
SARS-CoV-2). In our example, this would be the conditional probability that
the person is infected with SARS-CoV-2 given a positive PCT test result, for-
mally written as P(SARS-CoV-2 | PCR).6 This conditional probability would
then be taken as the new prior probability that a person has the virus and used
in further calculations: Pnew(SARS-CoV-2) := Pold(SARS-CoV-2 | PCR). The
conditional probability of a person being infected with the virus given a posi-
tive test result is calculated using the Bayes’ theorem:
P(SARS-CoV-2 | PCR) = P(SARS-CoV-2)× P(PCR | SARS-CoV-2)
P(PCR)
(2.1)
I have already introduced all terms in Bayes’ theorem with the exception of
P(PCR) which is the prior probability that a person receives a positive PCT
test result. However, one can calculate that probability by using the law
of total probability: P(PCR) = P(SARS-CoV-2) × P(PCR | SARS-CoV-2) +
P(∼SARS-CoV-2)× P(PCR | ∼SARS-CoV-2). Therefore, Bayes’ theorem effec-
tively combines together the prior (that is, our confidence that a person has the
6Note, however, that the posterior probability and the conditional probability are not al-
ways equivalent. For example, a clinician could have initially told to a patient that they
have tested positive and communicated the probability of SARS-CoV-2 under this condition,
i.e. P(SARS-CoV-2 | PCR). At a later point in time, the clinician could realise that they have
mistaken the patient’s test result with someone else’s and that the test results of the patient in
question are still unknown. In this case, the new, posterior probability of the patient having
been infected with the virus is the unconditional probability P(SARS-CoV-2).
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virus before seeing the test results) and the likelihoods (that is, the evidential
strength of a test result) to calculate the posterior probability (that is, our new
updated confidence in a person having the virus following the test results).
Using Bayes’ theorem to calculate the probability that a person is infected
with SARS-CoV-2 after receiving a positive PCT test result is an instance of
diagnostic reasoning (Meder & Mayrhofer, 2017b). In diagnostic reasoning, one
is aiming to estimate the probability of a cause after learning that the effect has
occurred. It is a reasoning from effects to causes. Bayesian networks, however,
can also be used to calculate the probability of an effect after learning that the
cause has occurred. This kind of reasoning, from causes to effects, is called
predictive reasoning. In the very simple 2-node example from Figure 2.2, the
probability that a person tests positive given that they have the virus is simply
the likelihood used to parameterize the CBN: that is P(PCR | SARS-CoV-2).
One can, however, easily imagine more complex situations where a person
gets tested multiple times and receives multiple test results. Figure 2.3 depicts
a CBN model for a situations where the same person gets tested on two differ-
ent occasions and receives two PCR test results. Here, after receiving a positive
PCR1 test result, one would, via diagnostic reasoning, estimate the new prob-
ability that the person is infected with SARS-CoV-2. However, the change in
the probability that the person has SARS-CoV-2 would result in a change in
the probability that the person would test positive (or negative) on the second
PCR2 test. This new probability of a person receiving a positive PCR2 test is
estimated via predictive reasoning and is most likely going to be different from
the likelihood P(PCR2 | SARS-CoV-2) used to parameterize the CBN.
The CBN in Figure 2.3 illustrates another fundamental concept in causal rea-
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SARS-CoV-2
PCR1 PCR2
Figure 2.3: An example of a CBN model with a common cause.
soning. I have argued that learning the outcome of PCR1 would affect the prob-
ability of the outcome of PCR2 even though the two tests are in a sense indepen-
dent; or symbolically, P(PCR2 | PCR1) 6= P(PCR2). This is because learning
the outcome of PCR1 would change the probability of the person having been
infected with SARS-CoV-2, which in turn would affect the probability of the
outcome of PCR2. If, however, we first learned that the person has definitely
been infected with SARS-CoV-2, then additionally learning that PCR1 test re-
sult was positive would not change the probability of the outcome of PCR2
test; or symbolically, P(PCR2 | SARS-Cov-2, PCR1) = P(PCR2 | SARS-CoV-2).
This is because additionally learning that the person received a positive PCR1
test result cannot change the probability that the person is infected with SARS-
CoV-2 (since we already know that they have definitely been infected with the
virus), which then in turn would not change the probability of the outcome of
PCR2 test. In other words, knowing the state of a common cause makes the
effects conditionally independent.
The following often mentioned example can help further illustrate the no-
tion of conditional independence. Imagine that data analysts have found that
ice cream sales and shark attacks are positively correlated: more shark attacks
correspond to more ice creams sold. However, the data analysts have also
found that shark attacks and ice cream sales have a common cause, namely
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temperature. The higher the temperature the more people crave the cold snack
increasing its sales and higher temperatures mean more people will be visit-
ing beaches which implies more opportunities for shark attacks. Therefore,
the temperature is able to explain the correlation between ice cream sales and
shark attacks and knowing the temperature will result in ice cream sales and
shark attacks being conditionally independent; in other words, controlling for
temperature will result in ice cream sales and shark attacks being uncorrelated.
Two variables are not only conditionally independent when they share a
common cause. They are also conditionally independent if they are arranged
in a causal chain and there is a third variable between them. Knowing the
state of that third variable would ‘block’ the impact of the first variable on
the second one the same way knowing that a person has been infected with
SARS-CoV-2 block the impact of learning the outcome of PCR1 on the out-
come of PCR2. For example, the CBN in Figure 2.4 models a causal chain
situation where the outcome of a PCR test can cause a person to self-isolate,
which in turn can cause them to work from home. In this situation, if we
do not know whether the person is self-isolating or not, but we do know that
they have tested negative for the virus, the fact that they have tested negative
will impact the probability of them working from home, as knowing that they
have tested negative would presumably change the probability of them self-
isolating, which in turn would change the probability that they are working
from home; or P(Work from home | ∼PCR) 6= P(Work from home). How-
ever, if we know that the person is self-isolating, additionally learning of their
PCR test result will not change the probability that they are working from
home, or P(Work from home | Self-isolation,∼PCR) = P(Work from home |
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Self-isolation). This is because we already know with probability 1 that the per-
son is self-isolating and additionally knowing the result of their PCR test will
not change that probability, which means that the probability that the person
is working from home will be unchanged by additionally learning the result of
a PCR test.7 We then say that the variable Working from home is conditionally





Figure 2.4: An example of a CBN model of a causal chain.
The notion of conditional independence in CBNs is not specific to particu-
lar causal structures. Rather, it is captured by a more general principle called
’the Parental Markov Condition’ (PMC) that applies to all CBNs. The PMC
can be formulated as follows: a variable X in a CBN is conditionally indepen-
dent from its non-descendants given its parents. Formally, this implies that
P(X | Parents, Non-descendants) = P(X | Parents). A node in CBN is a parent
of a child node if there is an arrow going from the former to the latter. If there
is a chain of nodes in a CBN, then a node that appears earlier in the chain is an
ancestor of a node that appears later in the chain, and a node is a descendant of
7It is, of course, possible that we learn evidence with the probability that is less than 1,
i.e. that we learn uncertain evidence. For example, we may not be fully sure whether a person
is in self-isolation, but we have been told by multiple sources that they are, which makes us
90% confident that the person actually is in self-isolation. For how to update probabilities with
uncertain evidence see Korb and Nicholson (2010).
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another node if it appears later in the chain than the other node. For instance,
in the CBN in Figure 2.4 the PCR is a parent node of Self-isolation and Self-
isolation is a parent node of Work from home. PCR, however, is not a parent node
of Work from home, but is its ancestor and Work from home is not a child node
of PCR, but is its descendant. In the CBN in Figure 2.3, PCR1 and PCR2 are
child and descendant nodes of their parent node SARS-CoV-2 and PCR1 is nei-
ther an ancestor nor a descendant of PCR2. In the CBN in Figure 2.4, the only
variable that has non-descendants is Work from home, namely PCR. Therefore,
the PMC implies only one conditional independence relation for that network,
i.e. P(Work from home | Self-isolation, PCR) = P(Work from home | Self-isolation).8
In the CBN in Figure 2.3, two variables have non-descendants: the non-
descendant of PCR1 is PCR2 and the non-descendant of PCR2 is PCR1. This
means that the PMC implies two conditional independence relations for that
CBN: P(PCR1 | SARS-CoV-2, PCR2) = P(PCR1 | SARS-CoV-2) and P(PCR2 |
SARS-CoV-2, PCR1) = P(PCR2 | SARS-CoV-2).
Identifying conditional independence in a CBN using the PMC makes the
computations of the joint probability distribution a lot less cumbersome. For
instance, image a person that is tested three times for the SARS-CoV-2 virus.
The CBN corresponding to this situations is presented in Figure 2.5.
8Note here the conditional independence is over variables not variables states. This is be-
cause the conditional independence relations hold for any combination of outcome of the three
variables. Further, intuitively it seems that the reverse also holds, that is if we know that the
person is in self-isolation, additionally learning that they are working from home will not affect
the probability of them testing positive (or negative) for the virus. This is also true, but it is not
captured by the PMC. To identify all conditional independence relations in a CBN, one can use
the method called d-separation. For more details see Neapolitan (2003).





Figure 2.5: An example of a CBN model with a common cause and three effects.
To calculate the join probability distribution of all four variables,
i.e. to calculate P(SARS-CoV-2, PCR1, PCR2, PCR3), one could use
the chain rule from the probability theory. This rule implies that
P(SARS-CoV-2, PCR1, PCR2, PCR3) = P(PCR3 | PCR2, PCR1, SARS-CoV-2)×
P(PCR2 | PCR1, SARS-CoV-2) × P(PCR1 | SARS-CoV-2) × P(SARS-CoV-2).
Estimating some of these conditional probabilities is notoriously hard,
which makes the estimate of the joint probability distribution less reli-
able. The PMC significantly simplifies the estimation of these conditional
probabilities as it implies that the three PCR test are conditionally indepen-
dent of each other given their parent node SARS-CoV-2. This means that
P(SARS-CoV-2, PCR1, PCR2, PCR3) = P(PCR3 | SARS-CoV-2) × P(PCR2 |
SARS-CoV-2) × P(PCR1 | SARS-CoV-2) × P(SARS-CoV-2). Estimating these
conditional probabilities is significantly easier, which makes the final estimate
of the joint probability distribution more reliable. We can imagine situations
where a CBN model includes a dozen or more variables where the application
of the chain rule to calculate the joint probability distribution would leave
us with conditional probabilities whose estimations would be practically im-
possible. The PMC can drastically reduce the complexity of these conditional
probabilities and make their estimation significantly less difficult.
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The CBNs thus have a number of features that make them quite appeal-
ing: (i) one can graphically represent the causal situations one is is trying to rea-
son about by assigning a node to each variable/event and drawing arrows be-
tween the nodes to illustrate the causal relations between the variables/events;
(ii) one can visually read off the conditional independence relations that hold
among the variables/events; and (iii) the PMC and other methods for identi-
fying conditional independences among the variables enable one to estimate
the conditional probabilities with less effort then one otherwise would, partic-
ularly in more complex causal situations.
I will conclude this section on CBNs with a brief discussion of the normative
aspect of CBNs. All probability distributions in CBNs are consistent with the
axioms of classical probability. Therefore, the person reasoning using a CBN
model cannot be Dutch booked. Furthermore, to update the probabilities the
CBNs employ Bayes’ theorem (and other theorems from probability theory),
which implies that a person updating their beliefs using a CBN model would
be minimizing their inaccuracy as discussed in Chapter 1. These features of
CBN models provide us with a normative aspect that some other modeling
strategies may lack. It then follows that the predictions from a CBN can be
considered normative, particularly in cases where it is clear how one would
model a particular causal situation.
2.1.3 Explaining away: normative account
In the previous section I have discussed two types of reasoning that feature in
CBNs, the diagnostic and predictive reasoning. The third main type of reason-
ing that also occurs in CBNs is intercausal reasoning.
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E
C1 C2
Figure 2.6: A CBN model of explaining away
Consider the graph in Figure 2.6, typically referred to as a common-effect
CBN. It consists of three nodes representing three random variables: two
causes, C1 and C2, and one common effect, E. The graph is directed and acyclic
and since C1 and C2 are interpreted as causes and E as an effect, the arrows have
a causal interpretation making the DAG a CBN. To fully parametrize this CBN,
one needs to specify the prior probabilities of the two causes, i.e. P(C1) and
P(C2), as well as the conditional probabilities of the effect E given the presence
and/or absence of each cause, i.e. P(E | C1, C2), P(E | C1,∼C2), P(E | ∼C1, C2),
and P(E | ∼C1,∼C2). Once one specifies these parameters, one can not only
compute the probability of a cause given the effect, e.g. P(C1 | E) (diagnos-
tic reasoning) and the probability of an effect given one cause, e.g. P(E | C2)
(predictive reasoning), but also the probability of one cause given the other
cause, e.g. P(C1 | C2) and the probability of one cause given the other cause
and the effect, e.g. P(C1 | E, C2). The estimation of the latter two probabilities
constitutes instances of intercausal reasoning, that is reasoning from one cause
to another.
As with any CBN, we can apply the PMC to the CBN in Figure 2.6. Two
variables have non-descendants in this CBN: C2 is a non-descendant of C1 and
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C1 is a non-descendants of C2. However, unlike in the CBNs that we have dis-
cussed in the previous section, C1 and C2 have no parents. By the PMC, this
means that C1 is independent from C2 given an empty set and that C2 is inde-
pendent from C1 also given an empty set; that is, C1 and C2 are unconditionally
independent. In other words, not knowing the state of the common effect vari-
able E, learning that C1 is present or absent does not affect the probability of C2
being present or absent and vice versa (or P(Ci | Cj) = P(Ci) where i ∈ {1, 2}
for any value of Ci and Cj).
So far, the common-effect CBN seems to align with what been said regard-
ing conditional independence. The common-effect CBNs, however, include
the following feature specific to them that makes intercausal reasoning partic-
ularly interesting. Namely, depending on the network parameterization, the
two causes in a common-effect CBN that are, per the PMC, initially uncondi-
tionally independent may become conditionally dependent if we learn that the
effect has happened; that is, upon learning that E is either present or absent, the
presence or absence of C1 may affect the probability of C2 being present or ab-
sent and vice versa. This is in contrast to the cases of conditional independence
implied by the PMC in the CBNs in the previous section where two variables
are conditionally independent regardless of how the network is parameterized
and they do not become conditionally dependent because we learned that a
variable has taken a particular state.
This brings us to explaining away. In Section 2.1.1 I have briefly introduced
explaining away where I mentioned that it is a pattern of causal reasoning that
occurs in situations where multiple causes compete to account for an effect.
I have also pointed out that in explaining away, after we learn that an effect
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has occurred, additionally learning that one of the causes has happened is suf-
ficient to explain the effect, which would in turn affect the probability of the
other cause, and more specifically it will reduce the probability of the other
cause. Explaining away, thus, is an instance of intercausal reasoning and it can
be modeled using common-effect CBN models such as the one in Figure 2.6
(see Pearl, 1988, 2009). For instance, we could model the example of explaining
away involving physical abuse, haemophilia and bruises from Section 2.1.1 by
representing physical abuse as C1, haemophilia as C2, and finally the bruises
on the body as E. The two causes are (unconditionally) independent when we
do not know whether the child has bruises on his body or not, which follows
our intuitions that physical abuse and haemophilia cannot probabilistically in-
fluence each other, before learning anything about the bruises. Once we learn
that the child has bruises on his body, we update the probabilities of the two
causes via diagnostic reasoning. The fact that the child has bruises on his body,
now renders the two causes conditionally dependent, since, as per explaining
away, additionally learning that the child is suffering from haemophilia would
change (decrease) the probability that the child has been physically abused.
Common-effect CBNs, however, do not always lead to the pattern of ex-
plaining away where after observing the effect, additionally learning one cause
decreases the probability of the other. This is only the case when CBNs are pa-
rameterized such that the following inequality holds (see Wellman & Henrion,
1993):
P(E | Ci, Cj) P(E | ∼Ci,∼Cj) < P(E | Ci,∼Cj) P(E | ∼Ci, Cj) (2.2)
for i, j ∈ {1, 2}; or in words, the product of the probability of evidence knowing
both causes are true and the probability of evidence knowing neither cause is
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true is strictly less than the product of evidence knowing only one cause is true
and the other false and the probability of evidence knowing the other cause is
true and the first one is false. From Inequality (2.2) it follows (see Morris &
Larrick, 1995; Griffiths, 2001):
P(Ci | E, Cj) < P(Ci | E) < P(Ci | E,∼Cj) (2.3)
The inequalities in (2.3) accord with the general intuition of explaining away
mentioned above and I take them as a definition of explaining away for the
empirical research outlined in the this chapter (see also Rehder & Waldmann,
2017; Rottman & Hastie, 2016).
Before concluding this section and continuing onto the review of the em-
pirical work regarding explaining away, I would like to make the following
observations. It is often assumed (and empirical studies have been conducted
with this assumption in mind) that explaining away situations hold when both
causes are generative: the probability of evidence given a cause is greater than
the prior probability of evidence (i.e. P(E | Ci) > P(E)) (Cheng, 1997). This is
true, meaning that Inequality (2.2) (and hence the inequalities in (2.3)) holds
if the causes are generative. However, it is also the case that Inequality (2.2)
holds if both or one of the causes is inhibitory, i.e. when the probability of
evidence given that cause is less than the prior probability of evidence or
P(E | Ci) < P(E).9 For example, sneezing can be prevented by taking anti-
histamine drugs and/or by turning on an air filtration system. Learning that
9Here I am not claiming that if P(E | Ci) > P(E) then the cause is generative and if
P(E | Ci) < P(E) then the cause is inhibitory, as the two events can be positively or nega-
tively correlated without them being causally related. Rather, I am taking that if a cause is
generative, then P(E | Ci) > P(E) and if a cause is inhibitory then P(E | Ci) < P(E).
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a person is sneezing will decrease the probability of them taking antihistamine
drugs and will decrease the probability that the air filtration system is on in the
space they occupy (i.e. P(E | Ci) < P(E) for both causes). However, addition-
ally learning that a person is taking antihistamine drugs will further reduce the
probability of the air filtration system being on, i.e. P(Ci | E, Cj) < P(Ci | E),
since the probability of sneezing is lower when both the person is taking the an-
tihistamine drugs and the air filtration system is on than when the person is just
taking the antihistamine drugs but the air flirtation system is off. Conversely,
if we instead learnt that the person is not taking the antihistamine drugs then
probability of the air flirtation system being on will go back closer to its prior. In
this case, P(Ci | E) < P(Ci | E,∼Cj) since the probability of sneezing is higher
if the person is not taking the antihistamine drugs and the filtration system is
off than if they are not taking the antihistamine drugs but the filtration system
is on. More technical details on when Inequality (2.2) holds with regards to the
generative/inhibitory nature of causes are presented in Appendix A.1.
Although the above are interesting considerations, in this chapter I exclu-
sively refer to, and focus on, generative causes.
2.1.4 Explaining away: empirical account
Despite the ubiquity and importance of explaining away in a wide range of
contexts, including social attribution, medical diagnosis and legal domains
(Kelley, 1973; Pearl, 1988; Rottman & Hastie, 2016), empirical research on ex-
plaining away in the psychological sciences adopting the constrained defini-
tion outlined by the inequalities in (2.3) is somewhat limited and has insofar
yielded mixed findings (for an overview see Rottman & Hastie, 2014). Over-
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all, however, it appears that human explaining away inference, even in simple
three-node common-effect causal structures (see Figure 2.6), is fallible, thus em-
phasizing the significance of further investigating this evasive phenomenon.
Most of the studies exploring explaining away have reported that peo-
ple explain away insufficiently or not at all, meaning that after learning that
one cause has happened people underadjust the probability of the other cause
(Davis & Rehder, 2017; Fernbach & Rehder, 2013; Morris & Larrick, 1995; Re-
hder & Waldmann, 2017; Rottman & Hastie, 2016; Sussman & Oppenheimer,
2011); in some cases, the studies have recorded a behaviour directly opposite
to that of explaining away: P(Ci | E, Cj) > P(Ci | E,∼Cj) (Fernbach & Rehder,
2013; Rehder, 2014a) or P(Ci | E, Cj) > P(Ci | E) (Rottman & Hastie, 2016, Ex-
periment 1a). Importantly, the insufficiency of explaining away remains ro-
bust across the different methodologies utilised by researchers. For example,
Rottman and Hastie (2016) taught participants the statistical parameters of the
variables in the common-effect structure through experience-based trials, com-
plemented by written and graphical information. By contrast, Fernbach and
Rehder (2013, Experiment 3) provided participants with explicit information on
the structure in textual and graphical formats only. Finally, Rehder and Wald-
mann (2017) compared three different formatting methods to convey infor-
mation to the participants: description-only (written description of the causal
model, without communicating parameters), experience-only (data regarding
the parameters presented in a tabular format without the causal structure),
and description-experience (combination of the former two formats). Similarly,
people’s error-prone explaining away behaviour is seemingly persistent over
different probability elicitation methods. Typically, studies have elicited proba-
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bilities from participants in the form of numerical estimates (Rottman & Hastie,
2016). Other methods that have been used include a verbal point scale or in-
ference ratings (Fernbach & Rehder, 2013; Sussman & Oppenheimer, 2011) and
qualitative forced choice responses in which participants are required to select
which one of two situations is more likely to have a certain variable present, on
the basis of the states of the other variables (Rehder, 2014a). Despite the use of
different information presentation formats and belief elicitation methods, all of
the above-mentioned studies reported insufficient explaining away.
2.1.5 Limitations of previous studies
Although the empirical studies on explaining away speak to the robustness
of people’s deviation from the normative model, it is worth mentioning some
limitations that are commonly found in these studies.
2.1.5.1 Prior probabilities of causes
The majority of the studies neither convey nor elicit prior probabilities to par-
ticipants (see Rottman & Hastie, 2014), making it difficult to compare partici-
pants’ inferences to the normative model since it is unclear what prior probabil-
ities participants assumed. In some cases, authors expected their participants
to infer information on the priors of causes, but never elicited their estimates,
therefore leaving unclear whether participants had accepted them (e.g. Rehder
& Waldmann, 2017). Exceptions to this trend are the few studies that explic-
itly stated and subsequently elicited priors from participants (Liefgreen, Tešić,
& Lagnado, 2018), or utilised participants’ own prior probability estimates to
calculate the normative benchmark probabilities pertaining to explaining away
2.1 Explaining away: Accounting for a single common effect 71
(Morris & Larrick, 1995).
The importance of adopting transparency when dealing with priors in em-
pirical studies of explaining away also lies in the fact that priors in most
cases directly dictate the amount of explaining away found in the norma-
tive model (see Morris & Larrick, 1995). Typically, lower priors imply a
larger amount of explaining away than higher priors, since ∆1 and ∆2 are
usually larger when the priors are lower than when they are higher, where
∆1 = P(Ci | E) − P(Ci | E, Cj) and ∆2 = P(Ci | E,∼Cj) − P(Ci | E) (see Fig-
ure 2.7). As really high prior probabilities lead to minimal amounts of explain-
ing away in the normative model, even if participants adopted the priors given
to them and engaged in the correct pattern of inference, explaining away would
most probably remain undetected. This suggests that for the normative amount
of explaining away in the model to be accurately computed (and thus for the
comparisons to the normative model to be informative), it is crucial to know
what priors are being utilised in experiments, both by participants and by ex-
perimenters. Although most studies have not taken these points into consid-
eration, there are a few exceptions, which should encourage researchers to use
similar approaches. For example, some authors manipulated the prior proba-
bilities of causes to reflect different amounts of normative explaining away (e.g.
Rottman & Hastie, 2016) and others purposefully utilised low priors in order to
increase the amount of explaining away in their normative model (e.g. Rehder
& Waldmann, 2017).
In this chapter I address these issues by (i) providing participants with ex-
plicit priors and subsequently re-eliciting these to ensure they have been ac-
cepted and (ii) assigning different priors ranging from low to high to the causes














∆1 = P (Ci | E) − P (Ci | E, Cj) ∆2 = P (Ci | E, ~Cj) − P (Ci | E)
Figure 2.7: The difference ∆1 = P(Ci | E) − P(Ci | E, Cj) and ∆2 = P(Ci | E,∼Cj) −
P(Ci | E) as a function of the priors (P(Ci)). The prior probabilities of the causes are
assumed to be equal in this figure. Further, the figure assumes deterministic set-up,
i.e., P(E | C1, C2) = P(E | Ci,∼Cj) = 1 (where i, j ∈ {1, 2}), and P(E | ∼C1,∼C2) = 0.
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in the model to vary the normative amount of explaining away.
2.1.5.2 Independence of causes
A second matter that could be contributing to the pervasive insufficiency of
explaining away pertains to the reported systematic violation of the condition
of independence in studies exploring explaining away in common-effect struc-
tures, i.e. P(Ci | Cj) 6= P(Ci | ∼Cj) (Rehder, 2011, 2014a, 2014b; Rehder & Bur-
nett, 2005; Rehder & Waldmann, 2017, Description-only condition; Rottman &
Hastie, 2016, Experiment 1b). In these cases, participants seem to be regarding
the two causes to be initially dependent, typically reporting a positive corre-
lation between them. Now, a positive correlation between the causes would
significantly lower the amount of explaining away in the normative model.
Generally, the higher the degree of positive correlation, the lower the norma-
tive amount of explaining away, with very high degrees of positive correlation
potentially leading to a pattern opposite to explaining away (see Morris & Lar-
rick, 1995). This then suggests that an insufficiency in explaining away could be
explained by participants understanding causes to be positively correlated in
studies where positive correlation between the causes is found. What is more,
in instances in which the causes are positively correlated, it may even seem in-
tuitive to not reduce or minimally reduce the probability of one causes given
the other, after observing the effect (see Morris & Larrick, 1995). To slightly
modify our example, haemophilia and internal bleeding can both be causes of
bruises on a body, but haemophilia and internal bleeding are also positively
correlated: a person suffering from haemophilia is more likely to have inter-
nal bleeding even before knowing anything about bruises. So, when a doctor
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learns that a patient has bruises, additionally learning that the patient has in-
ternal bleeding would incur minimal to no reduction in the likelihood that the
patient is suffering from haemophilia. This notion is empirically supported
by a study of Morris and Larrick (1995), in which participants explained away
significantly less in the condition in which they were communicated that the
causes were positively correlated than in conditions in which the causes were
said to be independent or negatively correlated.
Empirically detecting explaining away is, then, potentially particularly dif-
ficult in studies where participants report positive correlations between the
causes. For instance, in Rottman and Hastie (2016) Experiment 1b, participants’
average estimates relating to independence of the causes were P(Ci | Cj) = .45
and P(Ci | ∼Cj) = .35 (see Table 5 in Rottman & Hastie, 2016), suggesting
a posiive correlation between the causes and a violation of the independence
assumption. If one, however, includes these participants’ average estimates
as parameters in the normative model instead of those stated in the study
(i.e. P(Ci | Cj) = .25 and P(Ci | ∼Cj) = .25), one gets that P(Ci | E) = .54
and P(Ci | E, Cj) = .55 (see Appendix A.2). So, given the participants’ reported
positive correlation between the causes, the difference between P(Ci | E) and
P(Ci | E, Cj) is now negligible and slightly goes in the opposite direction
to explaining away. Furthermore, these new normative probability values
for P(Ci | E) and P(Ci | E, Cj) closely approximate average participants’ esti-
mates: P(Ci | E) = .58 and P(Ci | E, Cj) = .56 (see Table 7 in Rottman & Hastie,
2016). This is in line with the study by Morris and Larrick (1995) and high-
lights the importance of ensuring that participants understand the indepen-
dence relations between the causes in order to increase chances of detecting
2.1 Explaining away: Accounting for a single common effect 75
explaining away and make more direct comparisons to the normative model
which is assumed by the experimenters and communicated to the participants.
In the studies below I seek to guard from potential violations of indepen-
dence by (i) explicitly emphasizing, in both textual and graphical formats, that
the two causes are independent, (ii) employing cover stories that intuitively
would minimize participants’ inclination to view the two causes as uncondi-
tionally dependent, and (iii) asking participants qualitative relational questions
(see below) prompting them to compare the probability of Ci given the pres-
ence/absence of Cj (when the state of the effect E is unknown) to the prior
probability of Ci.
2.1.5.3 Probability elicitation methods
A third factor that may be contributing to the reported insufficiency of explain-
ing away in the psychological literature pertains to how belief updates are
elicited from participants. Foremost, explaining away is a relational concept.
In our previous example scenario, a social worker reduces the probability that
the child has been physically abused upon learning that he is suffering from
haemophilia relative to the probability that the child has been physically abused
when it was unknown whether the child is suffering from haemophilia. Simi-
larly, the social worker increases the probability that the child has been physi-
cally abused upon learning that he is not suffering from haemophilia relative to
the probability that the child has been physically abused when it was unknown
whether the child is suffering from haemophilia. This relational property of ex-
plaining away is more formally expressed in the inequalities in (2.3). It is then
important to empirically explore whether people understand this relational na-
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ture of explaining away.
Most studies on explaining away elicit participants’ belief estimates in iso-
lation without asking participants to compare their estimates or rates to their
other estimates or rates. For instance, participants are often required to pro-
vide an estimate of the probability of a cause given the presence of both the
effect and another cause, i.e. P(Ci | E, Cj), but they are seldom asked also to
consider the relation and direction of change of this probability compared to
the probability of the cause given just the effect, i.e. P(Ci | E).
Despite the intuitive importance of asking qualitative relational questions
when testing for explaining away, to the best of my knowledge only few stud-
ies have employed such or similar methods: Ali, Chater, and Oaksford (2011,
Experiment 2), Hall, Ali, Chater, and Oaksford (2016), Liefgreen et al. (2018),
and Rehder (2014a). The research presented here builds on these studies and
complements quantitative questions asking for numerical probability estimates
of, for example, P(Ci | E, Cj), with qualitative relational questions asking them
to consider whether P(Ci | E, Cj) is less than, greater than, or equal to P(Ci | E).
Further, I distinguish between direct explaining away which corresponds to
what is usually referred to as an explaining away question, namely a question
about P(Ci | E, Cj), of course in relation to P(Ci | E) (see for example Morris &
Larrick, 1995) and explaining away as a relational concept captured by inequal-
ities in (2.3) which includes the question about P(Ci | E, Cj), but also about
P(Ci | E) and P(Ci | E,∼Cj) (see for example Rehder & Waldmann, 2017). This
will allow for a more comprehensive view of explaining away.
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2.1.6 Motivations
Due to the potential methodological confounds mentioned above and the
mixed findings of the extant empirical work on explaining away, together with
colleges I conducted an initial study to evaluate people’s explaining away in-
ferences (see Liefgreen et al., 2018) utilising a novel design. Despite concluding
that participants accepted priors of causes and did not violate the assumption
of independence, Liefgreen et al. (2018) still observed insufficient explaining
away. A closer inspection of the data strongly suggested that participants’ be-
haviour could be categorised into two clusters: (1) those who, in answering di-
agnostic reasoning questions (i.e. P(Ci | E)), split the probability space between
the two causes and provided answers such that P(C1 | E) + P(C2 | E) = 1 and
(2) those who did not update the probabilities of causes from their priors, given
the presence of the effect or even given the presence of the effect and the other
cause: P(Ci) = P(Ci | E) = P(Ci | E, Cj). The explanations of the participants
in cluster (2) led me to hypothesize that these participants may be interpreting
probabilities as, what is called in the philosophical literature, ‘propensities’.
The two conjectures regarding the two clusters prompted the current study
in which I not only aimed to address the limitations of previous studies by
employing a novel experimental design (see Methods section), but I have also
attempted to test (i) whether people employ a strategy that I call ‘the diagnos-
tic split’ in tackling diagnostic reasoning questions and (ii) whether a specific
interpretation of probability partly drives the observed deviation of people’s
explaining away inferences from the normative ones. I will now describe the
two hypotheses in more detail and outline how I will empirically address them.
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2.1.6.1 Diagnostic split strategy
Experimental data from our previous study (Liefgreen et al., 2018) indicated
that a significant number of participants provided answers to the diagnostic
reasoning questions such that P(C1 | E) and P(C2 | E) added up to 1. This
was particularly striking in the condition in which the stated prior probabil-
ities were low, P(C1) = .2 and P(C2) = .1. In this condition, a number of
participants either said P(C1 | E) = P(C2 | E) = .5 or provided a more sophis-
ticated answer to reflect the 2 : 1 ratio of the priors, i.e. P(C1 | E) = .67 and
P(C2 | E) = .33 (the normative answers were P(C1 | E) = .71 and P(C2 | E) =
.36). Participants’ verbal reasoning explanations regarding P(Ci | E) questions
suggested that they correctly believed that since the effect was observed one of
the causes must have occurred, but incorrectly believed that as there are two
causes, there is a .5 probability that either cause happened.10 Other explana-
tions suggested participants reasoned in the following way: Cause 1 is 20%
likely to be happen, while Cause 2 is only 10% likely to happen, and as we
know one of them happened, it is twice as likely to be Cause 1, so the proba-
bility that the Cause 1 happened is .67, while this is .33 for Cause 2. This leads
to a hypothesis that when engaging in diagnostic reasoning in cases where the
two (or more) independent causes become exhaustive upon learning evidence,
i.e. P(C1 ∨C2 ∨ . . . ∨Cn | E) = 1 since P(E | ∼C1,∼C2, . . . ,∼Cn) = 0, but cru-
cially they do not become mutually exclusive, i.e. P(C1, C2, . . . , Cn | E) 6= 0 since
P(E | C1, C2, . . . , Cn) > 0, some people simply split the probability space be-
10The experimental design from our 2018 study was, like the experimental designs from
Experiment 1 and 2 below, fully deterministic, i.e. P(E | C1, C2) = P(E | Ci,∼Cj) = 1, and
P(E | ∼C1,∼C2) = 0.
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tween the two causes and assign each cause a .5 probability when the causes had
equal priors. I dubbed this strategy ‘the diagnostic split’.
It is worth noting the relationship between the diagnostic split strategy
and the normative reasoning. Namely, as the priors of causes converge to
0, the normative diagnostic inferences approach to the diagnostic split strat-
egy.11 Moreover, when the priors of the two causes follow a particular ra-
tio, a : b, then, given priors are very close to 0, it normatively follows that
P(C1 | E) + P(C2 | E) ≈ 1 and P(C1 | E) ≈
a
a + b




follows the diagnostic split predictions (see Figure 2.8).12 As such, the diagnos-
tic split hypothesis has some normative underpinnings and could be under-
stood as an extreme approximation of the normative diagnostic reasoning.
Other empirical studies seem also to have found trends corresponding to
the diagnostic split hypothesis. For instance, Rottman and Hastie (2016) report
that the highest point in distributions of participants’ diagnostic reasoning re-
sponses was at .5 (see Figure 6 in Rottman & Hastie, 2016). This was true for
11I thank Ben Rottman for pointing this out to us.
12The fact that lower priors lead to closer to normative estimates in diagnostic split reasoning
is interesting from a broader psychology of reasoning perspective. For instance, Oaksford and
Chater (1994) have argued that once we assume the rarity assumption, namely that the prob-
ability of an antecedent and a consequent in a conditional are low, people’s responses to the
Wason selection task have a strong rational basis. Furthermore, the data from studies on causal
reasoning seems to suggests that people often assume the rarity assumption in the case of the
priors of causes. Morris and Larrick (1995, Experiment 1) found that the participants’ average
adopted prior on an explaining away task was .23. Similarly, J. R. Anderson (1990) derived the
prior of .25 for a cause from Schustack and Sternberg (1981)’s data on causal inference with
one cause and one effect. The diagnostic split reasoning, thus, adds to this work and points
to the importance of rarity in (causal) probabilistic reasoning that may lead to the normative
answers.
































Pnorm(C1 | E) − 2/3
Pnorm(C2 | E) − 1/3
Figure 2.8: Left: the difference between the normative diagnostic reasoning
(Pnorm(Ci | E)) and the constant diagnostic split prediction of 1/2 in the case of equal
priors. Right: the difference between the normative diagnostic reasoning (Pnorm(C1 | E)
and Pnorm(C2 | E)) and the constant diagnostic split predictions of 2/3 and 1/3 for
2 : 1 ratio of the priors. Both figures assume deterministic set-up, i.e., P(E | C1, C2) =
P(E | Ci,∼Cj) = 1, and P(E | ∼C1,∼C2) = 0. We can see that as priors are getting
closer to 0 the diagnostic split hypothesis is better approximating the normative diag-
nostic reasoning.
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both Experiment 1a where the priors were P(C1) = P(C2) = .5 and Experiment
1b where P(C1) = P(C2) = .25, which suggests the use of the diagnostic split
strategy. A recent study by Pilditch, Fenton, and Lagnado (2019) tested peo-
ple for what they call ‘the zero-sum fallacy’. The fallacy stipulates that some
people treat evidence as a zero-sum game in which alternative independent
hypotheses compete for evidential support and evidential support of one hy-
pothesis means disconfirmation of the other. More specifically, the fallacy is
based on the false assumption that the two competing independent hypothe-
ses are mutually exclusive and exhaustive and that evidential support for one
hypothesis would entail decrease in the evidential support for the other one.
Pilditch et al. (2019) found that when evidence was equally predicted by two
competing hypotheses, learning that evidence obtains offers no support for ei-
ther hypothesis. People displayed this kind of reasoning even after introducing
an intervention such as explicitly stating that the hypotheses (causes) are non-
exhaustive, and it was shown that the results were not driven by participants’
believing that the evidence was non-diagnostic. Although Pilditch et al. (2019)
did not provide participants with priors and all data was qualitative, assuming
perhaps even natural priors of P(C1) = P(C2) = .5, suggests their findings fit
predictions of the diagnostic split hypothesis that P(Ci | E) = .5, since given
the priors of .5, E would provide no support for either C1 or C2. In addition,
a diagnostic split would occur given any priors, as according to zero-sum rea-
soning, the two causes would be considered mutually exclusive and exhaustive
which would imply that P(Ci | E) = .5 for any P(Ci).
I directly tested the diagnostic split hypothesis. In addition to low and
medium priors conditions where I expected to replicate our previous findings
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(i.e. I expect to find P(Ci | E) = .5 ≥ P(Ci), for P(C1) = P(C2) ≤ .5), in Ex-
periment 1 I also introduced a high priors condition (P(Ci) > .5). In this con-
dition, according to the diagnostic split hypothesis, I expect a significant num-
ber of participants to report that the probability of the causes reduces upon
learning the effect occurred, compared to their prior probabilities. In other
words, I expected to find that a number of participants will erroneously say
that P(Ci | E) = .5 < P(Ci) for P(C1) = P(C2) > .5 even though the causes are
maximally strong (i.e. their strengths are 1, see Cheng, 1997).
2.1.6.2 Probability interpretations
Another large cluster of data from our previous study, consisted of participants
who did not alter the probabilities of causes from the priors after learning the
effect occurred or after learning the presence of the effect and the other cause.
For these participants, P(Ci) = P(Ci | E) = P(Ci | E, Cj) in both medium and
low priors conditions. Through inspection of the data, I ascertained that par-
ticipants were not merely being inattentive during the task as their completion
time suggested they did not rush through the task. Furthermore, they provided
explanations about their responses where they usually outlined that since the
(prior) probability of one cause happening had been explicitly established, it
should not change even in the presence of the effect or of the alternative cause.
These considerations led to a hypothesis that participants in this cluster may
be interpreting probabilities in a specific way.
In the philosophy of statistics literature, one usually finds that probability
interpretations are split into at least two classes: epistemological and objective
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(Gillies, 2000a, 2000b; Hájek, 2012; Popper, 1959).13 In epistemological inter-
pretations, probability is related to (the incompleteness of) our knowledge. The
most famous interpretation within this class is the subjective probability inter-
pretation, according to which probabilities are identified as degrees of belief
of a particular person, meaning that different individuals can hold different
degrees of belief (or different belief strengths) about the same event. On the
other hand, objective interpretations view probability as a feature of the mate-
rial world that is independent of our knowledge or our beliefs. Probabilities,
according to this interpretation, can in principle be tested using statistical tests.
The frequency interpretation is a well-known objective probability interpre-
tation. Here, probabilities are specified as (limit) frequencies with which an
outcome occurs in a sequence of similar events.
A lesser-known probability interpretation is the propensity interpretation
(Popper, 1959; Giere, 1973), according to which probabilities are propensities
(or tendencies and dispositions) of a particular physical system to produce an
outcome (Hájek, 2012). To say that an event X occurs with a probability r,
i.e. P(X) = r, is to say that the strength of the propensity of a particular chance
set-up to produce outcome X on trial L is r (see Giere, 1973).14 For example, the
statement that the probability of a coin to land Heads equals 12 is equivalent to
the statement that there is a coin tossing set-up and that on a particular trial the
strength of the propensity for this coin to land Heads is 12 . This propensity is
13Some authors argue that instead of a strict divide between epistemological and objective
probability interpretations, there is a continuum of probability interpretations. See, for in-
stance, Gillies (2000a).
14For the purposes of this chapter I am confining myself to what Gillies (2000b) refers to as
‘single-case propensity theories’ (see for instance Giere, 1973).
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objective, it is part of the physical world, and it does not depend on our beliefs
about the coin landing Heads.
How does this relate to explaining away? Imagine a situation where there
are two coins tossed at the same time, each with a coin bias of 15 for Heads.
Imagine that in this set-up there is also a light bulb that will turn on if at least
one coin lands Heads. Here, it is perfectly natural to ask about the propen-
sity for the light bulb to turn on if Coin 1 landed Heads, i.e. P(E | C1), since
whether or not the coin lands Heads or Tails causally affects the propensity
of the light bulb (i.e. another physical system) to turn on and so it is per-
fectly plausible that P(E | C1) 6= P(E). So far the propensity interpretation
and normative account are in agreement. However, the propensity of Coin 1
to have landed Heads given that the light bulb turned on is simply the orig-
inal propensity for Coin 1 to land Heads: whether or not the light bulb turns
on cannot (backward) causally affect the propensity/the coin bias of Coin 1 to
land heads, therefore P(C1 | E) = P(C1) = 15 .15 In the same vein, addition-
ally learning that Coin 2 landed Heads cannot causally influence how Coin 1
landed and thus cannot not change the propensity of Coin 1 to land Heads,
i.e. P(C1 | E, C2) = P(C1 | E) = P(C1) = 15 . Thus according to the propensity
interpretation, observing the effect (or another cause) would not change the
propensity of the cause in question to happen. This is in stark contrast with the
normative account where these three probabilities are in general not equal.
However, like the diagnostic split hypothesis, the propensity interpretation
15This intuition has been (formally) outlined in Humphreys (1985), who employs it to argue
that propensities are inconsistent with the Kolmogorov Axioms of probability and that, by
extension, the propensity interpretation of probability cannot serve as the normative basis.
This inconsistency is commonly known as ‘the Humphreys’ paradox’ in the literature.
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has its normative underpinning in the limit. Figure 2.9 shows that as the priors
converge to 1, the normative diagnostic reasoning estimates approach the pre-
dictions of the propensity interpretation, i.e. that P(Ci | E)− P(Ci) = 0. Fur-
thermore, when the explaining away set-up is deterministic (as in the experi-
ments in this chapter), then even normatively it holds true that P(Ci | E, Cj) =
P(Ci). Thus although the propensity interpretation in general does not accord
with the normative account, it can, in some instances, well approximate the
normative account. For example, from Figure 2.9 we can see that the propen-
sity interpretation approximates normative diagnostic reasoning within .1 er-
ror when the priors are higher than .63. From Figure 2.8 on the left we can see
that the diagnostic split hypothesis approximate the normative diagnostic rea-
soning within .1 error when the priors are lower than .33. Thus the propensity
interpretation and the diagnostic split hypotheses are complementary to each
other: the propensity interpretation well approximates the normative account
when the priors are high and the diagnostic split hypothesis does the same
when the priors are low. Together, the two are approximating the normative
estimates within .1 error for two thirds of all the possible priors. Therefore,
even though both are fully opposed to the normative account, together they
can reasonably well approximate the normative account.
I thus hypothesise that the propensity interpretation, which predicts that
P(Ci | E, Cj) = P(Ci | E) = P(Ci)16, could be partly driving the insufficiency
16In general, the propensity interpretation would also predict that P(Ci) = P(Ci | Cj) =
P(Ci | ∼Cj) = P(Ci | ∼E) = P(Ci | Cj,∼E) = P(Ci | ∼Cj, E) = P(Ci | ∼Cj,∼E). However,
given that in this chapter I have adopted a deterministic set-up, it is not possible for P(Ci | ∼E),
P(Ci | Cj,∼E), and P(Ci | ∼Cj,∼E) to equal P(Ci) since if we learn that evidence does not
obtain that means that both causes are false with probability 1. Furthermore, I did not predict




















Figure 2.9: The difference between the normative diagnostic reasoning (Pnorm(Ci | E))
and the prior probability of the causes in the case of equal priors. The figure assumes
deterministic set-up, i.e., P(E | C1, C2) = P(E | Ci,∼Cj) = 1 (where i, j ∈ {1, 2}), and
P(E | ∼C1,∼C2) = 0. We can see that as priors are getting closer to 1 the propensity
interpretation is better approximating the normative diagnostic reasoning.
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observed in empirical studies of explaining away. The plausibility of this expla-
nation is increased in light of the psychology literature suggesting that people
may be able to distinguish between different variants of uncertainty, one of
which is propensity (see Fox & Ülkümen, 2011; Kahneman & Tversky, 1982),
and studies suggesting that people are sensitive to different probability inter-
pretations (Ülkümen, Fox, & Malle, 2016) and may in fact be thinking of prob-
abilities as propensities (Keren & Teigen, 2001). Furthermore, the propensity
hypothesis would fit the results reported by Rehder (2014a) where a large pro-
portion (and in most cases the majority) of participants reasoning with a 3-node
common effect CBN said that P(C1 | E) is as equally likely as P(C1 | E, C2).
This was particularly salient in Experiments 1–3 and the deterministic condi-
tion of Experiment 4a where no information about the strength of the causal
relations was provided to participants, which in turn might have suggested
that participants understood the causal relations in these cases to be determin-
istic: a cause always produces an effect (see Rehder, 2014a).17
that P(Ci | ∼Cj, E) would be accounted by the propensity hypothesis as, in the deterministic
set-up, it becomes a simple logic inference (see below) as P(Ci | ∼Cj, E) = 1. Lastly, although
the propensity hypothesis predicts that P(Ci) = P(Ci | Cj) = P(Ci | ∼Cj) I did not focus on
these probability estimates when it came to the propensity interpretation (however, see the
results sections regarding the independence of causes) as these results are equality predicated
by the normative account.
17One could argue that even the diagnostic split strategy could be seen as a particular inter-
pretation of probability, namely the classical interpretation according to which the probability
of an event is just a fraction of the total number of possibilities in which the event occurs (see
Gillies, 2000a; Hájek, 2012). For example, the classical probability of a die landing on an even
number is 36 . The classical interpretation is thought to be particularly salient when evidence is
symmetrically balanced, which could be expounded as cases where P(C1 | E) = P(C2 | E) =
. . . = P(Cn | E). These cases seem to correspond to cases in diagnostic reasoning where partici-
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Now, (causal) Bayesian networks (CBNs) usually go hand in hand with the
subjective probability interpretation (also referred to as the Bayesian probabil-
ity interpretation). Pearl (2009, see Section 1.1.2)—as well as Pearl (1988)—is
explicit in his adherence to the subjective probability interpretation. Probabili-
ties of nodes in a CBN represent our degrees of belief in events that are causally
related and learning that one event happened may affect our degree of belief
in some other event (another node in a CBN) happening. On this interpreta-
tion, it is perfectly natural to ask both about one’s degree of belief the light bulb
turned on if the Coin 1 landed Heads as well as one’s degree of belief that Coin
1 landed Heads if the light bulb turned on. Moreover, authors empirically test-
ing explaining away, in particular those using CBNs as a benchmark, are ex-
plicit about assuming a subjective probability interpretation making compar-
isons between normative and observed inferences (e.g. Morris & Larrick, 1995;
Rehder & Waldmann, 2017). However, people may not always interpret prob-
abilities in a subjective way, which can lead to deviations from the normative
account. This sentiment is also expressed by Tversky and Kahneman:
Decision analysis views subjective probability as a degree of belief,
i.e., as a summary of one’s state of information about an uncertain
pants assign equal probability to each of the possible causes after learning evidence that equally
supports each cause. However, as we find that some participants assign unequal probabilities
to each cause to reflect unequal priors (Liefgreen et al., 2018), I continue to talk about the di-
agnostic split strategy rather then the classical interpretations for (i) the classical interpretation
has difficulties in handling the cases where the outcomes (possibles) have unequal probabili-
ties, i.e. where outcomes are biased and (ii) the diagnostic split predicts the same probabilities
as the classical interpretation when the probabilities of the causes are equal, but also applies to
cases where the probabilities of the causes are unequal.
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event. This concept does not always coincide with the lay inter-
pretation of probability. People sometimes think of the probability
of an event as a measure of the propensity of some causal process
to produce that event, rather than as a summary of their state of
belief. The tendency to regard properties as belonging to the exter-
nal world rather than to our own state of information characterizes
much of our perception. We normally regard colors as properties
of objects, not of our visual system, and we treat sounds as external
rather than internal events. In a similar vein, people commonly in-
terpret the assertion “the probability of heads on the next toss of this
coin is 1/2” as a statement about the propensity of the coin to show
heads, rather than as a statement about our ignorance regarding the
outcome of the next toss. (Tversky & Kahneman, 1977, p. ii)
Testing whether participants’ responses on explaining away tasks are partly
driven by a particular probability interpretation different from a subjective
probability interpretation could then shed light on the findings reported in the
extant literature of explaining away.
2.1.7 Experiment 118
The aim of this experiment was two-fold: (i) to test people’s intuitions in ex-
plaining away contexts and (ii) to explore if people employ the diagnostic split
strategy and/or if they are driven by the propensity interpretation when rea-
soning in these contexts. In order to do so I used a novel experimental design
18This experiment was conducted together with Alice Liefgreen and David Lagnado (Tešić
et al., 2020).
2.1 Explaining away: Accounting for a single common effect 90
that not only addressed previously mentioned methodological confounds of
previous studies, but additionally allowed for a manipulation of two main fac-
tors: the prior probabilities of causes and the properties of cover stories within
which the same common-effect three node structure was embedded.
2.1.7.1 Manipulations
Prior probabilities of causes By manipulating priors of causes I aimed to: (i)
vary the amount of normative explaining away (the lower the priors the higher
the normative amount of explaining away) and (ii) test the diagnostic split
hypothesis. As such, I created three conditions in which the prior proba-
bilities of the causes were either low—P(C1) = P(C2) = .2—medium—
P(C1) = P(C2) = .5—or high—P(C1) = P(C2) = .7. In all conditions, the
presence of at least one cause entailed the presence of the effect: P(E | C1, C2) =
P(E | Ci,∼Cj) = 1 (where i, j ∈ {1, 2}); and absence of both causes entailed ab-
sence of the effect: P(E | ∼C1,∼C2) = 0. The deterministic relations between
the causes and the effect have as a consequence maximal normative explain-
ing away (for a given prior probability) since P(Ci | E, Cj) is equal to the prior
probability (i.e. to P(Ci)). Additionally, I hoped that these deterministic rela-
tions would facilitate people’s ability to engage in both diagnostic reasoning
and explaining away.
The lower the prior probabilities of causes are, the larger the normative
amount of explaining away (see also Rottman & Hastie, 2016). Given the pa-
rameters from the previous paragraph, when the priors are low, the probability
change from P(Ci | E), i ∈ {1, 2}, to P(C1 | E, C2) is .36 and the probability
change from P(C1 | E, C2) to P(C1 | E,∼C2) is .8, whereas when the priors are
2.1 Explaining away: Accounting for a single common effect 91
medium these changes were .17 and .5 respectively, and only .07 and .3 when
the priors are high. Therefore, manipulating priors allowed me to test the pre-
diction that participants would explain away more when reasoning with low
priors than when reasoning with both medium and high priors, and that par-
ticipants reasoning with medium priors would explain away more than those
reasoning with high priors.
Additionally, manipulating prior probabilities of causes allowed me to test
the diagnostic split hypothesis. I expected a significant number of participants
reasoning with low priors to update the probabilities of the two causes to .5 in
diagnostic reasoning questions, i.e. in P(Ci | E); for participants reasoning with
medium priors I expected them to stay at .5 for both causes in P(Ci | E); and I
expected participants reasoning with high priors to lower the probabilities of
causes from priors to .5 in P(Ci | E).
Properties of cover stories In addition to manipulating prior probabilities of
causes, I manipulated the properties of the cover stories. In the present study I
employed three different cover stories: one involving coin-tossing, one involv-
ing balls and containers, and one involving a dinner party. The cover stories
were picked such that the propensity interpretation was most accentuated in
the coin-tossing cover story, less so in the ball containers one, and least in the
dinner party one.
The propensity interpretation itself does not specify which cover stories
would lead to more or less acceptance of that interpretation. In devising the
cover stories I followed (i) the philosophy of probability literature and (ii) the
general idea outlined Section 2.1.6.2 on propensity interpretation that propen-
sities are associated with tendencies of a physical system that describes a par-
2.1 Explaining away: Accounting for a single common effect 92
ticular chance set-up and that propensities are often tied with causal (or even
causal-mechanistic) relationships. This would then imply that I expect to find
the propensity interpretation most pronounced in cover stories that include a
description of chance set-ups as physical systems with clear causal-mechanistic
relations. The cover stories that do not include physical systems or casual-
mechanistic relationships, such as, for instance, cover stories embedded in
certain social contexts would render the propensity interpretation less pro-
nounced.
The first cover story where I believed the propensity interpretation would
be the highly pronounced included a coin-tossing scenario with the two causes
(C1 and C2) being represented by two coins (binary variables assuming the
value of either Heads or Tails) that are tossed with the same probability pi for
Heads by two coin-tossing mechanisms located in separate rooms. If at least
one coin landed Heads, a light bulb (common effect), stored in a different unit
and connected to the two coin-tossing mechanisms via electric cables, would
switch on. From the propensity interpretation point of view, pi is the propen-
sity for a coin to land Heads given a coin-tossing set-up and that propensity
does not change whether or not the light bulb (i.e. the effect) is on or off: learn-
ing that the light bulb is on/off does not affect the propensity/the disposition
for a coin to land Heads. As the questionnaire prompted participants to answer
diagnostic reasoning and explaining away questions pertaining to the coins (see
Section 2.1.7.2 below) that are embedded in two physical systems with clear
causal-mechanistic relationships to the light bulb I argue that the propensity
interpretation will be strongly pronounced in this scenario.
The second cover story included balls and containers where the two causes
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were represented by two balls (binary variables assuming the value of either
copper or rubber) randomly selected from two independent containers and
placed on two gaps in an electric circuit. If at least one of the two balls was
copper, a light bulb in the circuit (the common effect) would turn on. This
cover story also included physical systems (mechanisms for random selection
of balls from containers) with clear causal-mechanistic relationships (electric
circuit) with the common effect (i.e. the light bulb). However, here I follow
Giere (1973) in arguing that although the propensity is still present in this cover
story, it is at the level of a random sampling mechanism (i.e. the way the balls
are selected from the containers), not at the level of balls that are placed onto
the electric circuit. The balls are either copper or rubber; they do not have a
propensity to be copper or rubber (or if they do it is an extreme propensity
of 0 or 1). The random sampling mechanism, on the other hand, does have a
propensity pi to select a copper or a rubber ball from a container. Since, in the
study, I prompted participants to answer diagnostic reasoning and explaining
away questions pertaining to the balls and not to the random sampling mecha-
nism, I argue that the propensity interpretation is less pronounced in this cover
story compared to the coin-tossing cover story where the propensity was at the
level of events I asked in the questionnaire, namely coins.
Finally, I created a cover story that incorporated a social context namely
a dinner party where the two causes were represented by two individuals,
Michael and Tom, and the common effect was represented by a third individ-
ual, Helen, who would drink wine only if at least one of the two aforemen-
tioned people brought wine to a dinner party (‘Helen’ was a binary variable
assuming the value of either ‘drinking wine’ or ‘not drinking wine’). In this
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cover story, the probability pi of whether a person brings wine to the party was
determined purely by the subjective estimates of a host of the party and not by
any particular physical system with clear underlying causal-mechanistic rela-
tionships to the common cause. For this reason, I argue that in this scenario the
propensity interpretation is the least pronounced (if at all).
Given the above rationale, I predicted that the proportion of participants
whose reasoning aligns with the propensity interpretation, i.e. who would re-
spond P(Ci) = P(Ci | E) = P(Ci | E, Cj), would be the highest when reason-
ing with the coin-tossing cover story, smallest when reasoning with the dinner
party cover story, and fall in between these when reasoning with the ball con-
tainers cover story.
2.1.7.2 Methods
Participants and Design A total of 464 participants (NMALE = 181, MAGE =
34.6 years) were recruited from Prolific Academic (www.prolific.ac). All par-
ticipants were native English speakers who gave informed consent and were
paid £1 for partaking in the present study, which took on average 10.6 minutes
to complete. Eleven participants were excluded as they answered incorrectly
to the catch trial, leaving a total of 453 participants in the analyses.
A between-participant design was employed and participants were ran-
domly allocated to one of 3 (Cover story: coins, ball containers, dinner party)
× 3 (Priors condition: low, medium or high) = 9 groups (NCOINS LOW =
49, NCOINS MED = 50, NCOINS HIGH = 50, NBALL CONTAINERS LOW = 51,
NBALL CONTAINERS MED = 52, NBALL CONTAINERS HIGH = 52, NDINNER LOW =
50, NDINNER MED = 50, NDINNER HIGH = 49).
2.1 Explaining away: Accounting for a single common effect 95
Materials Each of the groups was asked to complete an inference question-
naire (NQUESTIONS = 12), comprising of questions regarding priors and (un-
conditional) independence of causes, as well as reasoning questions relating to
diagnostic reasoning and explaining away. For a full list of questions and the
inferences these represented see Table 2.1. For some inferences, such as Diag-
nostic Reasoning and Explaining away, two questions were asked regarding
the same inference, one in qualitative format and one in quantitative format.
As mentioned in Section 2.1.7.2, participants in each group were required
to reason with different cover stories within which I additionally manip-
ulated the priors of causes in the common-effect structure. Three of the
groups (GroupCOINS LOW, GroupCOINS MED, GroupCOINS HIGH) reasoned with
a coin-tossing cover story in which the two causes (C1 and C2) were repre-
sented by two simultaneously tossed coins (binary variables assuming the
value of either Heads or Tails) in separate rooms and the common effect
took the form of a light bulb (LB) in a different unit, that could switch
on depending on the outcome of the tosses: if at least one coin landed
Heads, the light bulb turns on (see the top image Figure 2.10). An addi-
tional three groups (GroupBALL CONTAINERS LOW, GroupBALL CONTAINERS MED,
GroupBALL CONTAINERS HIGH) were reasoned with a cover story within which
the two causes were represented by two balls (binary variables assuming the
value of either copper or rubber) simultaneously drawn from two indepen-
dent containers and the common effect was again a light bulb in a sepa-
rate electric circuit, that could switch on depending on the outcome of the
draw: if at least one of the balls placed in the circuit is copper, the light bulb
turns on (see the middle image Figure 2.10). Finally, the remaining three
2.1 Explaining away: Accounting for a single common effect 96
groups (GroupDINNER LOW, GroupDINNER MED, GroupDINNER HIGH) were pre-
sented with a cover story in which the two causes were represented by two
individuals, Michael and Tom, and the common effect was represented by a
third individual, Helen, who would drink wine only if at least one of the two
aforementioned people brought wine to a a dinner party (‘Helen’ was a binary
variable assuming the value of either ‘drinking wine’ or ‘not drinking wine’)
(see the bottom image Figure 2.10). For full materials visit Open Science Frame-
work, https://osf.io/aqjkp/.
Table 2.1: Inference types and questions found in the questionnaire for Experiment 1.







P(C2 | C1) Qualitative
4 P(C1 | ∼C2) Qualitative
5 , 6
Diag. Reasoning
P(C1 | E)-R-P(C1) Qual. & Quant.
7 , 8 P(C2 | E)-R-P(C2) Qual. & Quant.
9 , 10 Explaining Away P(C1 | E, C2)-R-P(C1 | E) Qual. & Quant.
11 , 12 Logic19 P(C1 | E,∼C2)-R-P(C1 | E) Qual. & Quant.
Note: -R- stands for ‘in relation to’.
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Figure 2.10: Graphical representations of the cover stories presented to participants in
Experiment 1. The top image was featured in the coins cover story, the middle one in
the balls and container cover story, and the bottom one in the dinner party cover story.
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Procedure Participants in each of the nine groups were initially presented
with the pertinent cover story and were given explicit information on the
common-effect model embedded within the cover story including the prior
probability of each cause, and the causal relationships within the model. In the
coins and the dinner party cover stories the priors were presented in the form of
a percentage, whereas in the ball containers cover story they were presented as
a fraction/ratio (e.g. of the 10 balls, there are 2 copper balls and 8 rubber balls in
each urn).20 The priors in cases of the coins and the dinner party cover stories
were given only in a textual form. The priors in the ball container cover story
(i.e. the number of ball of each type) and the causal relations in all cover stories
were given to participants in both textual form and in visual form (graphical
representation, see Figure 2.10). In order to ensure participants understood the
structure, they were provided with a textual account by which each cause could
independently bring about the common effect. Subsequently, participants were
presented with the inference questionnaire (for questions see Table 2.1). The
questionnaire required participants to sequentially answer questions: firstly re-
garding priors of causes, secondly independence of causes, thirdly diagnostic
reasoning about each cause, and finally regarding explaining away. The graph-
ical and textual details of the cover story were present on the same page as the
relevant inference questions so participants could access these details at any
point.
19I have labeled questions 11 and 12 as ‘logic’ questions, since the set-up was deterministic
and learning that one cause did not happen, whilst knowing that the effect happened, entailed
(by logic) that the other cause must have happened, i.e. P(C1 | E,∼C2) = 1.
20Although the way priors were conveyed depended on a cover story, in all cover stories
they were elicited in the same manner, i.e. as a percentage on a scale from 0% to 100%.
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Questions marked as quantitative in Table 2.1 required participants to pro-
vide numerical estimates on a slider with a scale ranging from 0% to 100%.
Questions marked as qualitative required participants to select one of three op-
tions: the probability increases, decreases, or stays the same when asked about
e.g. P(C2 | C1) given no knowledge of whether E is present or not. To investi-
gate participants’ diagnostic and explaining away reasoning I employed both
qualitative and quantitative question formats. For example, participants in the
coin tossing cover story, after finding out that the light bulb is on, were asked
both a qualitative diagnostic reasoning question (e.g. Q5): “Does the probability
that Coin 1 landed Heads change (compared to Q1, where you said: X%) after
you find out that the light bulb turned on?” as well as a quantitative one: “What
do you now think is the probability that Coin 1 landed Heads?”. This ap-
proach enables one to capture the relational nature of explaining away, as well
as the direction and magnitude of change of beliefs given certain evidence.
Additionally, in order to better understand participants’ reasoning, some ques-
tions prompted participants to provide written explanations for their answers.
All evidence (i.e. new states of cause or effect variables) was provided to par-
ticipants both textually (e.g. in groups reasoning with a coin tossing cover
story: “You walk into Unit 3 and see that the light bulb is on”) as well as vi-
sually (as an updated graphical representation of the model).
2.1.7.3 Results
Participants’ answers to all qualitative questions in the inference questionnaire
are represented in Figure 2.11 and their responses to all quantitative questions
are in Figure 2.12.















































































Increase Stay the same Decrease
Figure 2.11: Distribution of participants’ responses to qualitative questions in Experi-
ment 1. Asterisks above the bars indicate normative answers.
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Figure 2.12: Participants’ responses to quantitative questions in Experiment 1. Red
horizontal lines are correct (normative) answers. Gray lines between data points de-
pict how participants changed their probability estimates from one questions to an-
other, with curved lines indicating that a participant did not change (within ± .02)
their probability estimate.
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A correct quantitative estimate Before I proceed to the main analysis, I will
first address what is meant by a correct quantitative estimate as this notion is
important for the main analysis. All the quantitative estimates are provided
on a scale from 0% to 100% using a slider with increments of 1%. Given that
these estimates are entered using a slider, it is plausible that some variability
in participants’ quantitative estimates could be due to ‘a slip of the hand’. This
would happen if a participant wanted to enter a specific estimate (e.g. 20%), but
instead entered different one that is in close proximity of the one they wanted
to enter (e.g. 21%) because their hand slightly slipped when they were entering
an estimate using a slider.
The variability that is due to a slip of the hand is, however, expected to be
small and withing a range of ε that is taking a small value. Nonetheless, one
would need to choose an appropriate value for ε in order to account for this
variability.
To find the most appropriate ε I focused on participants’ responses on the
two priors questions. The priors questions are easiest to answer (in two cover
stories correctly answering the two priors questions meant repeating the priors
provided in the cover story) and any variability around the correct answer to
the priors questions is most likely due to a slip of the hand. Thus, accounting
for such variability would mean accounting for the slip of the hand.
To choose an ε, I have (i) selected of participants’ responses that are within
.05 of the correct answer as I expected the variation that is due to the slip of the
hand to be small, specifically less than .05; (ii) of these selected responses I have
subtracted the correct prior so that all the responses are comparable across the
different priors; and (iii) I have calculated the variance of this data for each
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of 0 ≤ ε ≤ .05 where, for example, ε = .03 meant that all responses that are
within ±.03 of the correct prior are considered as the correct responses, i.e. the
difference between these responses and the correct responses was assumed to
be 0.
From Figure 2.13 we can see that the variance is quite small (the highest
variance is around .5) and that there is a significant drop variance from ε = 0
to ε = .02 that then flattens out between ε = .02 and ε = .04, with again a
significant drop between ε = .04 and ε = .05. This suggested that estimates
that are equal to ±.05 of the correct answer are plausibly not due to the slip
of the hand; rather participants seemed to have aimed to provide an estimate
that is different than the correct one, namely .55. Further, the graph also sug-
gested that an appropriate ε should be between .02 and .04 as that is where the
variance flattens out.
I have chosen ε to be equal to .02 in the further analyses for the following
reasons. First, from Figure 2.13 there does not seem to be much different in
variance for .02 ≤ ε ≤ .04, so ε = .02 already captures similar amounts of
variance that is dues to the slip of the hand as ε = .03 and ε = .04. Second,
a normative response in diagnostic reasoning for the high priors conditions is
.77. If a participant mistakenly provided .73 as their estimate but they actually
wanted to provide .7, this would have counted as a correct answer to the diag-
nostic reasoning question with ε = .04. Similar situation arises when ε = .03
and a participants provided .53 (with an intention of providing .5) as their es-
timate in diagnostic reasoning with low priors where the normative answer is
.56. Third, only ε = .02 is able to always distinguish between (i) estimates that
are in line with the normative answers in both diagnostic reasoning in high




















Figure 2.13: Variance in participants responses to the priors questions who provided
estimates that are within ±.05 of the correct answer as a function of different epsilons
(ε).
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(.77) and low (.56) priors conditions and (ii) estimates that are in line with the
prediction of the propensity hypothesis in the high priors conditions (.7) and
the prediction of the diagnostic split hypothesis in the low priors conditions
(.5), without some estimates falling in the both (i) and (ii).
After choosing an appropriate value for ε, we can now move on to the main
analyses.
Overall performance To test for a main effect of cover story and/or priors on
participants’ judgment accuracy I initially coded all participants’ answers as
correct (1) or incorrect (0). For all quantitative estimates, an answer was consid-
ered correct if it fell within ± .02 of the normative probability estimate. This al-
lowed for a comparative measure of participants’ accuracy for both qualitative
and quantitative types of inferences. Subsequently, if an inference judgment
had a symmetrical pair, i.e. if both inference judgements were of the same infer-
ence type (such as inferences regarding priors, independence, qualitative, and
quantitative diagnostic reasoning, see Table 2.1) I combined each participant’s
coded response to both questions into a single coded response: if a participant
answered both questions correctly, the response was coded as 1; otherwise 0.
This leaves eight coded question-types regarding: priors, independence, qual-
itative diagnostic reasoning, quantitative diagnostic reasoning, qualitative ex-
plaining away, quantitative explaining away, qualitative logic, and quantitative
logic.
To test the effect of Cover story and Priors on participants’ overall perfor-
mance (in the coded form) on the eight question-types, I built a generalized
linear mixed effects model with a binomial link function using the lme4 pack-
age (Bates, Mächler, Bolker, & Walker, 2014). The model had two fixed effects,
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Cover story and Priors, with a random intercept for each participant (there was
no random slope for participant since Cover story and Priors vary between par-
ticipants). I found a main effect of Priors, z = −3, p = .003 and no main effect
of Cover story, z = 0.56, p = .58. I also found no interaction between Cover
story and Priors, z = 0.12, p = .9. Including the predictors (Cover story and
Priors) in the model did improve model fit (χ2(3) = 9.33, p = .025) compared
to just having an intercept as a predictor.
Given that in the above analyses I found no main effect of Cover story
on accuracy nor an interaction between Cover story and Priors, I collapsed
data across cover stories to perform the subsequent analyses regarding par-
ticipants’ performance on explaining away. Therefore, I now compared across
three groups: a low priors group (GroupLOW, N = 150), a medium priors group
(GroupMEDIUM, N = 152), and a high priors group (GroupHIGH, N = 151).
Prior probabilities A Chi-Square test of independence illustrated a signifi-
cant difference in the proportion of participants who accurately stated the pri-
ors of both causes between the three groups, χ2(2) = 12.9, p = .002. Post-
hoc pairwise comparisons using Benjamini and Hochberg’s (1995) false discov-
ery rate (FDR) procedure with q∗ = 0.0521 indicated a significant difference
between GroupMEDIUM (92.8%) and GroupHIGH (78.1%), corrected p = .002.
No significant difference was found between GroupLOW (84.7%) and either
GroupMED, corrected p = .062, and GroupHIGH, corrected p = .192.
Overall, 85.2% of participants across all conditions answered the priors cor-
rectly. I have also computed a sample standard deviation from the correct pri-
ors (spriors) for each group. On P(C1) question, for GroupLOW, spriors = .11,
21The same applied to all other pairwise comparisons in this part of the chapter.
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95% CI [.08, .16]22; for GroupMEDIUM, spriors = .07, 95% CI [.05, .11]; for
GroupHIGH, spriors = .11, 95% CI [.1, .15]. On P(C2) question, for GroupLOW,
spriors = .11, 95% CI [.08, .16]; for GroupMEDIUM, spriors = .07, 95% CI [.04, .11];
for GroupHIGH, spriors = .11, 95% CI [.1, .15]. These results indicate relatively
low standard deviations from the stated priors.
Therefore, although the difference between the above groups was signifi-
cant, the high proportion of participants who stated the correct priors for both
causes and the low deviation from the stated priors within each group indi-
cate that overall participants accepted priors of causes given to them, across all
conditions (see also the distributions of participants responses for P(C1) and
P(C2) in Figure 2.12).
Independence of causes For a breakdown of the frequency of participants’
choices on independence questions see Figure 2.11. Within each group I ob-
tained the percentage of people who correctly answered both questions regard-
ing the independence of causes (Q3 and Q4 in Table 2.1). Within GroupLOW
this was 88.7%, within GroupMEDIUM this was 95.4% and within GroupHIGH
this was 88.1%. These high percentages demonstrate that the vast majority of
participants did not violate the assumption of the independence of causes (be-
fore learning the evidence) in any group.
Diagnostic reasoning Independent analyses were conducted on qualitative
and quantitative diagnostic reasoning questions (Qs 5–8 in Table 2.1).
22As the data are quite clearly non-normally distributed, the 95% confidence intervals were
calculated using the BCa nonparametric bootstrap confidence interval method (with 106 boot-
strap replicates) as recommend by Meeker, Hahn, and Escobar (2017).
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Qualitative A Chi-Square test of independence illustrated a significant
difference in the proportion of participants who accurately answered both qual-
itative questions relating to diagnostic reasoning between the three groups,
χ2(2) = 52.27, p < .001. Post-hoc pairwise comparisons using the FDR pro-
cedure illustrated a significant difference between GroupLOW (45.3%) and both
GroupMEDIUM (17.1%), corrected p < .001 and GroupHIGH (11.9%), corrected
p < .001. No significant difference was found between GroupMEDIUM and
GroupHIGH, corrected p = .26. As can be seen from Figure 2.11 almost half
of the participants in GroupLOW indicated the change of probability in the cor-
rect direction, which significantly differed from the percentage of participants
in GroupMEDIUM and GroupHIGH. This is an interesting finding as it seems to
suggest that a larger normative quantitative difference between the two prob-
abilities corresponds to a larger proportion of participants following the nor-
mative qualitative direction. Here, the largest probability increase was in the
low priors condition: P(Ci | E) − P(Ci) = .36, followed by the medium pri-
ors condition where the increase was .17 and the high priors condition where
it was only .07. The size of these normative quantitative differences between
the two probabilities directly corresponded to size of the proportions of partic-
ipants who answered the qualitative questions in accordance with the norma-
tive model.
Quantitative Fischer’s exact test of independence illustrated a significant
difference in the proportion of participants who correctly answered both quan-
titative diagnostic reasoning questions across the three groups, p = .002.
Post-hoc pairwise comparisons using the FDR procedure illustrated a signif-
icant difference between GroupLOW (0%) and GroupMEDIUM (6.6%) , corrected
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p = .005. No significant difference was found between GroupHIGH (2.6%) and
both GroupLOW, corrected p = .17, and GroupMEDIUM, corrected p = .17.
The low percentages suggest that all groups performed poorly compared to
the normative model (see also the distributions of responses for P(C1 | E) and
P(C2 | E) in Figure 2.12).
To gauge how much participants deviated from the normative estimates,
I computed a sample standard deviation from the normative response (snorm)
for each group. On P(C1 | E) question, for GroupLOW, snorm = .25, 95% CI [.22,
.27]; for GroupMEDIUM, snorm = .18, 95% CI [.17, .2]; for GroupHIGH, snorm =
.17, 95% CI [.15, .2]. On P(C2 | E) question, for GroupLOW, snorm = .24, 95%
CI [.22, .27]; for GroupMEDIUM, snorm = .18, 95% CI [.16, .20]; for GroupHIGH,
snorm = .17, 95% CI [.15, .19]. This suggests that GroupLOW most deviated from
the normative answers compared to the other two groups.
I also explored the amount and direction of change in participants’ proba-
bilistic estimates from their given priors to their estimates after learning about
the effect. As such I conducted the Wilcoxon signed-rank test on the difference
between participants’ estimates on each prior question and the related diagnos-
tic reasoning question (i.e. between P(C1) and P(C1 | E) and between P(C2)
and P(C2 | E)). When comparing these differences with the normative differ-
ences, the null hypotheses of all Wilcoxon signed-rank tests was that the dif-
ference between participants’ estimates equals to the corresponding normative
difference. Table 2.2 shows the normative differences, the empirical differences
of medians, and p-values of Wilcoxon signed-rank tests.
As can be seen from the table, participants heavily under-adjusted their
probability estimates since the null hypothesis that the normative difference is
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Table 2.2: Quantitative differences in diagnostic reasoning inferences per group in Ex-
periment 1.
Inferences Normative diff. Empirical diff. of medians p-value
GroupLOW
P(C1 | E)− P(C1) .36 .3 < .001
P(C2 | E)− P(C2) .36 .3 < .001
GroupMEDIUM
P(C1 | E)− P(C1) .17 0 < .001
P(C2 | E)− P(C2) .17 0 < .001
GroupHIGH
P(C1 | E)− P(C1) .07 0 < .001
P(C2 | E)− P(C2) .07 0 < .001
equal to the empirical difference is strongly rejected in all cases. Furthermore,
only in GroupLOW did the empirical difference go in the normative direction. In
both GroupMEDIUM and GroupHIGH the empirical differences of medians was 0
suggesting that in these groups participants’ quantitative diagnostic reasoning
estimates did not significantly differ from their priors estimates.
Direct explaining away Independent analyses were conducted on qualitative
and quantitative questions regarding direct explaining away (Q9 and Q10 in
Table 2.1).
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Qualitative For a breakdown of the frequency of participants’ choices on
the qualitative direct explaining away question see Figure 2.11. A Chi-Square
test of independence illustrated a significant difference in the proportion of
participants who accurately answered the qualitative question relating to ex-
plaining away between the three groups, χ2(2) = 12.25, p = .002 . Similarly to
the results regarding diagnostic reasoning (Section 2.1.7.3), post-hoc pairwise
comparisons using the FDR procedure illustrated a significant difference be-
tween GroupLOW (36%) and both GroupMEDIUM (21.7%), corrected p = .013
and GroupHIGH (19.9%), corrected p = .008. No significant difference was
found between GroupMEDIUM and GroupHIGH, corrected p = .8. This suggests
that participants in GroupLOW performed significantly better than participants
in GroupMEDIUM and participants in GroupHIGH. Similarly to qualitative di-
agnostic reasoning, this was congruent with the the size of the normative ex-
plaining found in the respective Priors conditions. Overall, however, the low
percentage of correct responses across groups suggest poor performance in this
category.
Quantitative A Chi-Square test of independence illustrated a significant
difference in the proportion of participants who accurately answered the quan-
titative question regarding direct explaining away between the three groups,
χ2(2) = 34.74, p < .001. Post-hoc pairwise comparisons using the FDR pro-
cedure illustrated a significant difference between GroupMEDIUM (82.9%), and
both GroupLOW (52.7%), corrected p < .001 and GroupHIGH (57.6%), cor-
rected p < .001. No significant difference was found between GroupLOW and
GroupHIGH, corrected p = 0.46. This suggests that in each group over half of
the participants correctly answered the direct explaining away question.
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For each group I also computed a sample standard deviation from the nor-
mative response (snorm). For GroupLOW, snorm = .22, 95% CI [.19, .27]; for
GroupMEDIUM, snorm = .15, 95% CI [.12, .19]; for GroupHIGH, snorm = .21, 95%
CI [.17, .25]. This suggests that GroupMEDIUM least deviated from the norma-
tive answers compared to the other two groups. The relatively high percent-
ages of correct answers and a relatively low deviation from the normative an-
swers may suggest good performance on quantitative direct explaining away.
Although this may appear as being at odds with the finding of overall poor
performance on qualitative direct explaining away, a quick look at Figure 2.12
reveals that a large number of participants repeated the priors in P(C1 | E),
P(C2 | E), and P(C1 | E, C2) (this is discussed in Section 2.1.7.3 below). Since
in the study P(C1) = P(C1 | E, C2) and a large proportion of participants did
accept the priors (see Section 2.1.7.3), this suggests that a large proportion did
correctly answer the quantitative direct explaining question. This result high-
lights the importance of also including qualitative relational questions in such
contexts.
Logic Independent analyses were conducted on qualitative and quantitative
‘logic’ questions (Q11 and Q12 in Table 2.1).
Qualitative A Chi-Square test of independence illustrated a significant
difference in the proportion of participants who accurately answered the qual-
itative question relating to explaining away between the three groups, χ2(2) =
6.88, p = .032. Post-hoc pairwise comparisons using FDR procedure illustrated
a significant difference between GroupMEDIUM (82.2%) and GroupHIGH (69.5%),
corrected p = .043. No significant difference was found between GroupLOW
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(73.3%) and both GroupMEDIUM, corrected p = .127, and GroupHIGH, corrected
p = .548. As can be seen from Figure 2.11, the majority of participants did,
however, correctly report the direction of the probability change.
Quantitative A Chi-Square test of independence illustrated no significant
difference in the proportion of participants who accurately answered the quan-
titative question relating to explaining away between the three groups, χ2(2) =
4.26, p = .119. The proportions were: GroupLOW, 68.7%; GroupMEDIUM, 77%;
and GroupHIGH, 66.9%. The high percentages suggest that in each group a ma-
jority of the participants correctly answered the logic question.
Overall these findings illustrate that across conditions a high percentage
of participants was able to correctly answer both quantitative and qualitative
logic questions, suggesting they largely understood the (deterministic) rela-
tions between variables in the 3-node structure.
Explaining away: relational concept Given the relational nature of explain-
ing away, to better investigate participants’ updating behaviour across this pat-
tern of inference, I conducted aggregate analyses on questions pertaining to di-
agnostic reasoning, explaining away, and logic. Independent analyses were
conducted on qualitative and quantitative relational explaining away ques-
tions.
Qualitative To explore participants’ qualitative relational explaining
away, I conducted the analysis on questions relating to direct explaining away
and logic (Q9 and Q11 in Table 2.1).23 A Chi-Square test of independence il-
23I did not include the two qualitative diagnostic reasoning questions here since these two
questions are about the relationship between the priors and diagnostic reasoning. The aim was
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lustrated a significant difference in the proportion of participants who accu-
rately answered both qualitative questions relating to explaining away concept
between the three groups, χ2(2) = 12.8, p = .002. Post-hoc pairwise com-
parisons using the FDR procedure illustrated a significant difference between
GroupLOW (32.7%) and GroupHIGH (15.9%), corrected p = .003 and between
GroupLOW and GroupMEDIUM (20.4%), corrected p = .033. No significant dif-
ference was found between GroupMEDIUM and GroupHIGH, corrected p = .386.
Similarly to the qualitative diagnostic reasoning and the qualitative direct ex-
plaining away results, these proportions seem to correspond to the size of the
normative relational explaining away in respective Priors conditions. The per-
centages, however, are again low suggesting poor overall performance.
Quantitative In regards to the quantitative relational explaining away, the
questions I included in the analyses were those relating to the updating of C1,
namely, P(C1 | E), P(C1 | E, C2), and P(C1 | E,∼C2). These are Q6, Q10 and
Q12 in Table 2.1.
A Friedman’s ANOVA was carried out on participants’ estimates of the
quantitative relational explaining away questions, within each of the groups
(see Figure 2.14). Results illustrated a significant difference between these es-
timates within GroupLOW, χ2(2) = 155.9, p < .001, within GroupMEDIUM,
χ2(2) = 190.9, p < .001 and within GroupHIGH, χ2(2) = 157.2, p < .001.
Wilcoxon signed-rank tests were carried out to compare participants’ esti-
mates with normative ones (see Table 2.3 below). In each of the tests, the null
to analyze participants understanding of the inequalities in (2.3) which are about the relations
between diagnostic reasoning and direct explaining away (Q9) and between direct explaining
away and ‘logic’ (Q11).









































































































































Figure 2.14: Box plots of participants’ quantitative relational explaining away re-
sponses in three groups along with the normative estimates in Experiment 1.
hypothesis was that the empirical difference between the pairs of inferences of
interest would equal the corresponding normative difference. As can be seen
from the table, participants mostly under-adjusted their probability estimates
since the null hypothesis that the normative difference is equal to the empiri-
cal difference is strongly rejected in most cases except in GroupHIGH between
P(C1 | E, C2) and P(C1 | E,∼C2) where participants appear to have sufficiently
shifted their estimates. The participants in GroupLOW and GroupMEDIUM have
thus under-adjusted their estimates despite the difference in medians between
P(C1 | E, C2) and P(C1 | E,∼C2) being equal to the normative difference for
these groups.
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Table 2.3: Within-group explaining away in Experiment 1.
Inferences Normative diff. Empirical diff. of medians p-value
GroupLOW
A− B .36 .3 < .001
C− B .8 .8 < .001
GroupMED
A− B .17 0 < .001
C− B .5 .5 < .001
GroupHIGH
A− B .07 0 < .001
C− B .3 .3 .067
Note: A := P(C1 | E), B := P(C1 | E, C2), C := P(C1 | E,∼C2).
Diagnostic split To test the diagnostic split hypothesis I included in the anal-
ysis only participants who reported the correct priors (N = 386, or 85.2% of
all participants) and then calculated the proportion of these participants who
reported .5 (± .02) as their estimate for both P(C1 | E) and P(C2 | E). Of 386
participants, 50.4% in GroupLOW, 78.7% in GroupMED and 13.6% in GroupHIGH
provided estimates in line with the diagnostic split hypothesis. A Chi-Square
test of independence illustrated that these proportions significantly differed
from each other, χ2(2) = 109.2, p < .001. All post-hoc pairwise comparisons
using the FDR procedure were significant with corrected p < .001. These pro-
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portions suggest that a large proportion of participants who correctly answered
the priors questions provided estimates predicted by the diagnostic split hy-
pothesis. Note that both the diagnostic split hypothesis and the propensity
hypothesis make exactly the same prediction in the medium priors condition,
namely stay at the prior of .5. Therefore, the higher proportion observed in
the GroupMED is expected as the .5 response is predicted by both hypotheses.
The relatively low proportion of participants observed in GroupHIGH suggests
that people are unwilling to reduce the probability to .5 in diagnostic reason-
ing from the high prior of .7. Overall then, these results partly support the
diagnostic split hypothesis.
At the outset of the this part of the chapter, I predicted that the diagnostic
split hypothesis would be able to account for a significant amount of failures
in (quantitative) diagnostic reasoning and (quantitative) relational explaining
away. To explore how much of these failures can be explained by the diagnos-
tic split hypothesis I built simple cross-tabulations. I selected only participants
who correctly answered the both priors questions (N = 386) and collapsed
the data across all conditions. I then cross-tabulated participants’ responses
as in line (‘yes’) or not in line (‘no’) with the diagnostic split hypothesis and
correct (‘yes’) or incorrect (‘no’) quantitative diagnostic reasoning as well as
correct (‘yes’) or incorrect (‘no’) quantitative relational explaining away (see
Table 2.4) (these tables also included responses that were in line (‘yes’) or not
in line (‘no’) with the propensity interpretation since this was relevant for the
section below).24 First, notice that the cross-tabulations for both diagnostic
24I have not included the diagnostic split hypothesis in cross-tabulations that included quali-
tative diagnostic reasoning and qualitative relational explaining away, as I did with the propen-
sity hypothesis, since (i) the propensity hypothesis has a very specific quantitative prediction
2.1 Explaining away: Accounting for a single common effect 118
reasoning and explaining away look very similar suggesting that participants
who correctly answer the quantitative diagnostic reasoning questions went on
to also correctly answer questions related to the quantitative direct explaining
and the quantitative logic question. However, as only 13 participants correctly
answered the quantitative diagnostic reasoning question this applied to only
about 3% of the data. Second, from the table we can see that the diagnostic
split hypotheses accounted for about 51% violations in quantitative diagnostic
reasoning and in quantitative relational explaining away. This finding sug-
gests that the diagnostic split reasoning played a significant part in violations
of both the quantitative diagnostic reasoning and quantitative relational ex-
plaining away.
Propensity interpretation In order to test the propensity hypothesis, I cal-
culated the proportion of people who did not update in the face of learning
evidence and learning the other cause occurred.
Qualitative I calculated the proportions of participants who, having
stated the correct priors (N = 386), selected ‘stay the same’ as an an-
swer to both qualitative diagnostic reasoning questions (Q5 and Q7) as well
as the qualitative direct explaining away question (Q9). Across each cover
story these percentages were (of N = 386): 63.8% for GroupCOINS, 53.8% for
GroupBALL CONTAINERS, and 46.8% for GroupDINNER. A Chi-Square test of in-
that does not depend on the qualitative directional of update from the priors and (ii) the diag-
nostic split hypothesis would have the same qualitative prediction as the normative account in
the low priors conditions (i.e. the probability should increase) and in order not to conflate these
two I have not included the diagnostic split hypothesis in cross-tabulations on the qualitative
results.
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Table 2.4: A cross-tabulation for correct/incorrect (yes/no) quantitative diagnostic rea-
soning and quantitative relation explaining away as well as for in line/not in line with
(yes/no) the diagnostic split hypothesis and the (quantitative) propensity hypothesis
predictions in Experiment 1. Total N = 386.
Diag. reasoning Explaining away
Quantitative Quant. relational
Yes No Yes No
Diag. split Propensity interpretation
(quantitative)
Yes Yes 0 101 0 101
Yes No 0 90 0 90
No Yes 0 99 0 99
No No 13 83 12 84
dependence found a significant difference between these proportions, χ2(2) =
7.96, p = .019. Post-hoc pairwise comparisons using the FDR procedure
showed the only difference to be between GroupCOINS and GroupDINNER, cor-
rected p = .021. No significant difference was found between GroupCOINS and
GroupBALL CONTAINERS, corrected p = .213, or between GroupBALL CONTAINERS
and GroupDINNER, corrected p = .316.
Quantitative Out of the participants who correctly stated the priors, I cal-
culated the proportions of those who provided the priors as their estimate
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to P(C1 | E), P(C2 | E), and P(C1 | E, C2) (i.e. Q6, Q8, and Q10). Collapsing
across the priors conditions, the percentages were (of N = 386): 60.8% for
GroupCOINS, 50% for GroupBALL CONTAINERS and 44.6% for GroupDINNER. Chi-
Square test of independence illustrated that these proportions significantly dif-
fered from each other, χ2(2) = 7.2, p = .028. Post-hoc pairwise compar-
isons using the FDR procedure showed the only significant difference to be
between GroupCOINS and GroupDINNER, corrected p = .034. No significant
difference was found between GroupCOINS and GroupBALL CONTAINERS, cor-
rected p = .198, or between GroupBALL CONTAINERS and GroupDINNER, cor-
rected p = .421.
The results from the qualitative and quantitative participants’ responses fit
the propensity hypothesis prediction: significantly more participants stayed at
the priors in the Coins cover story where the propensity hypothesis was ex-
pected to be the most pronounced compared to the Dinner cover story, with
the Ball containers cover story falling in between.
Furthermore, from Table 2.4 we can see that the propensity hypothesis ac-
counted for about 53% of violations in both the quantitative diagnostic rea-
soning and quantitative relational explaining away (of those who correctly an-
swered both priors questions). I also cross-tabulated participants’ answers as
(not) in line with the propensity hypothesis and (in)correct qualitative direct
and relational explaining away and (in)correct quantitative direct explaining
away. Table 2.5 shows that the propensity hypothesis accounted for about 73%
of violations in qualitative diagnostic reasoning, about 74% of violations in
qualitative direct explaining away, and about 71% of violations in qualitative
relational explaining away (of N = 386). The high percentages suggest that the
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propensity hypothesis was driving the majority of violations in all these infer-
ences. Table 2.6 further elucidates the point from Section 2.1.7.3 where I found
that an unexpectedly large proportion of participants correctly answered the
quantitative direct explaining away question. Here we see that about 70% of
these ‘correct’ responses were in fact responses given in line with the propen-
sity hypothesis where participants repeated the priors when answering the
quantitative direct explaining away question.
Table 2.5: A cross-tabulation for correct/incorrect (yes/no) qualitative diagnostic rea-
soning and both direct and relational qualitative explaining away as well as for in
line/not in line with (yes/no) the (qualitative) propensity hypothesis predictions in
Experiment 1. Total N = 386.
Diag. reasoning Qualitative explaining away
Qualitative Direct Relational
Yes No Yes No Yes No
Propensity interpretation
(qualitative)
Yes 0 211 0 211 0 211
No 95 80 100 75 89 86
2.1.7.4 Discussion
The methodology I used in Experiment 1 has resulted in the large proportions
of participants accepting the priors given to them, not violating the indepen-
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Table 2.6: A cross-tabulation for correct/incorrect (yes/no) quantitative direct explain-
ing away as well as for in line/not in line with (yes/no) the (quantitative) propensity
hypothesis predictions in Experiment 1.






dence of the causes before learning the effect, and correctly answering the fi-
nal logic question suggesting that they did understand the causal structure
and the parameters of the cover stories. Despite these encouraging results,
the findings echo those of the extant literature as participants overall insuffi-
ciently explained away. This was reflected in both poor diagnostic reasoning
and poor direct qualitative explaining away as well as in insufficient quali-
tative relational explaining away in all three groups. Quantitative relational
explaining away was insufficient in GroupLOW and GroupMED and marginally
sufficient in GroupHIGH. The sufficient quantitative relational explaining away
in GroupHIGH could be attributed to the small normative amount of explaining
away in the high condition which makes it easier for participants in this con-
ditions to sufficiently explain away compared to participants in the other two
conditions.
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Since the different priors lead to different amounts of the normative explain-
ing away I have predicted that participants would explain away more in low
priors condition than in both medium and high priors conditions, and that par-
ticipants reasoning with medium priors conditions would explain away more
than those reasoning with high priors. I have found that participants’ quantita-
tive responses only partially supported this prediction: only in diagnostic rea-
soning I have found that the difference P(Ci | E)− P(Ci) is the highest in the
low condition, followed by the medium and the high condition. This was not
found in participants’ responses to quantitative questions regarding both the
direct and relational explaining away. Interestingly, however, I have found that
the proportions of participants correctly answering the qualitative questions
regarding diagnostic reasoning and both the direct and relational explaining
away did directly correspond to the size of the quantitative difference between
the two probabilities and the normative amount of explaining away (which is
dictated by the priors), with the highest proportion of participants correctly
answering these qualitative questions being in the low conditions, followed by
the medium condition, with the smallest proportion of correct answers found
in the high condition. This finding is lending support to a claim that people
are sensitive to the size of the normative differences between the probabilities
being compared: the greater the quantitative normative difference the greater
the proportion of people who will correctly choose the normative qualitative
direction of probability change between the two probability estimates. This,
however, was not the case with the participants’ quantitative estimates which
could be attributed to the two hypotheses.
As predicted by the propensity interpretation hypothesis, I found that
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a significant proportion of participants reported that P(Ci) = P(Ci | E) =
P(Ci | E, Cj) in both qualitative and quantitative questions. Moreover, I found
that this proportion was the highest when participants were reasoning with
the cover story in which I expected the propensity interpretation to be the most
pronounced (Coins cover story) and the lowest when participants reasoned
with the cover story in which I expected the propensity interpretation to he
the least pronounced (Dinner party), with the third cover story (Ball and con-
tainers) falling between. This is exactly what is predicted by the propensity
hypothesis. Furthermore, the cross-tabulations showed that the propensity hy-
potheses accounted for over 50% of violations in quantitative diagnostic rea-
soning and relational explaining away and over 70% of violations in qualitative
diagnostic reasoning and explaining away (both direct and relational) (of those
who correctly answered the priors, N = 386).
Finally, regarding the diagnostic split hypothesis I found that a significant
proportion of participants in the low and medium conditions did split the prob-
ability space between the two causes in diagnostic reasoning and assigned .5
probability to each cause with the hypothesis accounting for over 50% of vi-
olations in quantitative diagnostic reasoning and relational explaining away
(of N = 386). However, as the proportion of participants was significantly
lower in the high conditions, the diagnostic split hypothesis was only partly
supported. These results may suggest that people split the probability space
in diagnostic reasoning only when the update to the diagnostic split predic-
tion from the priors is in the qualitatively normative direction, a notion that
is further explored in Experiment 2. The cross-tabulations in Table 2.4 also
pointed that correct quantitative diagnostic reasoning could be predictive for
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explaining away: participants who correctly answered the quantitative diag-
nostic reasoning questions also correctly answered questions related to both
the direct explaining away and the quantitative logic question. This is an inter-
esting finding on its own as it may suggest that the crucial part in explaining
away is diagnostic reasoning and that understanding violation in diagnostic
reasoning will possibly lead to understanding violations in explaining away.
Taken together, the two hypotheses accounted for about 78% of violations in
quantitative diagnostic reasoning and quantitative relational explaining away
(of N = 386). Given this and the other above-mentioned high percentages, I
can conclude that the diagnostic split hypothesis and the propensity hypoth-
esis were able to explain a significant amount of the observed insufficiency in
explaining away. This result, however, also suggests that there is around 22%
of the violations in quantitative diagnostic reasoning and relational explaining
away (total N = 386) that the two hypotheses were not able to capture. This
percentage us high enough to suggest that there are factors at work other than
the two hypotheses that drive participants estimates in diagnostic reasoning
and explaining away. Further work should endeavor to identify these factors.
Before moving on to the next experiment I would like to address potential
carry-over effects that might arise due to the order of the questions being kept
constant across all conditions in Experiment 1 (subsequent experiments). Many
previous studies on explaining away have elicited probabilities estimates from
participants on different types of judgments (priors, independence, diagnostic
reasoning, explaining away etc.) in a random order (see for example Fern-
bach & Rehder, 2013; Rehder, 2014a; Rehder & Waldmann, 2017; Rottman &
Hastie, 2016). All these studies have, however, found similar results in that
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people’s (quantitative) diagnostic reasoning and explaining away judgements
were poor. Given that the main results are similar, the set order of questions
asked in this experiment (and those that follow it) does not seemed to have
yielded in different performance on diagnostic reasoning and explaining away
questions. That being said, it is possible that a high percentage of participants
who correctly answered the priors questions could partly be attributed to the
fact that this was the first question they were presented with rather than the
question the order of which was random (many of the studies who used the
random order of questions reported low percentage of participants who pro-
vided the correct priors), which would be an instance of the primacy effects.
Given the importance of priors in the determining the amount of explaining
away, these potential primacy effects would, however, be desirable in the con-
texts of this and the following experiments are they would potentially increase
the acceptance of the priors.
2.1.8 Experiment 225
Experiment 1 suggested that the propensity interpretation of probability and
the diagnostic split strategy are some of the factors that are significantly driving
the findings regarding reasoning in explaining away. One of the limitation of
Experiment 1 was that it explored explaining away in situations where the prior
probabilities of causes were equal. The goal of this experiment was to examine
the robustness of the two hypotheses by testing them in explaining situations
where the priors of causes were not equal.
The results from Experiment 1 suggested that largest differences between
25This experiment was conducted together with Alice Liefgreen (Liefgreen & Tešić, in press).
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the predictions of the normative model and the participants’ probability esti-
mates were in the low priors condition. From the perspective of the two hy-
potheses this is expected as the predictions of these hypotheses diverge more
from the normative ones when the priors are low: the normative amount of ex-
plaining away is larger when the priors are lower increasing the discrepancy
between the normative predictions and the predictions of the two hypotheses.
This implies that the power of the experiment is higher if the priors are low
rather than medium or high. Therefore, all the scenarios in this next experi-
ment had priors of the causes that were low.
In addition to being low, the priors in this experiment were un-
equal: P(C1) = .2 and P(C2) = .1. The predictions of the propensity hypothesis
do not change due to unequal priors: it still predicts that P(Ci) = P(Ci | E) =
P(Ci | E, Cj), where i, j ∈ {1, 2}. Therefore, this experiment sought to replicate
the findings of Experiment 1 regarding the propensity hypothesis. The diag-
nostic split hypothesis predicts that P(C1 | E) + P(C2 | E) = 1, so was also
seeking to replicate the findings of Experiment 1. However, given that the pri-
ors are now unequal, one would expect participants not just to split the proba-
bility space equally between the two cases, i.e. P(C1 | E) = P(C2 | E) = .5, but,
as the findings from Liefgreen et al. (2018) suggested, some participants could
also follow the 2 : 1 ratio between the priors and split the probability space ac-
cordingly in diagnostic reasoning, i.e. they would estimate that P(C1 | E) = .67
and P(C2 | E) = .33. Thus, two clusters of participants estimates are expected
in this experiment that accord with the diagnostic split predictions.
2.1 Explaining away: Accounting for a single common effect 128
2.1.8.1 Overview
The same three cover stories from Experiment 1 were used to manipulate how
much the propensity interpretation was emphasized. A deterministic set-up
was again adopted, i.e. the presence of at least one cause entailed the presence
of the effect: P(E | C1, C2) = P(E | Ci,∼Cj) = 1; and the absence of both causes
entailed absence of the effect: P(E | ∼C1,∼C2) = 0. In this experiment, how-
ever, the priors were low and unequal with P(C1) = .2 and P(C2) = .1.
As the only manipulation in this experiment was how much the propensity
was pronounced across the three cover stories, only the propensity hypothesis
was directly tested in this experiment. However, as mentioned above the di-
agnostic split hypothesis has clear predictions for this experiment and I again
cross-tabulated the data to explore how much of the violation in diagnostic
reasoning can be explained by the diagnostic split hypothesis.
2.1.8.2 Methods
Participants and Design A total of 271 participants (NMALE = 11, 4 partic-
ipants identified as ‘other’, MAGE = 32.2 years) were recruited from Prolific
Academic (www.prolific.ac). All participants were native English speakers
who gave informed consent and were paid £1 for partaking in the present
study, which took on average 10.8 minutes to complete. Eight participants were
excluded as they did not pass the attention check, leaving a total of 263 partic-
ipants in the analyses.
A between-participant design was employed and participants were ran-
domly allocated to one of three groups which differed in the cover story they
were required to reason with: GroupCOIN (n = 87), GroupBALL (n = 87), and
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GroupDINNER (n = 89).
Materials The materials used in this experiment were exactly the same as
in Experiment 1, with the exception that in this experiment the priors were
unequal and only low priors were employed. For full materials visit Open
Science Framework, https://osf.io/zm6ec/.
Procedure The procedure for this experiment was exactly the same as for Ex-
periment one: participants were asked the same number of questions, the same
types of questions, and in the same order as in Experiment 1.
2.1.8.3 Results
Participants’ answers to all qualitative questions in the inference questionnaire
are represented in Figure 2.15 and their answers to all quantitative questions
are in Figure 2.16. As in Experiment 1, a separate analyses was carried out for
each inference type.
Overall Performance To determine the effect of the manipulations on partic-
ipants’ overall performance throughout the task, like in Experiment 1 a GLM
with binomial link function was built. The model had one fixed effect, namely
Cover story, with a random intercept for each participant (there was no random
slope for participant since Cover story varies between participants). There was
no main effect of Cover story, z = −1.43, p = .15. Including the predictor Cover
story in the model did not improve model fit (χ2(1) = 2.04, p = .15) compared
to just having an intercept as a predictor. As the predictor was centered, this
implied that the data grand mean fits the data no worse than the model which



















































































Increase Stay the same Decrease
Figure 2.15: Distribution of participants’ responses to qualitative questions in Experi-
ment 2. Asterisks above the bars indicate normative answers.

















































































Figure 2.16: Participants’ responses to quantitative questions in Experiment 2. Red hor-
izontal lines are correct (normative) answers. Gray lines between data points depict
how participants changed their probability estimates from one questions to another,
with curved lines indicating that a participant did not change (within± .02) their prob-
ability estimate. Note that the order of questions in this figure does not correspond to
the order of question in the experiment. It starts with participants’ estimates for P(C2)
rather than P(C1). This is done purely to aid the visual inspection of the data as the pri-
ors of the two causes were not equal. Specifically, it aids the inspection of participants’
estimates that did not change from one question to another.
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includes the predictor.
Given there was no effect of Cover story, the data were collapsed across
all three cover story conditions in order to obtain the following descriptives
regarding participants’ accuracy.
Prior probabilities Collapsing across all conditions, 79.1% of participants
correctly answered both questions pertaining to the prior probabilities,
i.e. P(C1) and P(C2). This is in line with the findings from Experiment 1 and it
suggests that the majority of participants accepted the priors.
Independence of causes For a breakdown of the frequency of participants’
answers to qualitative independence questions see Figure 2.15. Collapsing
across conditions, 89% of participants correctly answered both questions re-
lating to independence, i.e. Qs P(C2 | C1) and P(C1 | ∼C2). This is again
very much in agreement with the findings from Experiment 1 and suggests
that participants did not violate the assumption of Independence between the
cases (before knowing the evidence).
Diagnostic Reasoning As in Experiment 1, both qualitative and quantitative
estimates for diagnostic reasoning were collected. 50.2% of participants cor-
rectly answered both qualitative diagnostic reasoning questions and only .4% of
participants (i.e. only 1 participant) correctly answered both quantitative diag-
nostic reasoning questions, i.e. P(C1 | E) and P(C2 | E). This again very closely
mirrors the finding from Experiment 1 GroupLOW, i.e. the group that reasoned
with low priors. The amount and direction of change in participants’ quanti-
tative estimates from their given priors to their estimates after learning about
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the effect was also explored. As in Experiment 1, I conduced the Wilcoxon
signed-rank test on the difference between participants’ quantitative estimates
on each prior question and their related diagnostic reasoning question (i.e. be-
tween P(C1) and P(C1 | E) and between P(C2) and P(C2 | E)). Table 2.7 shows
the normative differences, the empirical differences of medians, and p-values
of Wilcoxon signed-rank tests.
Table 2.7: Quantitative differences in diagnostic reasoning inferences per group in Ex-
periment 2.
Inferences Normative diff. Empirical diff. of medians p-value
P(C1 | E)− P(C1) .51 .3 < .001
P(C2 | E)− P(C2) .26 .25 < .001
As in Experiment 1, the results here also suggest that participants have
under-adjusted their probability estimates and that difference went in the nor-
mative direction. However, as the priors are unequal in this experiment, the
normative difference between P(C1 | E) and P(C1) was higher than in Experi-
ment 1, implying that from the normative perspective participants even more
under-adjusted the probability P(C1 | E) than in Experiment 1. Analogously,
since the normative difference between P(C2 | E) and P(C2) was lower than
in Experiment 1, participants’ under-adjustment of P(C2 | E) was lower than
in Experiment 1. The specific clusters of participants’ estimates in diagnostic
reasoning are discussed in more detail below.
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Direct explaining away 34.6% of participants correctly answered the qualita-
tive direct explaining question (i.e. P(C1 | E, C2)) and 51% participants correctly
answered the quantitative direct explaining question. I have also computed a
sample standard deviation from the normative response (snorm) using the same
bootstrapping procedure as in Experiment 1; snorm = .28, 95% CI [.25, .32].
These results are again on par with those in Experiment 1, GroupLOW . Again,
these higher percentages again suggest a relatively better performance on di-
rect quantitative explaining away. However, a quick look at Figure 2.16 reveals
that a large number of participants repeated the priors in P(C1 | E), P(C2 | E),
and P(C1 | E, C2) and thus ‘correctly’ answered the direct explaining question.
This is further discussed below.
Logic 72.6% of participants correctly answered the qualitative direct explain-
ing question (i.e. P(C1 | E,∼C2)) and 73.3% participants correctly answered
the quantitative direct explaining question. These results are again on pair with
those in Experiment 1 and suggest that participant largely understood the (de-
terministic) relationships in the cover stories.
Explaining away: relational concept As in the analysis in Experiment 1, par-
ticipants’ understanding of explaining away as a relational concepts was ex-
plored. 31.6% participants correctly answered both questions related to the
qualitative relational explaining away, i.e. P(C1 | E, C2) and P(C1 | E,∼C2).
A Friedman’s ANOVA was carried out on participants’ estimates of the
quantitative relational explaining away questions: i.e. P(C1 | E), P(C1 | E, C2)
and P(C1 | E,∼C2). Results illustrated a significant difference between these
estimates: χ2(2) = 265.6, p < .001. Wilcoxon signed-rank tests were carried out
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to compare participants’ estimates with normative ones (see Table 2.8 below).
Table 2.8: Relational explaining away in Experiment 2.
Inferences Normative diff. Empirical diff. of medians p-value
A− B .51 .3 < .001
C− B .8 .8 < .001
Note: A := P(C1 | E), B := P(C1 | E, C2), C := P(C1 | E,∼C2).
These results are again very similar to those in Experiment 1, GroupLOW.
They suggest that participants’ understanding of explaining away as a rela-
tional concept was relatively poor compared to the normative answers and that
they mostly under-adjusted their probability estimates.
Diagnostic split The predictions of the diagnostic split hypothesis was that
participants would report their estimates in diagnostic reasoning such that
P(C1 | E) + P(C2 | E) = 1. As in this experiment priors were unequal, it was
expected that instead of just splitting the probability space equally between the
two causes in diagnostic reasoning, a proportion of participants would report
that P(C1 | E) = .67 and P(C1 | E) = .33 to reflect the 2 : 1 ratio of the priors.
To explore how much of the data can be explained by the diagnostic split hy-
pothesis, I only included participants who reported correct priors (N = 208, or
79.1% of all data) and calculated the proportion of participants who reported .5
(± .02) as their estimate for both diagnostic reasoning questions or .67 (± .02)
for P(C1 | E) and .33 (± .02) for P(C2 | E). This proportion was 47.1%, with
60.2% of these 47.1% reporting .5 as their estimates for both diagnostic reason-
2.1 Explaining away: Accounting for a single common effect 136
ing question and the other 39.8% reporting .67 for P(C1 | E) and .33 (± .02) for
P(C2 | E). The results suggest that (i) a large proportion of participants’ diag-
nostic reasoning estimates can be accounted for by the diagnostic split hypoth-
esis (in line with Experiment 1, GroupLOW where this proportion was 50.4%)
and (ii) that some participants did follow the priors ratio and provided diag-
nostic reasoning estimates in line with that ratio.
As in Experiment 1, I have also cross-tabulated participants’ responses to
explore how much of the deviations from the normative model in (quantita-
tive) diagnostic reasoning and (quantitative) relational explaining away can be
accounted for by the diagnostic split hypothesis. From Table 2.9 we can see
that about 47.1% of violation in quantitative diagnostic reasoning and 47.8%
of violation in quantitative relational explaining away can be accounted for by
the diagnostic split hypothesis (of N = 208).
Propensity interpretation To test the propensity hypothesis, I calculated the
proportion of participants who did not update their probabilities when pre-
sented with evidence.
The proportions of participants who selected ‘stay the same’ as an answer
to both qualitative diagnostic reasoning questions as well as the qualitative direct
explaining away question for the three cover stories were (N = 208): 45.5% for
GroupCOIN, 34.3% for GroupBALL, and 21.9% for GroupDINNER. A Chi-Square
test of independence showed a significant difference between these propor-
tions, χ2(2) = 8.59, p = .014. Post-hoc pairwise comparisons using the FDR
procedure showed that the only significant difference was between GroupCOIN
and GroupDINNER, corrected p = .018. No significant difference was found be-
tween GroupCOIN and GroupBALL, corrected p = .235, or between GroupBALL
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Table 2.9: A cross-tabulation for correct/incorrect (yes/no) quantitative diagnostic rea-
soning and quantitative relation explaining away as well as for in line/not in line with
(yes/no) the diagnostic split hypothesis and the (quantitative) propensity hypothesis
predictions in Experiment 2. Total N = 208.
Diag. reasoning Explaining away
Quantitative Quant. relational
Yes No Yes No
Diag. split Propensity interpretation
(quantitative)
Yes Yes 0 0 0 0
Yes No 0 98 0 98
No Yes 0 57 0 57
No No 0 53 3 50
and GroupDINNER, corrected p = .235.
To test the propensity hypothesis on participants’ answers to quantitative
questions, I calculated the proportions of participants who correctly stated the
priors and who provided the priors as their estimate to P(C1 | E), P(C2 |
E), and P(C1 | E, C2) for the three cover stories (of N = 208): 40.3% for
GroupCOIN, 26.9% for GroupBALL, and 12.5% for GroupDINNER. A Chi-Square
test of independence showed a significant difference between these propor-
tions, χ2(2) = 13.55, p = .001. Post-hoc pairwise comparisons using the FDR
2.1 Explaining away: Accounting for a single common effect 138
procedure showed that the only significant difference was between GroupCOIN
and GroupDINNER, corrected p = .002. No significant difference was found be-
tween GroupCOIN and GroupBALL, corrected p = .13, or between GroupBALL
and GroupDINNER, corrected p = .098.
These results almost exactly replicate those from Experiment 1. Signifi-
cantly more participants stayed at the priors in the Coins cover story where the
propensity hypothesis was expected to be the most pronounced compared to
the Dinner cover story, with the Ball containers cover story falling in between.
Furthermore, from Table 2.9 we can see that the propensity hypothesis ac-
counted for about 27% of violations in both the quantitative diagnostic reason-
ing and quantitative relational explaining away (of N = 208). I also cross-
tabulated participants’ answers as (not) in line with the propensity hypothesis
and (in)correct qualitative direct and relational explaining away and (in)correct
quantitative direct explaining away. Table 2.10 shows that the propensity hy-
pothesis accounted for about 77% of violations in qualitative diagnostic rea-
soning, about 56% of violations in qualitative direct explaining away, and
about 54% of violations in qualitative relational explaining away (N = 208).
Similarly, to the findings in Experiment 1, these percentages suggest that the
propensity hypothesis was driving the majority of violations in all these infer-
ences. Table 2.11 further shows that about 44% of ‘correct’ responses in quan-
titative direct explaining away were in fact responses given in line with the
propensity hypothesis where participants repeated the priors when answering
the quantitative direct explaining away question.
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Table 2.10: A cross-tabulation for correct/incorrect (yes/no) qualitative diagnostic rea-
soning and both direct and relational qualitative explaining away as well as for in
line/not in line with (yes/no) the (qualitative) propensity hypothesis predictions in
Experiment 2. Total N = 208.
Diag. reasoning Qualitative explaining away
Qualitative Direct Relational
Yes No Yes No Yes No
Propensity interpretation
(qualitative)
Yes 0 72 0 72 0 72
No 114 22 79 57 75 61
2.1.8.4 Discussion
The results from Experiment 2 very closely resemble those from Experiment
1, in particular those for GroupLOW: relatively poor diagnostic reasoning and
explaining away, with a large percent of participant under-adjusting their es-
timates compared to the normative ones. The findings, however, suggest that
the deviations from the normative model can be accounted for by two hypothe-
ses. A significant proportion of participants reported P(Ci) = P(Ci | E) =
P(Ci | E, Cj) in both qualitative and quantitative questions, with the propor-
tion of participant reporting these estimates being the highest in the Coins
cover story where it was expected that the propensity interpretation would
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Table 2.11: A cross-tabulation for correct/incorrect (yes/no) quantitative direct ex-
plaining away as well as for in line/not in line with (yes/no) the (quantitative) propen-
sity hypothesis predictions in Experiment 2. Total N = 208.






be the most pronounced and the lowest in the Dinner party cover story where
the propensity interpretation was expected to be the least pronounced, with
the Ball and containers cover story proportion falling in between these two.
As in Experiment 1, these results support the hypothesis that people do inter-
pret probabilities as propensities and that this can lead to deviations from the
normative model in explaining away situations. The cross-tabulations further
showed that the propensity hypotheses accounted for a significant percentage
of violations in diagnostic reasoning and direct and relational explaining away
(both qualitative and quantitative).
The diagnostic split hypothesis was also able to account for a large pro-
portion of deviations from the normative account in quantitative diagnostic
reasoning. In contrast to Experiment 1, in this experiment I found that some
participants provided estimates that reflected the ratios of the priors of the
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two causes. This was, however, expected as it was also suggested by the re-
sults from Liefgreen et al. (2018) and it fits the diagnostic split prediction that
P(C1 | E) + P(C2 | E) = 1. One could argue that the diagnostic split predic-
tions are under-specified as it allows P(C1 | E) and P(C2 | E) to assume any
probability values as long as they add up to one. Two points here. First, the
diagnostic split prediction that P(C1 | E) and P(C2 | E) have to add up to one
to support the hypothesis is already a very specific one: any combination of
P(C1 | E) and P(C2 | E) that does not add up to one would falsify the hypoth-
esis. Second, the participants who seemed to have engaged in the diagnostic
split reasoning did not provide estimates for the probability of the two causes
after learning the effect that are random. In Experiment 1 they were mostly
around .5 probability and Experiment 2 these were mostly around again .5 as
well as .67 (for C1) and .33 (for C2). Is seems then that there are at least two
factors that drive the estimates of participants who engage in diagnostic split
reasoning: the number of causes and the ratio of the priors of the two causes.
It remains to be seen what other factors contribute to how people choose esti-
mates when engaging in diagnostic split reasoning. Nevertheless, the results
from Experiment 1 and 2 suggest that they do not choose them at random.
Overall, the two hypotheses have accounted for around 75% of violations
in quantitative diagnostic reasoning and relational explaining away (of those
who answered both priors questions correctly, N = 208), thus accounting for a
significant amount of the observed insufficiency in explaining away and very
closely replicating the results from Experiment 1.
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2.1.9 Experiment 326
In Experiments 1 and 2, a significant proportion of participants provided .5
probability as their estimate for each cause in diagnostic reasoning. However,
it is not uncommon that people assign probability of .5 to events when they
want to express their lack of confidence in their answer or when they want to
express that they do not know what the answer is (see for example Fischhoff
& Bruine De Bruin, 1999). So rather than following the diagnostic split strat-
egy, an alternative explanation regarding Experiments 1 and 2 findings where
some people gave .5 as their estimates to diagnostic reasoning questions, is that
these people were expressing that they did not know the answers. The goal of
Experiment 3 was to disentangle the two possibilities and further extend re-
sults of Experiments 1 and 2 to more than 2 causes. To do so, in Experiment 3 I
prompted participants to reason with a 4-node common-effect CBN with three
causes (see Figure 2.17).
E
C1 C2 C3
Figure 2.17: A common-effect CBN model with three causes.
In the CBN from Figure 2.17, assuming the deterministic set-up like in Exper-
iments 1 and 2, the diagnostic split hypothesis would predict that P(C1 | E) +
26This experiment was conducted together with Alice Liefgreen and David Lagnado (Tešić
et al., 2020).
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P(C2 | E) + P(C3 | E) = 1. If we further assume equal priors for all 3 causes,
then if people engage in the diagnostic split reasoning we would expect that
they provide the following estimates: P(C1 | E) = P(C2 | E) = P(C3 | E) =
1
3 ≈ .33. As .33 is sufficiently distinct from a .5 response that could also be a
stand in for ‘I am not sure’ or ‘I do not know’, if people’s diagnostic reason-
ing judgments go to .33 that would suggest that these people do employ the
diagnostic split strategy.
Another goal of Experiment 2 was to further test a prediction of the diag-
nostic split hypothesis whereby given high enough priors the split in the di-
agnostic reasoning would result in P(Ci | E) being lower than P(Ci) (as was
the case in High condition in Experiment 1), which is opposite to the norma-
tive direction of the update where P(Ci | E) > P(Ci). In Experiment 1 I found
that only around 14% of participants’ estimates went down from .7 priors to .5
in diagnostic reasoning compared to half of participants’ estimates that went
up from .2 priors to .5 in diagnostic reasoning. This suggests that people were
significantly less inclined to reduce the probability of the causes in diagnostic
reasoning. Experiment 3 was set to test this prediction in the context of three
causes. If the results from Experiment 1 were replicated, then the diagnostic
split hypothesis would need to be revised to account for small proportion of
people who reduce the probability of causes in diagnostic reasoning.
2.1.9.1 Overview
Similarly to Experiments 1, I manipulated the priors of causes and presented
participants with different cover stories. I again employed a deterministic set-
up where the presence of at least one cause entailed the presence of the ef-
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fect: P(E | C1, C2, C3) = P(E | Ci, Cj,∼Ck) = P(E | Ci,∼Cj,∼Ck) = 1; and ab-
sence of all three causes entailed absence of the effect: P(E | ∼C1,∼C2,∼C3) =
0. In this experiment, however, the priors were either low, P(C1) = P(C2) =
P(C3) = .2 or medium, P(C1) = P(C2) = P(C3) = .5. I deemed these two
variations of priors to be sufficient to (i) disentangle the probabilistic split strat-
egy predictions from an alternative mentioned above and (ii) further test the
diagnostic split hypothesis on its prediction in the medium condition where
P(Ci | E) = .33 < .5 = P(Ci).
In this experiment I employed two cover stories from Experiments 1 and
2, one involving balls and containers, and one involving a dinner party. I did
not use the cover story involving coin tossing since Experiments 1 and 2 find-
ings suggested that participants reasoning within that cover story stayed sig-
nificantly more at their priors when answering diagnostic reasoning questions
compared to participants reasoning with the other two cover stories. As the
primary goal of Experiment 3 is to distinguish between people giving .5 esti-
mate to express their lack of confidence and the diagnostic split strategy, which
required providing estimates different to the prior probabilities, to increase the
power of Experiment 3 I did not include the cover story including coin tossing.
Further, since in Experiments 1 and 2 the tests regarding the propensity
hypothesis did not show significant difference between the balls and contain-
ers cover story and the dinner party cover story (although the ordinal differ-
ence was in line with the propensity hypothesis) I have not directly tested the
propensity hypothesis in Experiment 3. However, given that the propensity
hypothesis has a clear prediction in Experiment 3, namely P(Ci | E) = P(Ci)
for i = {1, 2, 3}, I again cross-tabulated the data to explore how much of the vi-
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olation in diagnostic reasoning can be explained by the propensity hypothesis.
Given the new structure in Figure 2.17, in the balls and container cover story
the three causes were now represented by three balls (binary variables assum-
ing the value of either copper or rubber), randomly selected from three inde-
pendent containers and placed on three gaps in an electric circuit. If at least one
of the three balls was copper, a light bulb in the circuit (common effect) would
turn on. In the dinner party cover story the three causes were represented by
three individuals, Michael, Tom and Sam, and the common effect was repre-
sented by a fourth individual, Helen, who would drink wine only if at least
one of the three aforementioned people brought wine to a party (‘Helen’ was
a binary variable assuming the value of either ‘drinking wine’ or ‘not drinking
wine’).
2.1.9.2 Methods
Participants and Design A total of 119 participants (NMALE = 39, 2 partici-
pants identified as ‘other’, MAGE = 35 years) were recruited from Prolific Aca-
demic (www.prolific.ac). All participants were native English speakers who
gave informed consent and were paid £1 for partaking in the present study,
which took on average 8.25 minutes to complete.
A between-participant design was employed and participants were ran-
domly allocated to one of 2 (cover story: ball containers, dinner party) ×
2 (priors condition: low, medium) = 4 groups NBALL CONTAINERS LOW = 28,
NBALL CONTAINERS MED = 30, NDINNER LOW = 32, NDINNER MED = 29).
Materials Each of the groups was asked to complete an inference question-
naire (NQUESTIONS = 12), comprising of questions regarding priors and (un-
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conditional) independence of causes, as well as reasoning questions relating
to diagnostic reasoning and explaining away. For a full list of questions and
the inferences these represented see Table 2.12. For diagnostic reasoning infer-
ences, two questions were asked regarding the same inference, one in qualita-
tive format (e.g. Q7) and one in quantitative format (e.g. Q8).
Each of the four groups reasoned either with low or medium priors and
were either presented the balls and containers cover story or the dinner party
cover story from Experiments 1 and 2 now adapted to include the third cause
(see Figure 2.18). For full materials visit Open Science Framework, https://
osf.io/aqjkp/.
Procedure Like in Experiments 1 and 2, participants in each of the four
groups were initially presented with the pertinent cover story and were given
explicit information on the common-effect model embedded within the cover
story including the prior probability of each cause, and the causal relation-
ships within the model. This was done in both textual form and in visual form
(graphical representation; see Figure 2.18). In order to ensure participants un-
derstood the structure, they were provided with a textual account by which
each cause could independently bring about the common effect. Subsequently,
participants were presented with the inference questionnaire (for questions
see Table 2.12). The questionnaire required participants to sequentially answer
questions firstly regarding priors of causes, secondly independence of causes
and finally regarding diagnostic reasoning about each cause. The graphical and
textual details of the cover story were present on the same page as the relevant
inference questions so participants could access these details at any point.
Questions marked as quantitative in Table 2.12 required participants to pro-
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Figure 2.18: Graphical representations of the cover stories presented to participants in
Experiment 3. The top image was featured in the balls and container cover story and
the bottom one in the dinner party cover story.
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Table 2.12: Inference types and questions found in the questionnaire for Experiment 2.








P(C2 | C1) Qualitative
5 P(∼C3 | ∼C2) Qualitative
6 P(C1 | ∼C3) Qualitative
7 , 8
Diagnostic Reasoning
P(C1 | E)-R-P(C1) Qual. & Quant.
9 , 10 P(C2 | E)-R-P(C2) Qual. & Quant.
11 , 12 P(C3 | E)-R-P(C3) Qual. & Quant.
Note: -R- stands for ‘in relation to’.
vide numerical estimates on a slider with a scale ranging from 0% to 100%.
Questions marked as qualitative, required participants to select one of three
options: the probability increases, decreases, or stays the same when asked
about e.g. P(C2 | C1) given no knowledge of whether E is present or not. To
investigate participants’ diagnostic reasoning I employed both qualitative and
quantitative question formats. For example, participants in groups reasoning
with the balls and containers cover story, after finding out that the light bulb is
on, were asked both a qualitative diagnostic reasoning question (e.g. Q7): “Does
the probability that Ball 1 is a copper ball change (compared to Q1, where you
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said: X%) after you find out that the light bulb turned on?” as well as a quan-
titative one: “What do you now think is the probability that Ball 1 is a copper
ball?”. Additionally, diagnostic reasoning questions prompted participants to
provide written explanations for their answers. All evidence (i.e. new states
of cause or effect variables) was provided to participants both textually (e.g. in
groups reasoning with balls container cover story: “You uncover the light bulb
and find that it is turned on”) as well as visually (as an updated graphical rep-
resentation of the model). One again, the graphical and textual details of the
cover story were present on the same page as the relevant inference questions
so participants could access these details at any point.
2.1.9.3 Results
Participants’ answers to all qualitative in the inference questionnaire are rep-
resented in Figure 2.19 and their responses to all quantitative questions are in
Figure 2.20.
Overall Performance As in Experiments 1 and 2, to test for a main effect
of cover story and/or priors condition on participants’ judgment accuracy
throughout the inference questionnaire I initially re-coded all of participants’
answers as being either correct (1) or incorrect (0). For all quantitative esti-
mates, an answer was considered correct if it fell within ± .02 of the normative
probability estimate. This allowed for a comparative measure of participants’
accuracy in both qualitative and quantitative types of inferences. Subsequently,
I combined each participants’ coded response to the symmetrical pairs of infer-
ence into a single coded response: if a participant answered all three questions
regarding priors correctly, the response was coded as 1; otherwise 0. The same





























































Increase Stay the same Decrease
Figure 2.19: Distribution of participants’ responses to qualitative questions in Experi-
ment 3. Asterisks above the bars indicate normative answers.

























































































Figure 2.20: Participants’ responses to quantitative questions in Experiment 3. Red
horizontal lines are correct (normative) answers. Gray lines between data points de-
pict how participants changed their probability estimates from one questions to an-
other, with curved lines indicating that a participant did not change (within ± .02)
their probability estimate.
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was done for the questions regarding independence and qualitative and quan-
titative diagnostic reasoning. This leaves four coded question-types regard-
ing: priors, independence, qualitative diagnostic reasoning, and quantitative
diagnostic reasoning.
To determine the effect of the manipulations on participants’ overall per-
formance throughout the task I built a GLM with binomial link function. The
model had two fixed effects, Cover story and Priors, with a random intercept
for each participant (there was no random slope for participant since Cover
story and Priors vary between participants). I found no main effect of Priors,
z = −0.89, p = .36 and no main effect of Cover story, z = −0.7, p = .49. There
was also no interaction between Cover story and Priors, z = −0.03, p = .97.
Including the predictors (Cover story and Priors) in the model did not improve
model fit (χ2(3) = 1.32, p = .72) compared to just having an intercept as a pre-
dictor. As the predictors were centered, this implied that the data grand mean
fits the data no worse than the model which includes both predictors.
Given there was no effect of scenario or priors on participants’ performance,
I collapsed all conditions in order to obtain the following descriptives regard-
ing participants’ accuracy.
Prior probabilities Collapsing across all conditions, 84% of participants
correctly answered all three questions pertaining to the prior probabilities
i.e. P(C1), P(C2) and P(C3).
Independence of causes For a breakdown of the frequency of participants’
answers to qualitative independence questions see Figure 2.19. Collapsing
across conditions, 89% of participants correctly answered all three questions
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relating to independence (i.e. Qs 4, 5, and 6 in Table 2.12).
Diagnostic Reasoning For a breakdown of the frequency of participants’ an-
swers to qualitative diagnostic reasoning questions see Figure 2.19. In re-
gards to diagnostic reasoning, 26% of participants correctly answered all three
qualitative diagnostic reasoning questions (Qs 7, 9, and 11 in Table 2.12) and
only 2.5% of participants correctly answered all three quantitative diagnostic
reasoning questions (Qs 8, 10, and 12 in Table 2.12).
Diagnostic split In order to test the diagnostic split hypothesis I firstly col-
lapsed the cover story condition and subsequently computed the proportion
of participants who, having given the correct priors (± .02) for all three causes
(N = 100, or 84% of all data), updated the probabilities of P(C1 | E), P(C2 | E)
and P(C3 | E) to .33 (± .02) each. This proportion was 34% in group reasoning
with low priors and 3.8% in group reasoning with medium priors (of N = 100).
A Chi-Square test of independence illustrated showed that these proportions
significantly differed from each other, χ2(1) = 13.48, p < .001. The findings
replicate those of Experiment 1, as participants reasoning with low priors em-
ployed the diagnostic split strategy significantly more than participants who
reasoned with medium priors.
Similarly to Experiments 1 and 2 analyses, I collapsed all data and cross-
tabulated responses of participants who correctly answered all three priors
questions. Table 2.13 illustrates that the diagnostic split hypothesis accounted
for about 18% of violations in quantitative diagnostic reasoning (of N = 100).
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Propensity interpretation Although I have not explicitly tested the propen-
sity hypothesis in this experiment, the cross-tabulations showed how much of
the violations in diagnostic reasoning can be accounted for by this hypothesis.
Table 2.13 shows that about 67% of the participants who failed quantitative di-
agnostic reasoning reasoned in line with the propensity interpretation (i.e. they
provided estimates P(Ci | E) = P(Ci) (± .02) for all three causes) (of N = 100).
Table 2.14 further shows that about 93% of the participants who failed quali-
tative diagnostic reasoning reasoned in line with the propensity interpretation
(i.e. they responded with ‘stay the same’ for all three comparison between the
priors and the diagnostic reasoning) (of N = 100). These results suggest that
the propensity hypothesis accounted for a significant proportions of failures in
diagnostic reasoning.
2.1.9.4 Discussion
Like in Experiments 1 and 2, in this experiment the majority of participants
accepted the priors given to them and did not violate the assumption of inde-
pendence of causes prior to learning of the effect. These findings corroborate
those of Experiments 1 and 2 and suggest that participants had a good under-
standing of the causal structure, parameters, and the cover story they were rea-
soning with. Despite this, I once again found that participants in all conditions
performed poorly in diagnostic reasoning, especially when this was measured
as accuracy of quantitative probability estimates.
In regards to the diagnostic split hypothesis, I found that it accounted for
about 18% of violations in diagnostic reasoning (of N = 100). More specifically,
I found that a significant portion of participants employed this strategy in the
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Table 2.13: A cross-tabulation for correct/incorrect (yes/no) quantitative diagnostic
reasoning as well as for in line/not in line with (yes/no) the diagnostic split hypothesis




Diagnostic split Propensity interpretation
(quantitative)
Yes Yes 0 0
Yes No 0 18
No Yes 0 66
No No 2 14
group reasoning with low priors, who increased their probabilities of P(Ci)
from .2 to .33. By contrast, this strategy was barely utilised by the groups rea-
soning with medium priors, who, according to the hypothesis would have had
to decrease their prior probability estimates of each cause from .5 to .33. The
findings therefore strengthen the notion that the diagnostic split hypothesis is
dependent on the normative direction of the update from the priors. When the
diagnostic split hypothesis predicts a value that is below that of the prior prob-
ability of the cause, then participants’ behaviour does not follow the predic-
tion. This is in accordance with the findings of Experiment 1 where I observed
a dearth of participants who engaged in the diagnostic split strategy when rea-
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Table 2.14: A cross-tabulation for correct/incorrect (yes/no) qualitative diagnostic rea-
soning as well as for in line/not in line with (yes/no) the (qualitative) propensity hy-







soning with high priors (P(Ci) = .7)). An intuitive explanation would be that
as evidence is positively correlated with a cause, learning of the presence of the
evidence (effect) would not decrease the probability of the cause. Overall find-
ings from Experiment 3 solidify the presence of the diagnostic split hypothesis
(in the normative direction of update) and serve to demonstrate that underly-
ing participants’ updating behaviour in Experiments 1 and 2 (attributing .5 to
each cause) was not a lack of confidence or an unawareness of the task, but
rather engagement in a specific strategy.
Another updating behaviour that accounted for a large cluster of partici-
pants’ data is encompassed by the propensity hypothesis. I found that about
two thirds of the violations in quantitative and over 90% of violations in quali-
tative diagnostic reasoning can be explained by the propensity hypothesis. Al-
though I have not explicitly tested the propensity hypothesis in Experiment 3
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these proportions provide further empirical support for it.
Overall, the findings show that the diagnostic split hypothesis and the
propensity hypothesis are able to explain the vast majority of the violations
in the data, thus suggesting that underlying pitfalls in diagnostic reasoning are
pervasive, but could be accounted for by specific reasoning strategies.
2.1.10 General discussion
Over the past few decades, causal Bayesian networks have been successfully
utilised to build normative and descriptive accounts of various facets of hu-
man reasoning. Despite this, they have so far failed to account for people’s
behaviour when engaging in explaining away. Empirical work in psycholog-
ical literature has repeatedly demonstrated that people violate the normative
CBN model in numerous ways when carrying out explaining away inferences.
I carried out three experiments utilising a novel methodology to address the
issues found in previous empirical studies of explaining away that arguably
partly accounted for people’s recurrent deviations from the normative model.
For example, I explicitly stated the prior probabilities of the causes found in
the model and re-elicited these from participants in order to ascertain that
these were accepted. Moreover, I utilised relational qualitative and quantita-
tive question formats to elicit probabilistic inferences from participants. This
allowed for to the assessment of people’s accuracy in providing single point
estimates as well as in detecting probabilistic changes in the model in a quali-
tative, more intuitive, fashion. This approach was successful in making partic-
ipants understand the parameters and relational properties found within the
common-effect structure they were required to reason with. As such, in both
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experiments and across conditions, I found that a high proportion of partici-
pants answered correctly questions relating to priors, independence of causes
as well as the final logic question.
The assumption of independence is often reported to be violated in the ma-
jority of studies that find insufficient explaining away (Rottman & Hastie, 2016;
Mayrhofer & Waldmann, 2015; Rehder & Waldmann, 2017). Assuming the
causes are independent before learning of the presence of the effect can be cru-
cial since positive correlation between the causes can drastically reduce the nor-
mative amount of explaining away. Notably however, in all three experiments
there was no violation of this assumption in any condition. All studies that
reported a violation of the assumption of independence utilised quantitative
questions to (unsuccessfully) elicit participants understanding of the indepen-
dence of causes. Given the findings from the experiments and given encour-
aging finding from Rehder (2014a) who also employed a version of qualitative
forced choice questions, utilising qualitative questions to address this under-
standing might be a promising way forward.
In addition, in Experiments 1 and 2 a large proportion of participants cor-
rectly answered the final logic question. This finding is important as it suggests
that participants did understand the logical structure of the problem presented
to them. However, some studies on explaining away reported a small percent-
age of participants as being able to solve questions pertaining to this inference.
For instance, Rottman and Hastie (2016) report that less than 10% in Exper-
iment 1a and only around 29% in Experiment 1b of responses correctly con-
cluded that after learning the evidence, additionally learning that one causes
did not occur means that the other one must have occurred (in their study they
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also had that P(E | ∼Ci,∼Cj) = 0 which implies that P(Ci | E,∼Cj) = 1).
Despite the encouraging findings regarding priors, independence, and
logic, the main findings echoed those of the extant literature as participants
in both experiments overall systematically violated the normative account of
explaining away (Davis & Rehder, 2017; Fernbach & Rehder, 2013; Morris &
Larrick, 1995; Rehder, 2014a; Rehder & Waldmann, 2017; Rottman & Hastie,
2016; Sussman & Oppenheimer, 2011). In Experiments 1 and 2 pitfalls in rela-
tional explaining away comprised of both poor diagnostic reasoning and direct
explaining away in both quantitative and qualitative questions. Further, par-
ticipants’ answers to quantitative inference questions corresponded to different
amounts of explaining away only in diagnostic reasoning. Notably however,
the results suggested that the proportions of participants correctly answering
the qualitative questions did directly correspond to the normative amount of
explaining away, a finding that should further be explored. In addition, find-
ings from both experiments suggest that deviations from the normative model
observed in the experiments could not be attributed to structural violations to
the normative model (i.e. violations of the independence condition), as past lit-
erature intimated, but instead seem to arise, at least in part, from participants
utilising certain sub-optimal reasoning strategies such as the diagnostic split
and interpreting probabilities as propensities.
2.1.10.1 Diagnostic split
The findings of the three experiments suggest that some people do split the
probability space between the causes when engaging in diagnostic reasoning.
As such, I found that a significant proportion of participants’ answers aligned
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with predictions made by the diagnostic split hypothesis. Furthermore, Experi-
ment 2 explored diagnostic reasoning with unequal priors. The findings in this
experiment suggested the participants who engaged in diagnostic split reason-
ing divided the probability space between the causes in different ways: some
have provided equal probability to both causes in diagnostic reasoning and
some have reflected the ratio of the priors of the causes and divided the prob-
ability space between the two causes according to that ratio in diagnostic rea-
soning. This suggests that there are at least two ways that drive the way partic-
ipants who engage in diagnostic split reasoning divide the probability space: (i)
split it equally among all causes and (ii) split the probability space following
the ratio of the prior probability of causes. Experiment 3 tested the strategy
in the context of three causes and excluded an alternative explanation of the
findings from Experiments 1 and 2 that posits that participants who provided
.5 as an estimate in diagnostic reasoning were not driven by the diagnostic split
strategy but rather trying to communicate that low confidence or an inability to
respond to the question. However, the findings from Experiment 1 suggested
that people were not willing to decrease the probability from the priors to the
prediction of the diagnostic split hypotheses; they rather stayed at the priors
in diagnostic reasoning. As this was further explored and confirmed in Experi-
ment 3, the diagnostic split hypothesis needs to be modified to account for this.
The hypothesis then holds only when its predictions align with the qualitative
predictions of the normative account: if, for example, the normative account
implies that P(Ci) ≤ P(Ci | E) for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, then the diagnostic split hypoth-
esis predicts that P(C1 | E) + · · · + P(Ci | E) + · · · + P(Cn | E) = 1 when the
set-up is deterministic and P(Ci) ≤ 1n .
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Crucially, through the use of cross-tabulations I was able to illustrate that
adopting a diagnostic split strategy accounted for 51% of observed deviations
in Experiment 1 (of N = 386, or of 85.2% of all data) and 47% in Experiment 2
(of N = 208, or of 79.1% of all data) in both quantitative diagnostic reasoning
and quantitative relational explaining away. In Experiment 3 approximately
18% of violations in quantitative diagnostic reasoning could be attributed to a
diagnostic split strategy (of N = 100, or of 84% of all data). Ultimately, this
suggests that this strategy contributes significantly to the observed violations
of explaining away.
So far I have only explored the diagnostic split hypothesis in a determin-
istic set-up where the presence of at least one cause entails the presence of an
effect and where the effect cannot occur when none of the causes are present; or
where after learning the effect one of the causes (or both) must have happened,
i.e. the causes are exhaustive. However, there is evidence that the hypothesis
also applies to less deterministic contexts. For instance, Rottman and Hastie
(2016) found spikes in data around the .5 probability from their Experiment
1 where the priors were the same for the two causes and the causes became
exhaustive after learning the effect, but a presence of a cause did not entail the
presence of the effect. Whether the diagnostic split hypothesis holds in the con-
text where a presence of a cause does not entail the effect (but the causes are
still exhaustive after learning the effect) should be explored in future work.
2.1.10.2 Propensity interpretation
The findings from the three experiments also suggest that a large number of
participants remained at the priors when answering diagnostic reasoning and
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direct explaining away questions. Moreover, Experiments 1 and 2 showed
that the proportions of participants who remain at the priors are different in
the three cover stories with the proportion of participants being the largest in
the cover story where I argued the propensity interpretation is the most pro-
nounced, the smallest in the cover story with the least pronounced propensity
interpretation, and in between in the third cover story. These findings fit the
predictions of the propensity interpretation, thus providing support for it. Fur-
ther, the propensity hypothesis was able to account for a significant amount
of insufficiency in explaining away. The cross-tabulations showed that the
propensity interpretation was able to account for 53% of violations in Exper-
iment 1 (of N = 386, or of 85.2% of all data) and 27% in Experiment 2 (of
N = 208, or of 79.1% of all data) in both the quantitative diagnostic reasoning
and quantitative relational explaining away; also over 70% violations in Ex-
periment 1 and over 54% violations in Experiment 2 in qualitative diagnostic
reasoning, direct and relational explaining away could also be explained by the
propensity hypothesis. These percentages support the hypothesis that adopt-
ing this interpretation of probability can significantly account for violations of
patterns of inferences within explaining away.
The prediction of the propensity interpretation, however, are not limited to
situations exhibiting explaining away. It also applies to any contexts where
probabilities could be interpreted as established propensities, especially if they
include causal-probabilistic elements. These include common-effect structures
in general (not just those exhibiting explaining away), but also common-causes
and chain structures as well as simple two-node cause-effect structures. Specif-
ically, in simple two-node structures the propensity interpretation could ex-
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plain adherence to the prior and conservatism in belief updating, which seem
to be often found in studies employing paradigms where probabilities are well-
defined stochastic properties of an environment (Erev, Wallsten, & Budescu,
1994). This is particularly interesting as the propensity interpretation’s pre-
diction in the two-node cases are in direct opposition to the well-known base
rate neglect where people partially or completely ignore the priors of causes
(Barbey & Sloman, 2007; Eddy, 1982; Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995; Tversky &
Kahneman, 1974). The situations where I expect the propensity interpretation
(or anchoring at the base rate) to be more pronounced than the base rate neglect
are those that are characterized by (i) a deterministic set-up, (ii) clearly defined
stochastic properties of (physical) systems, and (iii) clear causal-mechanistic
relations between the parts of the (physical) system or between multiple phys-
ical systems. The situations involving social interactions where relations are
less deterministic or less clearly related in a causal-mechanistic way would be
more prone to people neglecting the priors. These should be explored in the
future work.
Finally, I would like to touch on the normative status of the propensity hy-
pothesis. As the propensity interpretation is one of the interpretations of prob-
ability one might think that it should agree with the normative account. How-
ever, as mentioned in the introduction, problems for propensity interpretation
have been raised, such the Humphreys’ paradox, that challenge the idea that it
can be reconciled with the axioms of probability which are the bedrock of the
normative account. Furthermore, the propensity interpretation’s predictions
that the probability of a cause does not change in light of an effect (and in light
of additionally learning the other cause has obtained) goes against Bayesian
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updating (i.e. ‘conditionalization’) which means that an agent following the
propensity interpretation in this case is not uniquely minimising the inaccu-
racy of its beliefs when that inaccuracy is measured with a proper scoring rule
such as the Brier score (for details see Pettigrew, 2016). On the other hand, in
Section 2.1.6.2 I have seen that, under certain conditions, the propensity inter-
pretation can be a good approximation of the normative account. It is, however,
outside the scope of this thesis to argue for or against the normative status of
the propensity interpretation. I simply find that the propensity interpretation
is a good descriptive account of the findings on explaining away.
2.1.10.3 Limitations
A few important limitations are in order. First, in all three experiments priors
and conditional probabilities were communicated textually and graphically to
participants. I have not explored whether the findings replicate when partici-
pants are presented with learning data. Since with learning trials priors would
not be ‘established’ but inferred from data and function as estimates of priors,
I expect the propensity interpretation to be less pronounced. As a consequence
I would expect less participants to stay at the priors in diagnostic reasoning
and explaining away compared to the findings in the current study. However,
I would still expect participants to split the probability space in diagnostic rea-
soning as per the diagnostic split. This is supported by Rottman and Hastie
(2016) who utilized learning trials in their study. There are, however, even
further ways to communicate probabilities to participants apart from textual,
graphical representations, and experiential learning include. For instance, one
could employ summary descriptions and labelling. These all should be ex-
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plored in future studies.
Second, I have only considered explaining away in a deterministic set-up.
Admittedly this is fairly limiting from a perspective of the ecological validity
of the findings. I proposed further avenues of research with respect to this lim-
itation and have also argued that I expect to find similar results with respect to
the diagnostic split hypothesis even in non-deterministic set-ups. The propen-
sity interpretation seems to be particularly pronounced in deterministic set-up
and it may be less pronounced in non-deterministic ones. See Experiments 4
and 5 for findings regarding the two hypothesis in a non-deterministic set-up.
Third, in the experiments I have used the same quantitative response scale
that promoted participants enter a number between 0 and 100 eliciting from
them the probability with which the participants believed a certain event (a
coin landing Heads) would happen. However, other response scale formats
are available. For instance, a frequency format response scale (Gigerenzer &
Hoffrage, 1995) would ask participants to provide the number of coins (that
are like the coins in the cover story) that they would expect to land Heads
given that the light bulb turned on out of the total number of these coins that
land Heads. The primary reasons I have not used, for instance, the frequency
format response scale is that (i) given the events in the cover stories are token
events that had occurred only once (Coin 1 landed once, Ball 1 was picked for
a container once, and Michael is coming to a party at a particular location on a
particular time) the frequency format (which refers to a frequency with which
an outcome occurs in a sequence of similar events) would not have fit well
with the single occurrences of token events and (ii) eliciting frequencies from
participants would, I believe, steer them away from the propensity probability
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interpretation towards the frequency interpretation (which is out of the scope
of this thesis) thus reducing the power of the experiments. However, further
studies should explore different response scales formats, such as the frequency
format, that would arguably put more emphasis on different probability inter-
pretation, like the frequency probability interpretation. This would allow for a
further exploration of the role of probability interpretations in explaining away
and causal reasoning in general.
Fourth, I recognize that in some cases it may not be straightforward to de-
termine whether probabilities are interpreted as propensities or in some other
way. There is no normative computational procedure that could tell how prob-
abilities should be interpreted. One can only provide arguments for or against
a certain interpretation and rely on these when testing in contexts embodying
a certain interpretation. Most difficulties arise when discussing possible bor-
derline cases. For instance, some philosophers have argued that probabilities
in medical contexts, which are often employed in psychological experiments,
are on the border between epistemological and objective interpretations and
could lean either way (Gillies, 2000a). This, however, does not render empiri-
cal exploration of people’s intuitions about different probability interpretations
futile. As long as there is a sufficient consensus regarding how clear-cut are
the specific contexts for testing particular interpretations, one should be on a
safe side employing these in their empirical studies. Even in cases that are not
clear-cut one can employ different elicitation methods to test different interpre-
tations, e.g. one could use different phrasings of questions (c.f. Ülkümen et al.,
2016).
2.2 Extending explaining away: Learning (about) multiple pieces of evidence 167
2.2 Extending explaining away: Learning (about)
multiple pieces of evidence27
In the first part of this chapter I have discussed explaining away situations
where there are two independent causes and one common effect. We are, how-
ever, often exposed to more complex situations where there are multiple pieces
of evidence that could be accounted by multiple causes. For example, a person
is no more or less likely to have a bacterial infection if they have a viral infec-
tion, but both a viral infection and a bacterial infection can cause a rash and
also a swelling. These situations also give rise to explaining away reasoning,
but have a number of features that do not occur in explaining away situations
with only one effect. For instance, learning that one effect has happened will
make the causes dependent. This is also true in the explaining away situations
with one effect. However, because the two causes are now probabilistically de-
pendent, learning that another effect has also happened will have a different
impact on the probabilities of the two causes then if the causes were proba-
bilistically independent. This entails that in explaining away situations, every
other additional piece of evidence will result in (i) these pieces of evidence hav-
ing different impact on the causes from a CBN modeling perspective because
the causes are no longer independent and (ii) the normative amount of explain-
ing away would be different (and most likely it will be reduced if the causes
become positively correlated) then in typical explaining away situations with
independent causes.
The second feature of reasoning with multiple pieces of evidence relates to
27This section is based on work from Tešić and Hahn (2019).
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its sequential character. In real world contexts of reasoning about evidence, that
evidence frequently arrives sequentially. The standard normative CBN frame-
work for probabilistic reasoning yields the same ultimate outcome whether
multiple pieces of evidence are acquired in sequence or all at once, and it is
insensitive to the order in which that evidence is acquired. From an empirical
perspective, it is then interesting to explore different orders in which evidence
becomes available. The third feature relates to learning a new piece of evi-
dence whose potential existence we were not even aware of. We often cannot
anticipate in advance what kinds of evidence we will eventually encounter.
For example, we may take our car to the mechanic because it started making a
noise that we believe is concerning. The mechanics may inform us that there
is a problem with the engine’s wastegate, a part of our car’s engine that we
were not aware it even existed. This raises the question of what we do to our
existing models when we encounter new variables to consider. However, little
is known about what happens when evidence sets are expanded incrementally,
both from the normative CBN perspective and a descriptive perspective.
In this part of the chapter I discuss explaining away situations where one is
required to reason with multiple pieces of evidence. More specifically, I discuss
(i) how to model from a CBN perspective the situations when one is made
aware of a potential existence of a piece of evidence that one was not aware
before; (ii) how people reason in these kinds of situations when the evidence is
presented sequentially (in different orders) vs. all evidence is presented at the
same time, and where different pieces of evidence have different diagnosticity
(i.e. have different impacts on the causes). In this part I, thus, explore situations
that are not characterised by a deterministic set-up like in the previous part
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(i.e. situations where the presence of at least one cause entails the presence of
an effect). This will allow to extend some of the findings from the previous part
to the non-deterministic situations and would arguably increase the ecological
validity of these findings.
I explore both (i) and (ii) in a segment of (relational) explaining away,
namely diagnostic reasoning. The primary reason for not exploring all seg-
ments of explaining away reasoning in this part were the findings from
Liefgreen et al. (2018) which suggested that people find (direct) explaining
away reasoning in situations with multiple causes and multiple effect suffi-
ciently difficult that they tend to disengage. As I have adopted a very similar
experimental paradigm as used by Liefgreen et al. (2018), that I restricted the
exploration of (i) and (ii) to diagnostic reasoning. Nonetheless, the first three
experiments have suggested that people’s accuracy on diagnostic reasoning is
indicative of their accuracy in (direct) explaining away: participants who cor-
rectly answered (qualitative) diagnostic reasoning questions were more likely
to answer (direct) explaining away questions. Thus, even though I do not ex-
plore (direct) explaining away in the following experiments, the findings could
still be indicative of people’s performance on (direct) explaining away ques-
tions.
2.2.1 Introduction
Imagine the following situation. Tom wakes up one morning and notices a
rash on his skin. He does not think the rash is a big deal, but after a couple
of days the rash is still present so he decides to see a doctor. Before he visits a
doctor he thinks that the rash is either caused by a bacterial or a viral infection
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or, perhaps, both. Tom also believes that having a bacterial infection does not
make one more or less likely to have a viral one and vice versa; in other words,
Tom thinks that the two types of infection are independent. The doctor agrees
with him that the rash could be caused by a bacterial and/or a viral infection
and that the two types infections are independent. However, she additionally
informs Tom that he also has a swelling he didn’t notice, which can also be
caused by a bacterial and/or a viral infection. Furthermore, she tells him that
either type of infection is more likely to cause the swelling than the rash. How
do (should) Tom and the doctor revise their beliefs about multiple independent
causes given multiple pieces of evidence of different diagnosticity?
From a normative standpoint, many would argue that the answer is en-
coded in a CBN with 2 common effects and 2 independent causes.28 For in-
stance, the CBN in Figure 2.21 would model the situation described above: C1




Figure 2.21: CBN with 2 independent causes and 2 common effects.
To fully parameterize CBN from Figure 2.21, one needs to specify the fol-
lowing probabilities:
P1(C1) = c1 , P1(C2) = c2
28B. K. Hayes, Hawkins, Newell, Pasqualino, and Rehder (2014) have used a dynamic CBN
to model these kinds of situations. However, in this part of the chapter I employ static CBNs
as there are no significant differences in the formalism in this case.
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P1(E1 | C1, C2) = α1 , P1(E1 | C1,¬C2) = β1
P1(E1 | ¬C1, C2) = γ1 , P1(E1 | ¬C1,¬C2) = δ1 (2.4)
P1(E2 | C1, C2) = α2 , P1(E2 | C1,¬C2) = β2
P1(E2 | ¬C1, C2) = γ2 , P1(E2 | ¬C1,¬C2) = δ2
P1(C1) and P1(C2) are the prior probability of the two causes and the re-
maining probabilities are a part of the conditional probabilities tables for the
two effects. The doctor then could use this CBN to, via diagnostic reason-
ing, update her beliefs about the probability that Tom has a viral infection af-
ter learning that Tom has a rash by calculating P1(C1 | E1). After additionally
learning that Tom also has swelling the doctor could further update her prob-
ability of Tom having a viral infection by calculating P1(C1 | E1, E2) (similarly
for the bacterial infection).
However, it is somewhat accidental that Tom first noticed the rash and not
the swelling. He could have plausibly first seen the swelling and gone to the
doctor and then noticed the rash. Would the CBN calculation be different in
this scenario? It depends. If the rash and the swelling are not equally diag-
nostic of the two causes as is suggested by the example, then it is possible that
P1(C1 | E1) 6= P1(C1 | E2), in which case the doctor’s degrees of belief about
a viral infection after first learning that Tom has swelling would not be equal
to those where she first leaned about the rash. However, after learning the
second effect the order in which the effect appear no longer matters: that is,
P1(C1 | E1, E2) is always equal to P1(C1 | E2, E1). Moreover, from a formal point
of view the probability of a case after learning the two pieces of evidence in a
sequence and updating the probability of the cause after each piece of evidence
was known is equal to the probability of the cause that was updated from the
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prior probability after learning the two pieces of evidence at the same time.
It is then interesting from an empirical point of view to investigate whether
people are sensitive to these different ways the evidence was made available
and whether they update the causes differently depending on the order in
which the effects appear. Studies on sequential diagnostic reasoning have
sought to tackle exactly these issues (see Meder & Mayrhofer, 2017b; Hoga-
rth & Einhorn, 1992). They presented participants with a sequence of effects
and asked them to reason from multiple effects to causes either with each ef-
fect they learned (step-by-step procedure) or after they learned about the whole
sequence of effects (end-of-sequence procedure) (see Hogarth & Einhorn, 1992;
Rebitschek, Bocklisch, Scholz, Krems, & Jahn, 2015). Their studies were primar-
ily interested in investigating primacy effects (whereby most of the evidential
weight is given to the first piece of evidence) and recency effects (whereby most
of the evidential weight is given to the most recent pieces of evidence). Meder
and Mayrhofer (2017a) investigated sequential diagnostic reasoning by provid-
ing participants with verbal information regarding the strengths of the causes
instead of a more quantitative information (like the CPTs) and found that par-
ticipants are remarkably accurate in their judgements. However, all these stud-
ies investigated only situations where the causes were mutually exclusive and
exhaustive causes. These situations are not explaining away situations and
would be modeled with one node for all causes (see Figure A.1). An exception
is a study by B. K. Hayes et al. (2014). They have investigated a scenario where
two symptoms could be produced by two independent causes. However, in
their study both effects had exactly the same diagnosticity (i.e. the same CPT)
and for that reason there were no order effects, i.e. it did not matter whether
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one learnt first E1 or E2, P1(C1 | E1) = P1(C1 | E2).
One of the goals of this part of the chapter is to empirically investigate peo-
ple’s ability to reason diagnostically from multiple effects with different diag-
nosticities (CPTs) to multiple independent causes. More specifically, the aim
was to test how people’s judgements compare to the normative answer from
CBNs such as the one in Figure 2.21 by manipulating the way in which multiple
pieces of the evidence of different diagnosticity are presented (in a particular
order or at the same time) and the way judgements about the causes are elicited
from the participants (step-by-step (SbS) or all-at-once (AaO)).
Another interesting issue emerges when reasoning with independent
causes. Not only can we learn the evidence sequentially, but we can sequen-
tially learn about new pieces of evidence that we were not previously aware
of that may also influence our beliefs about the causes. In technical parlance,
we may need to expand the algebra to incorporate the new variables. Consider
Tom from our example. Initially Tom only knew about his rash and, based
on that knowledge, he updated his probabilities of the two causes. Unlike the
doctor, Tom did not even know that the two types of infection could also cause
swelling. It is only after he visited his doctor that he learned about the another
potential effect and the occurrence of that effect. At the time he only knew
about the rash he updated the probabilities of the two causes on the basis of a
CBN model with only three nodes: two independent causes and one common
effect while the doctor always had in mind the CBN from Figure 2.21. Despite
operating with two different CBNs, both Tom and the doctor would arrive at
the same probabilities (assuming the same priors and CPTs for the effect) at this
first step. The next step is, however, crucial. After learning about the swelling,
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the doctor would simply learn that the new piece of evidence has occurred
and update the probabilities of the causes based on the CBNs from Figure 2.21.
Tom, by contrast, might do one of the at least two following possibilities: (1)
forget about his original 3-node network and create a new 4-node one like the
one in Figure 2.21 in which case he would arrive at the same estimates as the
doctor; or (2) take his (and doctors) previous estimates of the two causes based
on only one piece of evidence and have them as new priors in his new 3-node
network with the second piece of evidence as a common effect (see Figure 2.22).






Figure 2.22: ‘Split’ CBN from E1 to E2
P1(C1) = e1 , P1(C2) = e2
P2(C∗1) = P1(C1 | E1) , P2(C∗2) = P1(C2 | E1)
P1(E1 | C1, C2) = α1 , P1(E1 | C1,¬C2) = β1
P1(E1 | ¬C1, C2) = γ1 , P1(E1 | ¬C1,¬C2) = δ1 (2.5)
P2(E2 | C∗1 , C∗2) = α2 , P2(E2 | C∗1 ,¬C∗2) = β2
P2(E2 | ¬C∗1 , C∗2) = γ2 , P2(E2 | ¬C∗1 ,¬C∗2) = δ2
Eq. (2.5) specify the priors and the CPTs of the two networks. Although one
might intuitively think that Tom will arrive at the same probabilities as the doc-
tor even in the case where he models the situation as in Figure 2.22, that turns
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out to be true only under very specific conditions, some of which may violate
common assumptions in causal Bayesian reasoning (see Appendix A.3). Less
technically, this is because once one learns evidence (E1) and updates the prob-
abilities of the two causes (C1 and C2) in a common-effect CBN, the two previ-
ously independent causes become dependent: although P1(C1 | C2) = P1(C1),
generally P1(C1 | C2, E1) 6= P1(C1 | E1) as discussed in the first part of this
chapter. This dependency is preserved in the full CBN network in Figure 2.21
even before one learns the second piece of evidence (E2) and again updates the
probabilities of the two causes. However, in the lower 3-node CBN in Fig-
ure 2.22 the dependency is lost since it is assumed that C∗1 and C
∗
2 are indepen-
dent before observing E2. Even though P2(C∗1) is equal to P1(C1 | E) and P2(C∗2)
is equal to P1(C2 | E), making C∗1 and C∗2 independent and not preserving the
independence induced by the first piece of evidence will result in final proba-
bility estimates of the two causes, i.e. their estimates after learning both pieces
of evidence, to most likely diverge on the two different modeling strategies.
More specifically, the final estimates of the two causes will always be higher
according to the ‘split’ CBN in Figure 2.22 than those according to the full one
in Figure 2.21 precisely because the full one accounts for the above-mentioned
dependency and the ‘split’ one does not. Moreover, when the diagnosticity of
the two pieces of evidence is different (as is the case in this study), the height
of the final estimates in the ‘split’ CBN will depend on the order the evidence
is observed: learning E1 then E2 will result in the final estimates of the causes
that are different to those that result from learning E2 then E1 (as previously
mentioned, whether we learn E1 first then E2 or vice versa does not affect the
final probability estimates of the causes in the full CBN). It is also worth point-
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ing out that this divergence only happens when the causes are independent. If
the causes are mutually exclusive and exhaustive, one can safely ‘split’ the full
network into multiple ones without worrying about ending up with different
estimates (see Appendix A.4).
It is worth pointing out that from a standard CBN perspective, there is not
a right or wrong way of modeling situations where one needs to incorporate
new variables in their already existing CBN models. The CBN theory is silent
when it comes to extending algebra and defining a new probability distribu-
tion over a new algebra. The two modeling strategies from above are chosen
mostly because they seem to be plausible ways of incorporating a new variable
in the specific context of adding a new common effect variable to an already
existing structure with two independent causes and one common effect. In sit-
uations where one would need to add a new common cause to a common effect
structure (for example, adding a new common cause to C1 and E1 in the upper
3-node CBN from Figure 2.22) would presumably be more difficult to do from
a CBN modeling perspective as it would require redefining some of probabil-
ity distributions that have already been defined in the old causal structure (for
example, it would require expressing the prior probability of C1 in terms of con-
ditional probabilities as in the new causal structure C1 would be dependent on
the common cause and it would require redefining the conditional probability
table for E1).
To address the issue in a more principled way one could try to define a
similarly measure between the causal structures and use this measure to de-
cide how to incorporate a new variable and define a probability distribution
over the new algebra. The work on these kinds of similarity measures is still in
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its infancy. For example, Eva, Stern, and Hartmann (2019) introduce multiple
similarity metrics and ways to prioritize these metrics to measure the similar-
ity between two causal graphs. However, their work is limited to comparing
two causal graphs that differ in their causal structure (i.e. the way the variables
are connected or not connected to each other), but not in their algebra as the
two graphs had to include the same variables. This part of the chapter is thus
contributing in a limited way to understating two different modeling strate-
gies when it comes to including new variables that were not part of previous
model’s algebra (see Appendices A.3 and A.4).
From an empirical point of view, to the best of my knowledge no study has
yet investigated sequential diagnostic reasoning with sequentially learning the
algebra. In the literature mentioned above participants were presented with all
the variables and the causal/probabilistic information related to them before
they started making judgements about the causes. Even in such contexts, it is
worth looking at order effects because it has long been recognized that order
effects may be particularly diagnostic with respect to the processes underlying
the formation of a judgment. Specifically, there is a long literature concerned
with order effects in contexts such as impression formation (N. H. Anderson,
1965) or numerical estimation (Jacowitz & Kahneman, 1995). However, the
investigation in this chapter goes beyond this as one of the aims of this part is to
examine how reasoners fare in probabilistic reasoning contexts where they are
faced with entirely new variables. This issue has, to the best of my knowledge,
not been explored. In many scientific and everyday situations we must make
judgements about potential causes given effects without being aware of other
potential effects that could also inform our judgements. Thus, the main aim of
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the study presented below was to examine how people reason with multiple
pieces of evidence when they successively learn not just that some piece of
evidence obtains, but also that there is another potential piece of evidence not
known before. I compared participants’ estimates to both the full network’s
predictions (Figure 2.21) and the ‘split’ networks’ predictions (Figure 2.22).
2.2.2 Experiment 4
In this experiment I investigated the influence of manipulating algebra and ev-
idence learning on probabilistic diagnostic reasoning judgements of the two
independent causes. Participants were prompted to reason with either the full
4-node model (Figure 2.21) from the outset or they learned in stages that there
is another possible effect of the two causes. Further, participants either ob-
served the effects in one of the two sequences or they observed both effects at
once. The prior probabilities of the cases and CPTs of the effects were the same
in all conditions: P(C1) = P(C2) = .15; P(E1 | C1, C2) = .99, P(E1 | C1,¬C2) =
P(E1 | ¬C1, C2) = .7, P(E1 | ¬C1,¬C2) = 0; P(E2 | C1, C2) = .6,
P(E2 | C1,¬C2) = P(E2 | ¬C1, C2) = .2, P(E2 | ¬C1,¬C2) = 0. For simplic-
ity the priors of the causes were the same and the CPTs of the effects reflected
different diagnosticities of the two effects.
2.2.2.1 Methods
Participants and Design A total of 271 participants (NMALE = 101, MAGE =
32.1 years; one participant identified as neither male nor female) were recruited
from Prolific Academic (www.prolific.ac). All participants were native En-
glish speakers who gave informed consent and were paid £1.25 for taking part
2.2 Extending explaining away: Learning (about) multiple pieces of evidence 179
in the present study, which took on average 13.9 minutes to complete. Partic-
ipants were randomly assigned to one of the 2 (algebra: full or sequential) ×
3 (evidence learning: all-at-once (AaO), step-by-step from E1 to E2 (SbS1), or
step-by-step from E2 to E1 (SbS2)) = 6 between-participants groups (one group
with 44 participants, 3 groups with 45 participants, and 2 groups with 46 par-
ticipants).
Materials All participants were given the same cover story wherein rain (C1)
and a lawn sprinkler (C2) (two binary and independent variables) could cause a
wet lawn (E1) and/or a wet exterior house wall (E2) (a version of the cover story
can be found in Pearl, 1988). The participants in the AaO condition completed
an online inference questionnaire comprising of 10 comprehension questions
(2 about the priors of the causes and 8 about the CPTs) and 2 test questions
(one relating to P(C1 | E1, E2) and one to P(C2 | E1, E2)). Everyone else com-
pleted the same 10 comprehension questions and 4 test questions (relating to
P(C1 | Ei), P(C2 | Ei), P(C1 | Ei, Ej), and P(C2 | Ei, Ej)). For the full materials
used in Experiment 4 see Appendix A.5.
Procedure After giving an informed consent and basic demographic informa-
tion, participants were shown the following instructions:
WELCOME!
You will now be presented with a situation and required to answer
some questions related to the situation. Please make sure you read
all the information carefully before answering the questions.
Throughout the survey you will be able to navigate forward and
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backward by clicking on the appropriate buttons.
After reading this information, the participants in the full algebra condition
were presented with a causal cover story (both in a textual and a visual form)
which explained the relations between variables and probabilistic information
relating to the priors of both causes (priors were textually communicated as
a percentage chance). They were then asked 2 priors comprehension ques-
tions where they were required to restate the priors communicated to them
in the cover story. Following that, participants were told the CPTs of the two
pieces of evidence (also textually communicated as a percentage chance) and
subsequently asked 8 comprehension questions regarding the CPTs (in a ran-
dom order) where they were required to restate the CPTs. After completing the
comprehension questions, participants in the AaO condition learned that both
pieces of evidence occurred and were prompted to answer 2 test questions (one
for each cause) presented in the same order. Participants in the SbS conditions
first learned about one piece of evidence and answered 2 test questions relating
to the 2 causes and then learned that the second piece of evidence occurred and
asked final 2 questions. When answering the test questions participants were
reminded of the priors of the causes and the CPTs of each piece of evidence, as
well as their previous estimates of the two causes (in the SbS conditions).
Participants in the sequential algebra condition were initially told a cover
story (both in a textual and a visual form) including only two causes and one
effect. As in the full algebra condition, they were told the priors of the causes
(percentage chance) and asked 2 priors comprehension questions. In contrast
to the full algebra contention, they were then told CPTs (percentage chance) re-
garding only one piece of evidence and completed 4 comprehension questions
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related to CPTs (in both the AaO and the SbS conditions). This was followed by
2 test questions relating to the probability of the causes given that one piece of
evidence was observed (only in the SbS conditions). Participants then addition-
ally learned that there is another piece of evidence potentially relevant to the
probability estimates of the two causes. They learned the CPTs for the second
piece of evidence and completed 4 comprehension questions followed by 2 test
questions prompting them to estimate their confidence in the causes happen-
ing given the additional piece of evidence obtained. Again, participants were
reminded of the priors of the causes, CPTs (but only for the current piece of ev-
idence), and their previous estimates of the two causes (in the SbS conditions).
In the AaO, after completing the first 4 comprehension questions participants
were not told that the evidence obtained. Rather, they went on to learn that
there is another potentially relevant piece of evidence, completed additional 4
comprehension questions, and were subsequently then told that both pieces of
evidence obtained. After that, participants were reminded of the priors, CPTs
(for the both pieces of evidence) and completed 2 test questions regarding the
probabilities of the two causes.
In all conditions the test questions prompted participants to provide per-
centage confidence (0–100%) of Ci given one or two effects. For example, after
learning that E1 occurred, they were asked (in SbS1 condition) a diagnostic rea-
soning questions: “How confident are you that it rained overnight now that
you know that the lawn is wet?” After additionally learning E2 occurred they
were asked: “How confident are you that it rained overnight now that you
know that both the lawn and the house wall are wet?” (the full algebra condi-
tion) or “How confident are you that it rained overnight now that you know
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that the house wall is also wet?” (the sequential algebra condition). All partic-
ipants provided explanations for each answer to the test questions.
2.2.2.2 Results
Comprehension To find out the proportion of participants who accepted the
priors and the CPTs, I computed the numbers of participants who answered all
10 comprehension questions correctly (±.02). Out of 271 participants, only 61
answered all 10 comprehension questions correctly: in the full algebra condi-
tion, GroupAaO = 8, GroupSbS1 = 7, and GroupSbS2 = 14; in the sequential algebra
condition, GroupAaO = 13, GroupSbS1 = 7, and GroupSbS2 = 12. Visually com-
paring the test questions estimates of the participants who correctly answered
all 10 comprehension question (Figure 2.23) to those of the participants who in-
correctly answered at least one of the 10 comprehension questions (Figure 2.24)
seems to suggest that there was not much difference in the general trends and
the ways participants answered the test question in these two groups.
A linear mixed effects model on participants’ estimates to the test questions
seems to support this view. The model had one fixed effect Comprehension
(whether or not the participant answered all 10 comprehension questions cor-
rectly), a random intercept for each participant, and a random slope and a ran-
dom intercept for each of the test questions. According to the model, there was
no main effect of Comprehension (t = .85, p = .41). As there was no main ef-
fect of Comprehension, the following analysis was preformed on the full data
set including all 271 participants. Figure 2.25 shows the responses of all 271
participants to the priors and test questions.
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Full CBN Split CBN from E1 to E2 Split CBN from E2 to E1
Figure 2.23: Responses of the participants who answered all 10 comprehension ques-
tions correctly to priors and test questions in Experiment 4. Red horizontal lines are
correct (normative) answers according to the full BN model. Green and purple hori-
zontal lines correspond to the predictions of the split CBN model. Gray lines between
data points depict how participants changed their probability estimates from one ques-
tions to another, with curved lines indicating that a participant did not change (within
± .02) their probability estimate.
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Full CBN Split CBN from E1 to E2 Split CBN from E2 to E1
Figure 2.24: Responses of the participants who answered some of the comprehension
questions incorrectly to priors and test questions in Experiment 4. Red horizontal lines
are correct (normative) answers according to the full BN model. Green and purple hor-
izontal lines correspond to the predictions of the split CBN model. Gray lines between
data points depict how participants changed their probability estimates from one ques-
tions to another, with curved lines indicating that a participant did not change (within
± .02) their probability estimate.
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Full CBN Split CBN from E1 to E2 Split CBN from E2 to E1
Figure 2.25: Responses of all 271 participants to priors and test questions in Experi-
ment 4. Red horizontal lines are correct (normative) answers according to the full BN
model. Green and purple horizontal lines correspond to the predictions of the split
CBN model. Gray lines between data points depict how participants changed their
probability estimates from one questions to another, with curved lines indicating that
a participant did not change (within ± .02) their probability estimate.
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Test questions To test the effect of the algebra and the evidence learning con-
ditions on participants’ estimates on the test questions, a linear mixed effects
model was built. The model had two fixed effects, Algebra and Evidence learn-
ing, with a random intercept for each participant (there was no random slope
for participant since algebra and evidence learning conditions vary between
participants). I found a main effect of Evidence learning, but no main effect
of Algebra (see Table 2.15). I also found no interaction between Algebra or
Evidence learning. However, likelihood ratio tests showed that including the
predictors in the model does not improve model fit compared to just having an
intercept as a predictor (χ2(3) = 6.11, p = .11). That is, the data grand mean
fits the data no worse than the model which includes both predictors.
Table 2.15: Linear mixed effect model results for test questions in Experiment 4
A=Algebra; EL=Evidence learning
Estimate 95% CI t-value p
A -6.51 [-17.76, 4.73] -1.13 .26
EL -0.53 [-1.03, -0.03] -2.1 .04*
A× EL 3.28 [-17.76, 4.73] 1.29 .2
A finer grained analyses on the data within each group showed a signifi-
cant difference between P(C1 | Ei) and P(C1 | Ei, Ej) in the full algebra SbS1
condition (t(44) = −4.04, p < .001); in the full algebra SbS2 condition both
between P(C1 | Ei) and P(C1 | Ei, Ej) (t(45) = −4.87, p < .001) and P(C2 | Ei)
and P(C2 | Ei, Ej) (t(45) = −2.98, p = .005); as well as in the sequential al-
gebra SbS2 condition between P(C1 | Ei) and P(C1 | Ei, Ej) (t(45) = −5.57,
p < .001) and between P(C2 | Ei) and P(C2 | Ei, Ej) (t(45) = −6.13, p < .001).
2.2 Extending explaining away: Learning (about) multiple pieces of evidence 187
No significant differences in the sequential SbS1 condition.
Further analyses showed that none of the P(C1 | Ei, Ej) and P(C2 | Ei, Ej)
are significantly different across the levels of the evidential learning condi-
tion whereas some P(C2 | Ei) are: in the full algebra condition P(C2 | Ei) in
SbS2 and SbS1 are statistically different, t(89) = −2.09, p = .04, as well as
P(C2 | Ei) in the sequential algebra condition SbS2 and SbS1 t(88.5) = −2.51,
p = .014, with those in SbS1 having higher means. Combining these results
from those above regarding participants estimates within each group suggests
that (i) people are sensitive to the different orders the pieces of evidence of dif-
ferent diagonsticity were presented and (ii) that their estimates go against both
the full CBN and the ‘split’ CBNs (qualitative) predictions since the differences
P(C1 | Ei, Ej)− P(C1 | Ei) and P(C2 | Ei, Ej)− P(C2 | Ei) are larger in SbS2 con-
dition than in SbS1 condition whereas the full CBN and the ‘split’ CBN predict
exactly the opposite (see Figure 2.25).
A closer look at the data distributions in Figure 2.25 reveals the driving
force of the results; namely, the participants’ responses are highly clustered.
Figure 2.26 shows that there are 5 significant clustering points. ‘.20’, ‘.60’, and
‘.70’ seem to correspond to the probability values one finds in the CPTs for
the effects. One clustering point (‘.15’) corresponds to the priors of the causes.
The largest clustering point seems to be around the ‘.50’ mark, which captured
34.1% of all answers to the test questions. Figure 2.27 shows the frequency of
responses around (±.02) the five clustering points for each group. The data
captured by the five clustering points amounted to 68.4% of all data.
Finally, to assess the fit of each model to the data, I calculated mean squared

















Figure 2.26: The distribution of all the test question estimates around the 21 clustering
points (bins) (± .02) in Experiment 4.
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Figure 2.27: The frequency of participants’ responses around the five focal points (bins)
(± .02) in Experiment 4.
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errors (MSEs) for each model across the two algebra conditions.29 Given the
above-mentioned clustering around particularly the ‘.50’ mark, I additionally
calculated the MSEs for a simple model that included the correct priors (same
as in both the full CBN and the ‘split’ CBN modeling), but has .50 as a response
to all test questions. The results are presented in Table 2.16.
Table 2.16: MSEs for the full CBN, ‘split’ CBN, and ‘.50’ model in the full and sequential
algebra conditions
Full algebra Sequential algebra
Full CBN 621.18 536.94
‘Split’ CBN 778.93 701.97
‘.50’ model 573.73 496.65
The best fitting model of the three was the simple ‘.50’ model, further con-
firming the clustering effect around the ‘.50’ mark and the results of the linear
mixed effect model. The full CBN model was a better fit than the ‘split’ CBN
model of both the full algebra condition data and sequential algebra condition
data. All three models fit better the sequential algebra condition data than the
full algebra condition data suggesting a difference between the two conditions.
However, the linear mixed effect model suggests that the difference is not sta-
tistically significant.
Diagnostic split Like in Experiments 1, 2, and 3, in this experiment we also
have that P(E1 | ¬C1,¬C2) = P(E2 | ¬C1,¬C2) = 0; in other words, know-
29Note that the ‘split’ CBN does not have a unique prediction for AaO condition (see Fig-
ure 2.25). In calculating the MSE for that model I included the prediction that had the lower
MSE.
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ing that one of the effects has occurred makes the two independent causes
exhaustive (but not mutually exclusive). Because of this, one would expect
the diagnostic split reasoning to emerge in this experiment as well. Conse-
quently, one would expect that after learning one of the effects has happened
a number of participants would splits the probability space between the two
causes such that P(C1 | Ei) + P(C2 | Ei) = 1. Similarly, one would expect that
after learning the second effect has happened that some participant would es-
timate the probability of the causes such that P(C1 | Ei, Ej) + P(C2 | Ei, Ej) =
1. It is worth noting that even if participants provided estimates such that
P(C1 | Ei) + P(C2 | Ei) = 1 and P(C1 | Ei, Ej) + P(C2 | Ei, Ej) = 1, it would not
imply that they provided estimates such that P(C1 | Ei) = P(C1 | Ei, Ej) and/or
P(C2 | Ei) = P(C2 | Ei, Ej). The participants could still be exhibiting diagnos-
tic split reasoning even if their estimates for the two causes after learning the
second effect differed to those they provided after learning only one effect has
happened, as long as the probabilities of the two causes added up to 1.
To explore diagnostic split reasoning in this experiment, I calculated (i)
the proportion of participants who provided their estimates in diagnostic rea-
soning after learning that one effect has happened such that P(C1 | Ei) +
P(C2 | Ei) = 1 and (ii) the proportion of participant who provided their es-
timates after learning the second effect has happened such that P(C1 | Ei, Ej) +
P(C2 | Ei, Ej) = 1. 37.9% of participants provided estimates (±.02) such that
P(C1 | Ei) + P(C2 | Ei) = 1 and 31% of participants provided estimates (±.02)
such that P(C1 | Ei, Ej) + P(C2 | Ei, Ej) = 1. Furthermore, 58% of the 37.9% of
participants who provided estimates such that P(C1 | Ei)+ P(C2 | Ei) = 1 went
on to provide the probability estimates for the two causes that P(C1 | Ei, Ej) +
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P(C2 | Ei, Ej) = 1. These results seem to suggest that diagnostic split reasoning
was a significant driver of the probability estimate trends in data pertaining to
the test question.
Propensity interpretation The propensity hypothesis also has a clear predic-
tion in the context of this experiment. It predicts that some participants would
stay at their prior probabilities and would not update the probabilities of the
causes after leaning evidence occurred. More specifically, the hypothesis pre-
dicts that some participants would provide the estimates such that: P(C1) =
P(C1 | Ei) = P(C1 | Ei, Ej) and P(C2) = P(C2 | Ei) = P(C2 | Ei, Ej). Only 7.4%
of the participants provided estimates that matched these predictions of the
propensity hypothesis. This suggests that only a small proportion of the par-
ticipants in this experiment reasoned in agreement with the propensity hypoth-
esis.
2.2.2.3 Discussion
In this experiment I found that people are sensitive to the order of presentation
of the different pieces of evidence. However, although there was a trend in in-
creasing the probabilities of the causes after finding out that the second piece of
evidence obtained (in accordance with both the full and the ‘split’ CBN model),
the (qualitative) predictions of both models regarding the amount of increase
in each order go against the participants’ mean estimates.
Further, I have explored people’s diagnostic reasoning in the context of
learning new variables. I found that people update almost identically when
they are presented with the full algebra and when the algebra is expanded se-
quentially. In principle, this lack of difference could mean either that people are
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very good at this expansion, or that they inappropriately treat the full model in
a sequential, local fashion. The MSE analysis showed that the full CBN model
is a better fit than the ‘split’ CBN model across board supporting the latter op-
tion. However, the significant clustering in our data and the fact that the ‘.50’
model fitted the data better then either the full or the ‘split’ CBN model sug-
gest that different participants employed different strategies in answering our
test questions. Some of these seem indicative of well-established errors in hu-
man causal/probabilistic reasoning such as ‘the inversion fallacy’ where peo-
ple confuse P(A | ¬B) with P(B | A) (Nance & Morris, 2002). Other strategies
that participants seemed to have employed are discussed and experimentally
tested in the first part of this chapter.
The propensity interpretation seemed to have played a small role in driving
participants’ probability estimates as only around 7% of them have provided
estimates in accordance with the predictions of the propensity hypothesis. As
I have speculated in the first half of this chapter, this could have well been be-
cause (i) the set-up in Experiment 4 was not deterministic, (ii) the cover story
was not mechanistic in a sense that it did not include a mechanism of how
causes bring about the effects, and (iii) the priors of causes were not estab-
lished in any objective manner (for example, the prior probability of rain in
this experiment was established by the protagonist in the cover story remem-
bering a forecast that said that there was a 15% chance of rain overnight; in
contrast, in Experiments 1 and 2 the prior probability of a coin to land Heads
was established by a coin tossing mechanism that always tossed the coin with
a particular probability for Heads). Given all these features of the cover story
from Experiment 4, it then seems plausible that not many participants would
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reason in accordance with the propensity hypothesis. Thus, (i), (ii), and (iii)
provide useful guidelines for when very few people reason in line with the
propensity interpretation.
The diagnostic split reasoning hypothesis has, however, accounted for a
much larger proportion of participants’ estimates. After learning that one of
the effects has taken place, around 38% of the participants’ estimates for the
two causes could be accounted by the diagnostic split hypothesis and after ad-
ditionally learning that the second effect has happened, around 31% of partici-
pants reasoned in line with the diagnostic split hypothesis. Although the above
analysis seems to suggest that a significant number of participants engaged in
the diagnostic split reasoning, this result would need to be further qualified.
In Experiment 3, I explored whether participants who answered with .5 in di-
agnostic reasoning did so to express that they do not know what the answer
is or their lack of confidence. The results from that experiment suggested that
participants, indeed, did engage in the diagnostic split reasoning. Unlike in
Experiment 3, in this experiment there was a very low percentage of the partic-
ipants who correctly answered all the comprehension questions (that included
both the questions about the priors and the CPTs). As the majority of the par-
ticipants who seemed to have engaged in the diagnostic split reasoning have
provided .5 as their estimate for the test questions, it is, thus, plausible that
at least some of these participants wanted to communicate that they were not
sure about their answer or that they did not know the answer.
The fact that a small proportion of participants answered all comprehen-
sion questions correctly, that a much greater proportion of them provided .5 as
their estimate to test question, and that in general the participants’ estimates
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seemed more noisy than of those in the first three experiments all seem to sug-
gest that participants struggled with the task in this experiment significantly
more than in the first three experiments of this chapter. This could be for a
number of reasons. For example, using a non-deterministic and/or a larger
number of probability estimates that needed to be communicated to the partic-
ipants could have resulted in a more noisy estimates and/or more .5 estimates
that served as a stand-in for ‘I don’t know’ or ‘I’m not sure’. It could also be
that the 4-node network is already too complex for the participants to provide
meaningful estimates (this was suggested by the findings in Liefgreen et al.,
2018). In the next experiment I explored one of these possibilities.
2.2.3 Experiment 5
The large proportion of participants who incorrectly answered the comprehen-
sion questions related to the priors and the CPTs in Experiment 4 may suggest
that participants were overwhelmed with the quantitative information (in to-
tal 10 numerical values, 2 prior probabilities and 8 probability values for the
CPTs). This may have resulted in a large proportion of participants simply re-
peating the quantitative information or replying with .50 (to communicate ‘I
don’t know’) to the test questions, thus obscuring any potential effects of ex-
tending the algebra on people’s diagnostic reasoning estimates.
The goal of this experiment was to explore the effects of different orders
of evidence presentation and sequential algebra expansion on diagnostic rea-
soning in situations where the amount of the quantitative information com-
municated to the participants was reduced and compare the empirical find-
ings with the two predictions of both the full model and the split model.
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This reduction was achieved in two ways: (i) participants were communi-
cated only the strength of the causal relations between the effects and causes,
more specifically they were communicated only the likelihood P(Ej | Ci) for
i, j ∈ {1, 2};30 and (ii) the strength of the causal relation was communicated in
a verbal/qualitative manner rather than in a numerical/quantitative way.
Communicating only the strength of the causal relations reduced the num-
ber of parameters from 8 CPT values in Experiment 4 to four in this exper-
iment. In total, in this experiment 6 parameters were communicated to the
participants (2 priors and 4 probabilities regarding the strength of the causal
relations). Reducing the number of parameters, however, comes at a cost. Us-
ing only the priors and P(Ej | Ci) one cannot calculate the exact posterior prob-
abilities P(Ci | Ej) and P(Ci | E1, E2) for either model. This is because one is
missing the joint probability P(E1, E2) in the case of the full model (E1 and E2
are independent in the split model so there P(E1, E2) = P(E1)P(E2)) and the
probability of each effect given that either cause did not occur (i.e. P(Ej | ∼Ci)
for i, j ∈ {1, 2}) both for the split and the full model. Despite this, one can
express the exact ratio of the posterior odds for the split model using only the










The ratios in Equation 2.6 are then used to test the predictions of the split
model. Unfortunately, the same cannot be done for the full model: in addi-
30Measuring causal strength as the likelihood P(Ej | Ci) is not the only way to understand
causal strength. Many other measures of causal strength have been proposed (for an overview
see Fitelson & Hitchcock, 2011). Which of these measures is the most appropriate one is still
quite a debated issue (see, for example, Chapter 6 of Sprenger & Hartmann, 2019).
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tion to the likelihoods one would also need the joint probability over E1 and
E2 (see Appendix A.6). Nonetheless, one can estimate where the correspond-
ing ratio for the full model would be when compared to the split model ratios.
This is done by incorporating the following information: (i) the posteriors of
the causes after learning the first piece of evidence are the same for both mod-
els; (ii) the posteriors after learning the second piece of evidence are higher in
the split model for both causes (for an illustration of (i) and (ii) see the pre-
dictions of the two models in Figure 2.25); (iii) the prior of the causes were
unequal in this experiment (see below). Together, (i), (ii), and (iii) imply that
the ratio of the posteriors for the full model is more likely to be in between the
two ratios for the split model from Equation 2.6: i.e. between the split model
ratio for when modeling situations where we first learn E1 and then E2 and the
split model ratio for when first learn E2 and then E1.
The second modification of the experimental design in this experiment com-
pared to Experiment 4 that aimed at reducing the amount of the quantitative
information related to the manner the parameters were presented to the par-
ticipants. Namely, all probabilistic information (the priors and the strengths of
the causal relation, i.e. the likelihoods) were communicated to the participant
through qualitative/verbal expression such as ‘Rain almost always causes the
lawn to be wet’ or ‘Sleep deprivation often causes magnesium deficiency’. Us-
ing only verbal expression to communicate the parameters further reduces the
amount of the quantitative information.
We often communicate probabilities through verbal expressions Several
empirical studies have investigated how verbal expression are interpreted
(e.g. Harris & Corner, 2011;Weber & Hilton, 1990; for a recent review of the
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literature on verbal probability expressions see e.g. P. J. Collins & Hahn, 2018).
However, most of the studies on causal-probabilistic reasoning provided par-
ticipants with the quantitative information, not least because the models that
are used for comparison, such as CBNs, require numerical input. An exception
is a study by Meder and Mayrhofer (2017a). They investigated people’s se-
quential diagnostic reasoning with verbal information and compared it to the
sequential diagnostic reasoning of those who were provided with the quan-
titative/numerical information. Specifically, the authors used a mapping of
verbal expression to the numerical ones from Bocklisch, Bocklisch, and Krems
(2012) and compared the sequential diagnostic reasoning of a group of par-
ticipants who were communicated the priors and the likelihoods using verbal
expressions (e.g. ‘X is frequently the cause of the symptoms’) to the sequential
diagnostic reasoning of a group of participants who were communicated the
same parameters using the mapped numerical expression (e.g. ‘X is the cause
of the symptoms in 67% of all cases’). The findings from Meder and Mayrhofer
(2017a) suggested that there was a high consistency between the two groups
and that both groups’ diagnostic judgments were quite accurately tracking the
predictions of a related Bayesian network model. In this experiment I relied on
these findings. I communicated to the participant the 6 parameters in a verbal
expression form and used the mapped numerical estimates from Bocklisch et
al. (2012) to compute the ratio of odds for the split model.
Lastly, in this experiment I used low unequal priors. This was done in hope
of reducing the number of .50 responses if they are a product of diagnostic split
reasoning (in Experiment 2 I found that when reasoning with unequal priors
people who engage in diagnostic split reasoning do not always provide .50 as
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a response, but rather follow the ratio of the priors). Furthermore, the low
unequal priors contribute to further narrowing down the prediction of the full
model regarding the ratio of odds as mentioned above.
2.2.3.1 Overview
In this experiment, like in Experiment 4, I manipulated the order in which
the evidence was presented and whether the full algebra was available to the
participants from the start or the algebra was introduce sequentially. How-
ever, unlike in Experiment 4, in this experiment the all-at-once (AaO) condi-
tion was excluded. This was because (i) Experiment 4 suggested none of the
P(C1 | Ci, Ej) and P(C2 | Ci, Ej) were significantly different across the eviden-
tial learning conditions, including AaO and (ii) given the parameters communi-
cated to the participants, the two models had no specific predictions regarding
this condition.
Further, two cover stories were used in this experiment: a modified version
of the one from Experiment 4 to accommodate unequal priors and the verbal
probability expression and a new one. The verbal probability expression used
in this experiment (with their mapped numerical counterpart) were the fol-
lowing. For priors: P(C1) = ‘unlikely’ (.22) and P(C2) = ‘very unlikely’ (.12)
(mapping from Wintle, Fraser, Wills, Nicholson, & Fidler, 2019). For the like-
lihoods I used the following expressions: P(E1 | C1) = ‘almost always’ (.88),
P(E1 | C2) = ‘often’ (.7), P(E2 | C1) = ‘almost never’ (.08), P(E2 | C2) = ‘some-
times’ (.33) (mapping from Bocklisch et al., 2012).
Given these likelihoods, if participants reasoned in accordance with the split
model we would expect that the ratio of their posteriors (from Equation 2.6)
2.2 Extending explaining away: Learning (about) multiple pieces of evidence 200
would be around 4.1 when they are first told that E1 obtains and then that
E2 obtains; when they are first told that E2 obtains and subsequently that E1
obtains this ratio would be around 1.3. For the full model, we would expect
that the corresponding ratio for the full model will most likely be somewhere
between these two values.
2.2.3.2 Methods
Participants and Design A total of 120 participants (NMALE = 48, MAGE =
33.3 years) were recruited from Prolific Academic (www.prolific.ac). All par-
ticipants were native English speakers who gave informed consent and were
paid £1.25 for partaking in the present study, which took on average 8.9 min-
utes to complete. Participants were assigned to one of the 2 (algebra: full or
sequential) × 2 (evidence learning: step-by-step from E1 to E2 (SbS1), or step-
by-step from E2 to E1 (SbS2)) = 4 between-participants groups (one group with
28 participants, 2 groups with 30 participants, and one group with 31 partici-
pants).
Materials In this experiment there were two cover stories. The first cover
story (n = 60) was exactly the same as the one used in Experiment 4, except
that all the information regarding the parameters was communicated to the
participants through verbal expressions. The second cover story (n = 59) had
sleep deprivation (C1) and skipping magnesium rich foods (C2) (two binary
and independent variables) as potential causes of magnesium deficiency (E1)
and obesity (E2). Unlike in Experiment 4, in this experiment there were no com-
prehension questions related to the CPTs of the effects. Thus, all participants
were asked 6 questions: 2 about the priors of the causes and 4 test questions
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relating to P(C1 | Ei), P(C2 | Ei), P(C1 | Ei, Ej), and P(C2 | Ei, Ej)). For the full
materials used in Experiment 5 see Appendix A.7.
Procedure The procedure was exactly like that of Experiment 4 for step-by-
step levels of the evidence learning condition (i.e. excluding the all-at-once
level) and the two levels of the algebra condition. The only difference was
that participants were not asked any comprehension questions as these were
not included in this experiment.
2.2.3.3 Results
Participants responses to the priors and the four test questions are in Fig-
ure 2.28.
Priors There was no significant difference between P(C1) and P(C2) in any
of the four groups: for the full algebra, SbS1 group t(29) = 0.97, p = .19; for
the full algebra, SbS2 group t(30) = 1.75, p = .09; for the sequential algebra,
SbS1 group t(29) = 1.36, p = .18; and for the sequential algebra, SbS2 group
t(27) = −0.41, p = .69.
Test questions To test the effect of the algebra and the evidence learning con-
ditions on participants’ estimates on the test questions, a linear mixed effects
model was built. Like in Experiment 4, the model had two fixed effects, Alge-
bra and Evidence learning, with a random intercept for each participant (there
was no random slope for participant since algebra and evidence learning con-
ditions vary between participants). There was no main effect of Evidence learn-
ing (though the p-value was quite close to α = .05) and no main effect of Alge-
2.2 Extending explaining away: Learning (about) multiple pieces of evidence 202







































































































Figure 2.28: Responses of participants to priors and test questions in Experiment 5.
Blue triangles are means and error bars are 95% confidence intervals. Gray lines be-
tween data points depict how participants changed their probability estimates from
one questions to another, with curved lines indicating that a participant did not change
(within ± .02) their probability estimate.
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bra (see Table 2.17). I also found no interaction between Algebra or Evidence
learning. Furthermore, likelihood ratio tests showed that including the pre-
dictors in the model does not improve model fit compared to just having an
intercept as a predictor (χ2(3) = 4.02, p = .26). That is, the data grand mean
fits the data no worse than the model which includes both predictors.
Table 2.17: Linear mixed effect model results for test questions in Experiment 5
A=Algebra; EL=Evidence learning
Estimate 95% CI t-value p
A 0.02 [-0.58, 0.62] 0.06 .95
EL -3 [-5.98, 0.05] -1.9 .058
A× EL 0.14 [-0.45, 0.75] 0.48 .63
A finer grained analyses on the data within each group showed the follow-
ing results. Further, a significant difference was found both between P(C1 | Ei)
and P(C1 | Ei, Ej) (t(29) = 3.8, p < .001) and P(C2 | Ei) and P(C2 | Ei, Ej)
(t(29) = −6.03, p < .001) in the full algebra SbS1 condition; in the full alge-
bra SbS2 condition there was a significant difference both between P(C1 | Ei)
and P(C1 | Ei, Ej) (t(30) = −3.6, p = .001) and P(C2 | Ei) and P(C2 | Ei, Ej)
(t(30) = −2.5, p = .018); in the sequential algebra SbS1 condition there was
a significant between P(C1 | Ei) and P(C1 | Ei, Ej) (t(29) = −4.2, p < .001)
and between P(C2 | Ei) and P(C2 | Ei, Ej) (t(29) = −5.13, p < .001); in the se-
quential algebra SbS2 condition there was a significant between P(C1 | Ei) and
P(C1 | Ei, Ej) (t(27) = −6.3, p < .001) and between P(C2 | Ei) and P(C2 | Ei, Ej)
(t(27) = −3, p = .006). These results imply that learning a second piece of evi-
dence changed participants probability estimates compared to when they knew
2.2 Extending explaining away: Learning (about) multiple pieces of evidence 204
about only one piece of evidence.
Further analyses showed that none of the P(C2 | Ei, Ej) were significantly
different across the levels of evidential learning and only in the sequential al-
gebra was there a difference in P(C1 | Ei, Ej) between the two levels of the
evidential learning condition t(56) = −2.9, p = .005. None of the P(C2 | Ei)
were significantly different across the levels of evidential learning, whereas all
P(C2 | Ei) were: in the full algebra condition P(C1 | Ei) for SbS2 and SbS1
were statistically different, t(59) = 4.6, p < .001, and in the sequential algebra
condition P(C1 | Ei) for SbS2 and SbS1 were statistically different t(50) = 5.1,
p < .001. Combining these results from those above regarding participants
estimates within each group suggests that people are sensitive to the different
orders the pieces of evidence of different diagonsticity were presented, but that
there was no effect of the algebra condition. These results very closely resemble
those from Experiment 4.
The prediction of the split model regarding the ratio of the priors from
Equation 2.6 was that in SbS1 evidential learning condition this ratio would
be around 4.1 and in SbS2 this ratio would be around 1.3, and the ratio for the
full model would most likely be in between these two values. I have calculated
the odds ratio for each participants’ (removing those whose ratios required di-
vision by 0) and compared it to split model predictions. For the group rea-
soning in the full algebra SbS1 conditions there was no significant difference
between split model prediction and the participants’ derived ratios (the mean
ratio was 14.6), t(24) = 1.85, p = .077; similarly for the group reasoning in
the sequential algebra SbS1 conditions (the mean ratio was 12.4), t(24) = 1.94,
p = .063; for the group reasoning in the full SbS2 conditions there was no
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significant difference between the split model prediction and the participants’
derived ratios (the mean ratio was 1.9), t(28) = 1.04, p = .3; lastly, for the group
reasoning in the sequential SbS2 condition this difference was significant (the
mean ratio was 0.66), t(24) = −6.75, p < .001. These results seem to partially
support the split model’s predictions. However, given that (i) the means for
the SbS1 groups were very close to being significantly higher, (ii) the mean for
the sequential SbS2 group was significantly different from the prediction, and
(iii) there was no significant difference between the two algebra conditions, the
support for this model is very limited. In addition, the results do not support
the (range of) predictions from the full model.
Unlike in Experiment 4 where we saw a high clustering of participants’ re-
sponses (particularly around the ‘.50’ mark), in this experiment that is much
less the case. Only 11.3% of all answers to the test questions were .50 (±.02)
(see Figure 2.29). This is significantly lower than 34.1% which was in Experi-
ment 4. All other clusters in this experiment capture around 10% of the data
or less. This suggests that there was no significant clustering in Experiment 5
that could account for the large proportion of the participants’ estimates and
that the experimental design in this experiment was successful in reducing the
clustering (especially around the ‘.50’ mark).
Diagnostic split To explore how many participant provided estimates to
the test questions in line with the diagnostic split reasoning, I calculated
the proportion of participants whose estimates were such that P(C1 | Ei) +
P(C2 | Ei) = 1 and P(C1 | Ei, Ej) + P(C2 | Ei, Ej) = 1. Only 16.8% of partici-
pants provided estimates such P(C1 | Ei) + P(C2 | Ei) = 1 and 12.6% of partic-
ipants provided estimates such P(C1 | Ei, Ej) + P(C2 | Ei, Ej) = 1. These pro-













Figure 2.29: The distribution of all the test question estimates around the 21 clustering
points (bins) (± .02) in Experiment 5.
2.2 Extending explaining away: Learning (about) multiple pieces of evidence 207
portions are significantly lower than in Experiment 4 where the corresponding
proportions were 37.9% and 31%.
Propensity interpretation Only 4.2% of participants provided estimates such
that: P(C1) = P(C1 | Ei) = P(C1 | Ei, Ej) and P(C2) = P(C2 | Ei) =
P(C2 | Ei, Ej). This was lower than in Experiment 4 where this proportion was
7.4%. This results that only a small proportion of the participants in this exper-
iment reasoned in agreement with the propensity hypothesis.
2.2.3.4 Discussion
Overall, the results from Experiment 5 closely resemble those from Experiment
4. There was no significant difference between the algebra conditions and there
seems to have been an influence of the order in which the evidence was learnt.
These findings persisted despite the new design where the probabilities were
communicated through verbal expression and despite no significant clustering
around the probability estimates (especially around the ‘.50’ mark) compared
to Experiment 4.
Although only the strengths of the causes (i.e. the likelihoods) were commu-
nicated to the participants, one could derive the ratio of the posterior odds of
the split model and express it via as the ratio of the likelihoods, that was then
used as a prediction of the split model. To calculate these likelihoods I used
the mapped numerical estimates of the verbal probability expressions. A lim-
ited support for the split model and no support was found for the full model
was found. However, there are further limitations to this support. Using only
the data collected from Experiment 5 one cannot determine whether the par-
ticipants (on average) accepted the mapped numerical estimates of the verbal
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probability expressions. Furthermore, as studies have documented large indi-
vidual differences in understanding, communicating, and using verbal proba-
bility expressions, it is then even more difficult to determine whether the par-
ticipants accepted the mapped numerical estimates (see, for example, Wallsten
& Budescu, 1995). The finding that participants’ estimates seemed to have re-
flected different causal strengths in different orders of evidential learning sug-
gests that participants were sensitive to these different strengths that were com-
municated via the verbal expressions. However, it is not clear to what extent
they were sensitive to these different expressions, as, for instance, there was no
significant difference between the two average estimates for the priors in any
of the four groups.
The diagnostic split and the propensity hypothesis were also explored in
this experiment. The results suggested that the proportion of people who rea-
soned in line with the diagnostic split hypothesis was significantly lower than
in Experiment 4 and somewhat lower for the propensity hypothesis. Some of
the potential reasons for this finding regarding the diagnostic split hypothesis
are that (i) participants were not communicated/it was left of to interpretation
whether the two causes became exhaustive after learning the effects has hap-
pened (as was the case in the first four experiments), which could then leave
open the possibility for unobserved causes that could have also resulted in the
effect occurring, and/or (ii) the verbal probability expressions do not trigger
diagnostic split reasoning as much as the numerical probability estimates. The
latter explanation could also account for the somewhat lower proportion of the
participants who reasoned in line with the propensity interpretation in Experi-
ment 5 compared to Experiment 4. These should be explored in future research.
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2.2.4 General discussion
The general goal of the part of the chapter was twofold. First, I sought to ex-
plore new avenues in sequential diagnostic reasoning by investigating people’s
causal judgements with multiple independent causes and multiple pieces of
evidence of different diagnosticity. To this effect I found that people are sen-
sitive to the different diagnosticity of the evidence. This was the case when
the probabilistic information regarding the diagnosticity was communicated
both through the numerical probability estimates and the verbal probability ex-
pressions. However, I have found that people do not follow the predictions of
the normative (full) CBN model and sometimes provided estimates that went
against the (even qualitative) prediction of the normative model. This suggests
that although people were sensitive to the different diagnosticities of the evi-
dence, it is perhaps not these diagnosticities that led them to provide specific
estimates for the two causes. In contrast, Meder and Mayrhofer (2017a) found
that both the numerical probability estimates and the verbal probability expres-
sion were effective in communicating the different diagnosticities of the effects
in the case of the mutually exclusive causes.
The second goal was to introduce the issue of novel variables in sequential
reasoning and the practical as well as modeling challenges it presents. In par-
ticular, I have explored two modeling strategies for extending algebra in the
context of adding an effect to a common-effect 3-node causal structure: a split
CBN model and a full CBN model. I have shown that predictions of the two
models differ under most of the circumstances. The results from Experiments
4 and 5 have, however, suggested that (i) there was no difference between the
groups who were presented the full algebra from the beginning and the groups
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who were presented the algebra in a sequential way and (ii) that there was little
support for either the split or the full CBN model.
One potential explanation of these results is that there actually is no differ-
ence between reasoning with full algebra or learning the algebra in a sequen-
tial manner. The results from Experiment 4, however, showed a high degree of
clustering around specific focal points (in particular ‘.50’ mark), which seemed
to have driven participants’ estimates. By reducing the amount of the quanti-
tative information and using verbal probability expression the clustering has
significantly reduced in Experiment 5. However, even in Experiment 5 partic-
ipants seemed to have strongly relied on the likelihoods to provide estimates
to the test questions, with the clustering being less pronounced because of the
vagueness of the verbal probability expressions. This suggests at least two pos-
sible explanations: (i) the experimental design used in Experiment 4 and 5 is
not appropriate to explore diagnostic reasoning in more complex (2 indepen-
dent causes and 2 effects) causal situations or (ii) the 4-node causal situations
with 2 independent causes and 2 effects are already too complex for people
to process and reason with. The latter explanation is not without merit as the
recent research suggests that, when presented with more complex situations,
people preform poorly compared to the normative CBN models (see e.g. Cruz
et al., 2020; Liefgreen et al., 2018). This does not imply that all 4-node causal
structures are too complex for people to reason with. For instance, research on
diamond structures where there is a one common cause of two further inter-
mediate causes which in turn cause one common effect suggests that people in
general demonstrate the basic normative patterns when reasoning with these
kinds of structures (Meder, Hagmayer, & Waldmann, 2008, 2009). What poten-
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tially sets apart the structure used in Experiment 4 and 5 from the diamond
structure is that the structure in Experiment 4 and 5 includes two explaining
away patterns (compared to only one in the diamond structure) that people
find in general difficult process as discussed in the first part of the chapter and
that it has one extra parameter. All this could result in the complexity that goes
beyond people’s reasoning abilities.
The two hypotheses from the first part of the chapter, the propensity inter-
pretation and the diagnostic split, were explored in this part of the chapter as
well. The results suggested that the diagnostic split hypothesis accounted for
a large proportion of the responses in Experiment 4, although some of these
responses could have been due to participants’ providing .50 as their estimate
to communicate that they do not know the answer. In Experiment 5, the diag-
nostic split hypothesis account for a significantly smaller proportion of the es-
timates, suggesting that (i) the diagnostic split reasoning is less prevalent when
the parameters are communicated as verbal probability expression and/or (ii)
the fact it was left open to the participants to interpret whether there are any
unobserved causes that could have also produced the effects might have lead
the participant away from the diagnostic split reasoning. The propensity in-
terpretation accounted for a significantly smaller proportion of participants es-
timates in Experiments 4 and 5 compared to Experiments 1-3. This could be
because, as speculated in the first part, in Experiments 4 and 5 (i) the set-up
was not deterministic, (ii) the cover stories were not mechanistic, and (iii) the
priors were not established in an objective way. The even lower proportion of
the estimates that aligned with the propensity interpretation in Experiment 5
compared to Experiment 4 could be because of the parameters being communi-
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cated through verbal expressions. The vagueness of the verbal expression than
could have even more contributed to, for instance, the priors not been clearly
and objectively established. Further research should explore these avenues.
2.3 Conclusions
In this chapter I have explored how explanation when thought of as a product
and explanation of a specific outcome in an intrapersonal context can affect our
beliefs in causal reasoning. Specifically, I explored a particular causal reason-
ing pattern explaining away. I have found that when engaging in basic 3-node
explaining away situations people are significantly deviating from the CBN
normative prediction, but that they are doing that in a very specific ways that
could be captured by the two hypotheses: the diagnostic split and the propen-
sity interpretation.
I have also explored sequential diagnostic reasoning in explaining away
situations with multiple pieces of evidence. Here, I also explored the potential
effects of sequentially extending algebra. This was a novel exploration from
both a modeling and an empirical perspective. I have found that people are
sensitive to different diagnosticities of evidence, but no effects of the algebra
extension were found. As the research on extending algebra is still in its infancy
regarding both the modeling strategies and the empirical exploration, further
research is warranted.
If one were to take a step back from all the details of the experiments in this
chapter and consider the notion of explanation employed in this chapter they
would find that this notion is quite limited. The explanation to consists of one
node in a CBN that is ‘responsible’ for a change in the probability of another
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node. This, however, is not the only way to understand explanations. In the
next chapter I discuss the different notions of explanation and their relations
to, in particular, the AI literature.
3
Explaining the argument: The case of
causal Bayesian networks
In the previous chapter I explored the relationship between argument/belief
change and explanations of specific outcomes. However, we often ask for or
are invited to provide explanations of not just the presence or existence of spe-
cific outcomes, but also how these outcomes came about. For example, a doctor
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could point to a specific disease as an explanation of why a patient has particu-
lar symptoms. The patient, however, could ask a doctor why do they think that
the symptoms could be accounted for by the disease. In this case, a doctor (or
more broadly a scientific community) would need to provide an explanation
of an inference or a reasoning process(es) that led them to think that a specific
disease is a cause of particular symptoms. Similarly, in court it is often not
sufficient just to say that a particular person is guilty of a crime. Often, a pros-
ecutor is required to present and explain a case or an argument or an inference
process regarding how the evidence is incriminating the defendant.
In more recent times, explaining reasoning and decision-making processes
of the artificial intelligence (AI) systems has emerged as a prominent issue. For
example, an Amazon recommender system, an AI system that provides auto-
matic recommendations, could recommend to us a particular book. However,
as many of us have experienced, it is often unclear why a particular book is
recommended. Further explanation of why that particular book was recom-
mended and of what decision-making process led the AI system to this rec-
ommendation is, either explicitly or implicitly, required by the human user
if that recommendation is to have an impact on whether or not the user will
ultimately buy the book. The field called ‘the explainable AI’ (XAI) is de-
voted to addressing this challenge of explaining the decisions and inference
processes of AI systems. Furthermore, recent years have seen a groundswell
of interest in machine-generated explanation for AI systems, where (one) AI
system is generating explanations of (another) AI system’s inference processes
(Doshi-Velez & Kim, 2017; Gunning & Aha, 2019; Montavon, Samek, & Müller,
2018; Rieger, Chormai, Montavon, Hansen, & Müller, 2018; Samek, Wiegand,
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& Müller, 2017). Multiple factors exert pressure for supplementing AI sys-
tems with explanations of their outputs. Explanations provide transparency
for what are often black-box procedures. Hence transparency is viewed as crit-
ical for fostering the acceptance of AI systems in real-world practice (Bansal,
Farhadi, & Parikh, 2014; Chen et al., 2014; Fallon & Blaha, 2018; B. Hayes &
Shah, 2017; Mercado et al., 2016; Wachter, Mittelstadt, & Russell, 2017), last
but not least, because transparency might be a necessary ingredient for dealing
with legal liability (Felzmann, Villaronga, Lutz, & Tamò-Larrieux, 2019; Doshi-
Velez et al., 2017; Goodman & Flaxman, 2016; Wachter, Mittelstadt, & Floridi,
2017). At the same time, decades of research in AI make plausible the claim
that AI systems genuinely able to navigate real-world challenges are likely to
involve joint human-system decision making, at least for the foreseeable fu-
ture. This however, requires AI systems to communicate outputs in such a
way as to allow humans to make informed decisions. In other words, it would
require human-friendly explanations of AI systems’ reasoning and decision-
making processes that led the AI systems to produce a particular outcome or
recommend a particular action.
In this chapter, I will explore the explanations of inference processes or ar-
guments. The kinds of explanations that I am going to be considering are still
made in an intrapersonal context and are products of explanation processes.
Figure 3.1 illustrates where these explanations are located in the 3-dimensional
explanation cube.
The focus of this chapter will be explaining inference processes in causal
Bayesian networks (CBNs). There are two main reasons to concentrate on ex-
plaining inference in CBNs. Firstly, in Chapters 1 and 2 we have seen that
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Figure 3.1: The three dimensions of explanation.
many argument schemes can be modeled using CBNs. Explaining inferences in
concrete CBNs would thus equate to explaining arguments themselves, which
would further inform the discussion on the relationship between arguments
and explanations. Secondly, CBNs are an AI technique that has been viewed
as significantly more interpretable and transparent than deep neural networks
(Gunning & Aha, 2019), while still possessing a notable predictive power and
being applied to various contexts ranging from defence and military (Falzon,
2006; Laskey & Mahoney, 1997; Lippmann et al., 2006) and cyber security
(Chockalingam, Pieters, Teixeira, & van Gelder, 2017; Xie, Li, Ou, Liu, & Levy,
2010), over medicine (Agrahari et al., 2018; Wiegerinck, Burgers, & Kappen,
2013), and law and forensics (Lagnado, Fenton, & Neil, 2013; Fenton, Neil,
& Lagnado, 2013), to agriculture (Drury, Valverde-Rebaza, Moura, & de An-
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drade Lopes, 2017) as well as psychology and philosophy as seen in previous
chapters. As such, CBNs are a promising meeting point connecting the re-
search on machine-generated explanation in AI and the research on human
understanding of explanation in psychology and philosophy. Furthermore,
given the increasing popularity of CBNs within AI (Friedman, Geiger, & Gold-
szmidt, 1997; Pernkopf & Bilmes, 2005; Roos, Wettig, Grünwald, Myllymäki, &
Tirri, 2005; Ng & Jordan, 2002), including their relation to deep neural networks
(Choi, Wang, & Darwiche, 2019; Rohekar, Nisimov, Gurwicz, Koren, & Novik,
2018; Wang & Yeung, 2016) and efforts to explain deep neural networks via
CBNs (Harradon, Druce, & Ruttenberg, 2018), explaining inferences in CBNs
would not just inform work in XAI, but also more generally in AI.
In order to explore what is explanatory in the context of CBNs (or any other
context), one would need some theoretical background regarding what counts
as an explanation and, more specifically, what counts as a ‘good’ explanation.
In Chapter 1 we have seen that there are many measures of argument quality.
Similarly, there are also many ways to explicate explanatory goodness. In this
chapter I review some of these ways and apply them to the case of explaining
inference in CBNs.
The chapter proceeds in two parts. In the first part I review different notions
of explanation with a specific focus on CBNs and introduce key theoretical per-
spectives on what constitutes an explanation, and more specifically a ‘good’
explanation, from the philosophy literature. In the second part I compare these
theoretical perspectives and the criteria they propose with a case study on ex-
plaining reasoning in CBNs.
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3.1 Theoretical background1
In the previous chapter I have explored a particular reasoning schema called
‘explaining away’ where learning a state of a variable in CBN is sufficient to
‘explain away’ the evidence and thus reduce the probability of other possible
causes. In that chapter I have only briefly mentioned what is meant by an
explanation in the context of explaining away, without going into a broader
discussion on explanation. This was because the main goal of that chapter was
to explore human causal reasoning in explaining away and its extensions and
to address specific modeling strategies. In this part of the chapter, however, I
am going to do discuss different notions of explanation that are found in the
literature and that also apply to CBNs. Taking a step back from looking at a
specific reasoning schema, in this part of the chapter I will discuss how the no-
tion of explanation in the case of explaining away (as well as in other reasoning
patterns) relates to the notion of explanation of inference.
Figure 3.2: A CBN model of explaining away.
1This section is based on work from Tešić and Hahn (in press).
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3.1.1 Explaining evidence
Defining an explanation has proven to be quite a difficult task (Lombrozo,
2012). Explanations have been understood as answers to how- and why-
questions, as well as judgments about why an outcome occurred or hypotheses
that include causes of what is being explained (also known as explanandum).
These different ways of delineating an explanation point to different aspects of
an explanation. Generally speaking, however, explanations can be understood
as proposition that address a request for an explanation (Lombrozo, 2012). For
instance, in the case of the inference of the best explanation (IBE) one is aim-
ing to find the best explanation (hypothesis/proposition) of evidence (or data);
once such explanation is found it then warrants a conclusion suggested by an
explanation (Harman, 1965; Lipton, 2003). To illustrate, consider again an ex-
ample where a doctor is presented with a child who is in pain (evidence/data).
To decide an appropriate treatment, the doctor needs to to answer the follow-
ing question: why is the child in pain? (request). The doctor finds that the best
explanation of the child’s pain is that the child has pulled a muscle (hypothe-
sis/proposition) (the example is due to Okasha, 2000).
This notion of explanation maps well onto CBNs. In Chapter 2 we
saw how, in explaining away situations, learning that one cause (hypothe-
sis/proposition) has happened is sufficient to explain the effect (evidence, but
also, as a consequence, can affect the probability of another (initially) inde-
pendent cause. To use the example introduced in that chapter and graphi-
cally represented in Figure 3.2, learning that a child has haemophilia (hypothe-
sis/proposition) is sufficient to explain the bruises on the body (evidence) and
as a consequence would reduce the probability of physical abuse. Explain-
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ing away reasoning is an example of intercausal reasoning, one of the three
main types of reasoning in CBNs. As noted earlier in this thesis, the other
two types of reasoning are predictive reasoning and diagnostic reasoning (of-
ten referred to as an abduction, see, e.g., Korb & Nicholson, 2010). Consider
again the CBN in Figure 3.2. An example of predictive reasoning would be
inferring a probability that the child has bruises given that it’s suffering from
haemophilia (i.e. inference from causes (or hypotheses, h) to effects (or evi-
dence, e)); whereas diagnostic reasoning would be inferring a probability of
physical abuse from learning that the child has bruises (i.e. inference from ef-
fects (e) to causes (h)). In all these three types of reasoning, an explanation is a
variable (or a proposition) that can account for the presence/absence of another
variables (evidence) in a CBN and that often has an impact on the probability
of other variables in a CBN. This is a very simple view, but thinking of expla-
nations as consisting of a variable that can account for the changes in states
of other variables in a CBN does resemble similar ideas from psychology and
philosophy regarding explanation more generally.
Other ways of explaining evidence in CBNs go beyond this simple view of
explanation, often, however, building upon it. For example, diagnostic rea-
soning (abduction) is used to find the most probable explanations (causes)
of observed evidence (effects), that is, to find the configuration h with the
maximum p(h | e) (the approach is called ‘maximum a posteriori’ (MAP)
and is due to Pearl, 1988). Similarly, Shimony’s (1991) partial abduction ap-
proach first marginalizes out variables that are not part of explanations (x)
and then searches for the most probable h: that is, find h with the maximum
∑x p(h, x | e). More recently, Yuan, Lim, and Lu (2011) introduced a method
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they call ‘Most Relevant Explanation’ (MRE) which chooses the explanation
that has the highest likelihood ratio compared to all other explanations: that is,
find h with the maximum p(e | h)/p(e | h), where h denotes all other alterna-
tive explanations to h. Nielsen, Pellet, and Elisseeff (2008) introduced a ‘Causal
Explanation Tree’ (CET) method which uses the post-intervention distribution
of variables (Pearl, 2009) in selecting explanations, which is in contrast to all
previous methods since they use a non-interventional distribution of variables
in a CBN. Drawing on their definition of causation, Halpern and Pearl (2005b)
develop a definition of explanation to address the question of why certain evi-
dence holds given users epistemic state. Their definition of explanation states
that (i) a user should consider evidence to hold, (ii) an explanation (h) is a suf-
ficient cause of evidence, (iii) h is minimal (i.e. it does not contain irrelevant or
redundant elements), and (iv) h is not known at the beginning, but it is consid-
ered as a possibility. This is an improvement over other accounts. However,
their account of causation, again, has as an output a set of variables in a CBN
model which is deemed the causes of evidence in the model. Yap, Tan, and
Pang (2008) employ the Markov blanket to determine which variables should
feature in an explanation. A Markov blanket of a node A includes all nodes that
are direct parents, children, or children’s parents of that node. For example, all
nodes within the dashed circle in Figure 3.3 constitute a Markov blanket of
node A. A powerful property of the Markov blanket is that knowing the states
of all the variables in a Markov blanket of A would uniquely determine the
probability distribution of A: additionally learning the states of other variables
outside the Markov blanket of A would not affect the probability distribution
of A. Yap et al.’s ‘Explaining CBN Inferences’ procedure identifies Markov
3.1 Theoretical background 223
nodes of evidence (i.e. nodes in a Markov blanket of the evidence node) and
learns context specific independences in Markov nodes with a decision tree to
exclude irrelevant nodes in an explanation of the evidence.
Figure 3.3: An example of a Markov blanket. All nodes within the dashed circle con-
stitute a set of nodes that is a Markov blanket of node A. The illustration is publicly
available via Wikimedia Commons. URL: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/
File:Diagram of a Markov blanket.svg
Despite the differences among these methods, they all share at least one
commonality: explanation of evidence is exhausted by a set of variables (hy-
potheses/propositions) in a CBN that these methods have pointed to. In other
words, explanatory justification is provided in terms of a set of variables. This
observation is not, however, restricted to explanations in CBNs. Image classi-
fication is a problem commonly addressed in deep neural networks literature.
XAI approaches to image classification in deep learning are looking for pixels
that contribute the most to an image being classified under a certain category
(Lundberg & Lee, 2017). Although this is an important and commendable re-
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search stream in XAI, it does not address how an AI system came to a conclu-
sion (output) and it does not provide an explanation of the inference processes
in an AI system: why is it that certain pixels contributed more than the others to
an image being classified under a certain category? Why is it that a certain sub-
set of pixels is sufficient for an AI system to classify an image? (Sun, Chockler,
Huang, & Kroening, 2019).
Selecting a set of nodes (or pixels) that best justifies the evidence (output)
according to a particular method or selecting a hypotheses that have the high-
est explanatory power is undoubtedly useful. However, in certain contexts
(e.g. high-cost domains, see Herlocker, Konstan, & Riedl, 2000) this is arguably
not enough to meet the demands of user transparency. In contrast to the notion
of explanation as a justification of evidence is that of explanation of reasoning
processes in CBNs, and expert systems in general (Lacave & Dı́ez, 2002; Sørmo,
Cassens, & Aamodt, 2005; Wick & Thompson, 1992). Here one is interested in
how evidence propagates in a CBN rather than in selecting a set of variables
that would account for evidence.
3.1.2 Explaining reasoning processes
Sometimes just finding single propositions or sets of propositions is not suffi-
cient to respond to the explanation request. Often, we are required to explain
our reasoning processes that led us to believe that a particular proposition is an
adequate explanation. For example, in court proceedings an explanation re-
garding why certain a person A died is that the defendant killed them. But
simply saying that the defendant killed A is usually not enough for a judge to
convict the defendant of the crime. The prosecution is required to present a case
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or make an argument that further elaborates on why they think the defendant
killed A, connecting the pieces of evidence to the claim that the defendant killed
A and explaining how the evidence bears on the defendant’s guilt. Thus, in this
example the original claim (the defendant killed A) is not sufficient to explain
the evidence and we are in the search for further justification and clarification
that goes beyond data and evidence to link that data to the claim/hypothesis.
The explanation in this case would consist of the justification and clarification
that connects the evidence and the hypothesis.
The view that explanations are links between claims/hypothesis and
data/evidence is not novel. For instance, Toulmin in his book The uses
of argument introduces his highly influential argument framework (Toulmin,
1958/2003). There, he differentiates between claims, data, and warrants.
Claims are propositions we are trying to argue for using data. For instance,
the fact (data) that Harry’s hair is red provides direct support for the claim that
Harry’s hair is not black. However, the way data provides support for a claim
is not always obvious. For example, it may not be clear to everyone that the fact
(data) that a person is a Swede provides support for the claim that they are not
Roman Catholic; sometimes a further warrant or explanation is needed, such
as ‘A Swede is most likely not a Roman Catholic’ to connect the data to the
claim. Thagard (1989) argues even more forcefully for the conception of expla-
nations as links between data and claims (or hypotheses) and Antaki and Leu-
dar (1992) view explanations as providing support for claims. More recently,
Brem and Rips (2000) explored whether people are able to distinguish between
explanation and evidence. They distinguish between the claim (‘a proposition
whose truth value we are attempting to establish’), evidence (data), and expla-
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nation that can provide support for the claim by providing a (causal) bridge
between data and the claim. For instance, one could argue that welfare recipi-
ents have difficulty getting off public aid (data/evidence) because they lack job
skills (claim). However, it is not necessarily obvious how lack of skills could
lead to the difficulty of getting off the public aid. To that end one could provide
an explanation such as ‘Job skills increase a person’s chances of landing a well-
paid job, which in turn supplies them with enough money to give up welfare
checks’. This explanation further elucidates the relationship and an inference
process between the claim and data and as such provides a bridge between
them.
The conception of explanations as bridges or links between claims and data
is not only found in the psychology and philosophy literature. At the beginning
of this chapter I mentioned an example regarding an Amazon recommender
system providing us with a book recommendation. When an AI system pro-
vides us with a recommendation (e.g. an Amazon recommender system rec-
ommending us a book to buy) based on our search history (data), to most of
us users it is not clear how the AI system came to a particular recommenda-
tion. One of the challenges in computer science and, more specifically, in rec-
ommender systems research, is not just finding a recommendation for a human
user, but also providing a machine-generated explanation of that recommenda-
tion (Zhang & Chen, 2020). The goal is to build AI systems that would generate
explanation for the recommendations (e.g. the book has been recommended
because it is in the same category as the books we previously bought), which
would provide users with an insight into how the AI system came to its rec-
ommendation so that users are more likely to trust the recommendation and
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follow up on it. Here, from a user perspective explanations can also viewed as
links between data and a recommendation: an explanation provides an insight
into how the AI system came to a particular recommendation given the data,
that is it provides an insight into the reasoning processes of an AI system.
Explaining reasoning processes in CBNs has also been a research focus
amongst expert systems researchers for some time (see Lacave & Dı́ez, 2002 for
an overview). I describe explaining reasoning processes in CBNs through a re-
cent attempt in the context of the Bayesian Argumentation via Delphi (BARD)
project.
The BARD project (Cruz et al., 2020; Dewitt, Lagnado, & Fenton, 2018;
Liefgreen et al., 2018; Nicholson et al., 2020; Phillips, Hahn, & Pilditch, 2018;
Pilditch, Hahn, & Lagnado, 2018; Pilditch et al., 2019) set as its goal the devel-
opment of assistive technology that could facilitate group decision-making in
an intelligence context. To this end, BARD provides a graphical user interface
enabling intelligence analysts to represent arguments as CBNs and allowing
them to examine the impact of different pieces of evidence on arguments as
well as to bring groups of analysts to a consensus via an automated Delphi
method. An essential component of the system is the algorithm for generating
natural language explanations of inference in a CBN, or more specifically, an
explanation of evidence propagation in a CBN. This algorithm builds on ear-
lier work by Zukerman and colleagues that have sought to use CBNs to gener-
ate arguments (Zukerman, McConachy, & Korb, 1998; Zukerman, McConachy,
Korb, & Pickett, 1999). The algorithm uses an evidence-to-goal approach to
generate explanations for a CBN. An explanation starts with the given pieces
of evidence and traces paths that describe their influence on intervening nodes
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until the goal is reached. In essence, the algorithm adopts a causal interpreta-
tion of the links between the connected nodes, finds a set of rules that describe
causal relations in a CBN, and calculates all paths between evidence nodes and
target nodes (claims/hypotheses) and builds corresponding trees in order to
determine the impact of evidence on target nodes. Figure 3.4 provides an ex-
ample. There we have four pieces of evidence: Emerson report, Quinns report,
and AitF Sawyer Report all stating that ‘The Spider’ is in the facility and Comms
Analyst Winter Report stating that ‘The Spider’ is not in the facility. The goal
is to explain the impact of these four pieces of evidence on two target vari-
ables, namely Is The Spider in the facility? and Are logs true? (Are Emerson &
Quinn spies?). The algorithm first finds all relevant paths between evidence
and target nodes, builds a corresponding tree and calculates the impact of ev-
idence on the target, which is simply a difference between the probability of
the target node before learning particular piece(s) of evidence and after learning
particular piece(s) of evidence. This way the algorithm can find the so-called
HighImpSet—the nodes that have the highest impact on the target node, the
NoImpSet—the nodes that, in light of the other evidence nodes, have no impact
on the target node, and the OppImpSet—the nodes that have the opposite im-
pact to that of HighImpSet. Finally, the algorithm realizes the explanations in
English language using sentences, clauses and phrases devised and combined
by means of a semantic grammar (Burton, 1976). The output of the algorithm
is presented in Figure 3.5.
As can be seen, the output in Figure 3.5 provides significantly more infor-
mation to the user than just a single verdict on whether or not the variable Is
The Spider in the facility? is part of the explanation of the evidence, as would be
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Figure 3.4: A CBN of a fictional scenario used in BARD testing phase. Four pieces of ev-
idence are available: Emerson Report=Yes, Quinns Report=Yes, AitF Sawyer Report=Yes,
and Comms Analyst Winter Report=No.
Figure 3.5: A summary report generated by the BARD algorithm applied on the CBN
from Figure 3.4. In addition to the natural language explanation, it provides sets with
nodes that are HighImpSet, NoImpSet and OppImpSet. For the purposes of this chapter
we can ignore MinHIS and CombMinSet.
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the output of methods looking for a justification of evidence. In addition to the
impact sets, it provides a natural language explanation on how different pieces
of evidence influence the probability of the target variable (claim/hypothesis).
Here again explanation can be explicated as the bridge or the link between ev-
idence (data) and the target variables (claims/hypotheses).
Nevertheless, there remain continued challenges with this approach. First,
the algorithm retains difficulties in coping adequately with soft evidence,
namely evidence that we do not learn with probability 1. For instance, imagine
that in the CBN in Figure 3.4 we additionally learn that the logs are most likely
true, but we are not absolutely convinced. To reflect that we would set p(Are
logs true? (Are Emerson & Quinn spies) = True) to equal 0.95 for instance. Thus
the probability of Are logs true? (Are Emerson & Quinn spies) = True has changed
from 0.46243 to 0.95, but it didn’t go all the way to 1. The current version of the
algorithm is not able to calculate the impact of such change. Second, the expla-
nations generated by the algorithm are not aimed specifically at what a human
user might find hard to understand. To make matters worse, it is arguably the in-
teractions between variables and the often counterintuitive effects of these, that
users will most struggle with (for psychological evidence to this effect see for
example Dewitt et al., 2018; Liefgreen et al., 2018; Phillips et al., 2018; Pilditch et
al., 2018, 2019; Tešić et al., 2020). In other words, the system generates an (accu-
rate) explanation, but not necessarily a good explanation. For further guidance
on what might count as a good explanation I consult research on this topic
within the philosophy of science and epistemology, where the topic has raised
decades of interest.
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3.1.3 Good explanation
3.1.3.1 A brief overview of models of explanation
The historic point of departure for thinking about the nature of explanation
in philosophy is the covering law model (Hempel & Oppenheim, 1948), also
known as the “deductive-nomological model” of scientific explanation (where
nomological means pertaining to the laws of nature). This model construes
explanation as a deductive argument with true premises that has the phe-
nomenon to be explained (the so-called explanandum) as its conclusion. Specif-
ically, this conclusion is derived from general laws and particular facts. For
example, an explanation of a position of a planet at a point in time consists
of a derivation of that position from the Newtonian laws governing gravity
(general law), and information about the mass of the sun, the mass of the
planet, and position at a particular time and velocity of each (particular facts)
(Woodward, 2017). A key feature of this model is that it views explanation
and prediction as essentially two sides of the same coin. In the same way that
Newtonian laws and information about the mass of the sun and the planet
etc. can be used to predict the position of the planet at some future time the
inference can also be used to explain the position of the planet after we observe
it. In other words, we see here the same tight coupling between diagnostic
reasoning and predictive reasoning that I mentioned earlier in the context of
CBNs. However, while this coupling works in CBN’s across the range of pos-
sible probabilities, it becomes forced in the covering law model when dealing
with probabilistic explanations, in particular, when dealing with cases where
the probability of observing the conclusion is low. Not only do probabilistic
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contexts move the inference from deduction to an ampliative inference where
the conclusion is no longer certain, the symmetry between explanation and
prediction also becomes forced. We might for example readily explain some-
one being struck by the lightning by appealing to stormy weather conditions
and the fact that they were out in the open. But we would nevertheless has-
ten to predict that someone will be struck by the lightning even if they are out
in the open and there is a storm as it is a low probability event. This limits
the utility of the covering law model within the social sciences where deduc-
tion is not commonplace and where low probability events are often found.
Hempel himself was aware of these difficulties to the extent that he proposed
two versions of the model the deductive-nomological model and an inductive-
statistical one, and himself thought that the inductive statistical model applied
only when the explanatory theory involves high probabilities. Even this re-
striction, however, does not deal appropriately with the asymmetries involved
in explanation. These can be observed even in purely deductive context as is
illustrated by the following example from Salmon (1992). Imagine there is a
flagpole with a shadow of 20m and someone asks why that shadow is 20m
long. In this context, it seems appropriate to explain the length of the shadow
by appealing to the height of the flagpole, the position of the sun, and the laws
of trigonometry. These together adequately explain the shadows length. But
note that this inference can be reversed: when can also use the sun’s position,
the laws of trigonometry, and the length of the shadow to explain the height
of the flagpole. This, however, seems wrong; an adequate explanation of the
height of that flagpole presumably involves an appeal to the maker of the flag-
pole in some form or other. Examples such as these serve to illustrate not just
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the limits of Hempel’s account but of the limits of deductive approaches in the
context of explanation more generally.
The asymmetric relations involved in explanation prompted alternative ac-
counts of scientific explanation within the subsequent literature. Chief among
these are causal accounts which assert that to explain something is to give a
specification of its causes. The standard explication of cause in this context
is that of factors without which something could not be the case (i.e. condi-
tio sine qua non). This deals readily even with low probability events, and
causes can be identified through a process of “screening off”. If one finds that
p(M | N, L) = p(M | N), then N screens off L from M and that M is causally
irrelevant to L. For example, a reading of a barometer (B) and whether there
is a storm (S) are correlated. However, knowing the atmospheric pressure (A)
will make these two independent: p(B | A, S) = p(B | A), suggesting no causal
relationship between B and S. However, the notion of cause in itself is notori-
ously fraught as is evidenced by J. L. Mackie’s convoluted (Mackie, 1965) def-
inition whereby a cause is defined as an “insufficient but necessary part of an
unnecessary but sufficient condition”. This rather tortured definition reflects
the difficulties with the notion of causation when multiple causes are present
thus giving rise to overdetermination (for example, decapitation and arsenic in
the blood stream can both be the causes of death), the difficulties created by
causal chains (for example, tipping over the bottle which hits the floor which
releases the toxic liquid) and the impact of background conditions (for exam-
ple, putting yeast in the dough causes it to rise, but only if it is actually put in
the oven, the oven works, the electrical bills have been paid, and so on). It is
a matter of ongoing research to what extent causal Bayes nets, that is CBN’s
3.1 Theoretical background 234
supplemented with the do-calculus (Pearl, 2009), provide a fully satisfactory
account of causality and these difficulties (see also Halpern & Pearl, 2005a). At
the same time, the difficulty of picking a single one out of multiple potential
causes points to the second main alternative to Hempel’s covering law model,
namely so-called pragmatic accounts of explanation.
According to van Fraassen (1977) an explanation always has a pragmatic
component: specifically what counts as an explanation in any given context
depends on the possible contrasts the questioner has in mind. For example,
consider the question “why did the dog bury the bone?”. Different answers
are required for different prosodic contours: “why did the dog (i.e., not some
other animal) bury the bone?”; why did the dog bury the bone? (say, rather
than eat it); why did the dog bury the bone? (say, rather than the ball). In
short, pragmatic accounts bring into the picture the recipient of an explanation
while rejecting a fundamental connection between explanation and inference
assumed by Hempel’s model.
3.1.3.2 Explanatory virtues
Philosophy has not only tried to characterise the nature of explanation, it has
also sought to identify the so-called “explanatory virtues”. Of the many things
that might count as an explanation according to a particular theoretical account
of explanation, not all may seem equally good or compelling. Among ‘expla-
nations’, we might ask what distinguishes better ones from poorer ones. In
search of explanatory virtues that characterise good explanation, a number of
factors have been identified: explanatory power, unification, coherence, and
simplicity are chief among these. Explanatory power often relates to the ability
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of an explanation to decrease the degree to which we find the explanandum
surprising; the less surprising the explanadum in light of an explanation the
more powerful the explanation. For instance, a geologist may find a prehis-
toric earthquake as explanatory of deformation in layers of bedrock to the ex-
tent that these deformations would be less surprising given the occurrence of
such an earthquake (Schupbach & Sprenger, 2011). Unification refers to expla-
nations’ ability to provide a unified account of a wide range of phenomena.
For example, Maxwell’s theory (explanation) managed to unify electricity and
magnetism (phenomena). Coherence renders explanations that better fit our
already established beliefs to be preferred to those that do not (Thagard, 1989).
Explanations can also have internal coherence, namely how parts of an expla-
nation fit together. Finally, an often motioned explanatory virtue is simplicity.
According to Thagard (1978), simplicity is related to the size and nature of aux-
iliary assumptions needed by an explanation to explain evidence. For instance,
the phlogiston theory of combustion needed a number of auxiliary assump-
tions to explain facts that are easily explained by Lavoisier’s theory: it assumed
existence of a fire-like element ‘phlogiston’ that’s given away in combustion
and that had ‘negative weight’ since bodies undergoing combustion increase in
weight. Others operationalise simplicity as a number of causes invoked in an
explanation: the more causes the less simple an explanation (Lombrozo, 2007).
While all of these factors seem intuitive, debate persists about their nor-
mative basis. In particular, there is an ongoing debate within the philosophy
of science about whether these factors admit of adequate probabilistic recon-
struction (Glymour, 2014). Wojtowicz and DeDeo (2020), however, aimed to
provide a Bayesian account of explanatory virtues and operationalize these
3.1 Theoretical background 236
virtues in a common mathematical framework. At the same time, there is now
a sizeable program within psychology that seeks to examine the application
of these virtues to every day lay explanation. This body of work probes the
extent to which lay reasoners endorse these criteria when distinguishing bet-
ter from worse explanations (Bechlivanidis, Lagnado, Zemla, & Sloman, 2017;
Bonawitz & Lombrozo, 2012; Johnson, Jin, & Keil, 2014; Johnson, Johnston,
Toig, & Keil, 2014; Lombrozo, 2007, 2016; Pennington & Hastie, 1992; Sloman,
1994; Williams & Lombrozo, 2010; Zemla, Sloman, Bechlivanidis, & Lagnado,
2017). To date, researchers found some degree of support for these factors, but
also seeming deviations in practice.
3.1.3.3 Implications
What can be inferred for the project of explaining reasoning in CBNs and in AI
systems in general from this body of research? There are at least two points.
First, it seems clear that CBNs provide a potential tool that is compatible
with present thinking about the explanation at least in principle. They can cap-
ture the asymmetry in explanation as arcs are directed and can have a causal
interpretation (Pearl, 2009), whilst at the same time being able to make pre-
dictions. This is in contrast to, for instance, a rule-based expert system with
IF-THEN rules and a set of facts which would be susceptible to the symmetry
‘error’ in explanation illustrated by the flagpole example from Section 3.1.3.1.
A CBN on the other hand would be able to account for the asymmetry given
a causal interpretation and directional representation of arrows. However, it is
neither clear how explanations in CBNs can capture the pragmatic component
that van Fraassen raises nor how to operationalise explanatory virtues in the
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context of CBNs. These are all potential avenues for further research.
Second, the debates about the nature of explanation and explanatory virtues
have been conducted at very high levels of abstraction. They have also typi-
cally focused on philosophy of science and issues tightly related to it. This is
true even for psychological research on explanation, to the extent that it has
tried to model psychological investigations more or less directly on philosoph-
ical distinctions. However, for the purposes of developing suitable AI algo-
rithms, it also seems important to work in the opposite direction, as it were
from the bottom up. In other words, it seems important to simultaneously start
with simple applications of CBN’s to multiple variable problems, and consider
what kinds of explanations a human (expert) would produce. This would shed
light on the kinds of explanations that seem natural and appropriate to human
users as well as provide guidelines on possible theories of explanation. A sim-
ilar point has been made in AI literature that has emphasised the importance
of human-generated explanations to serve as a baseline for comparison with
machine-generated explanations (Doshi-Velez & Kim, 2017). To explore these
ideas further, I conducted a case study on explanations of inference processes
in CBNs.
3.2 A case study on human-generated explanation
of inferences in CBNs
The main goal of this study was to explore the kinds of explanations of infer-
ence processes a human user may find appropriate and natural in the context
of CBNs. This is interesting from both the psychological and the AI perspec-
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tive as, on the one hand, it could give us further inputs into human explana-
tory intuitions and preferences and, on the other hand, it could inform the AI
researcher that aims to build algorithms for an automated generation of expla-
nations.
To explore this goal I have adopted a ‘bottom up’ approach. Namely, in-
stead of assuming a particular definition of explanation of inferences in AI sys-
tems I ask a human user to provide us with explanations. I then analyze these
explanations in the light of the above literature in philosophy, cognitive science,
and psychology to come to a set of features that characterize explanations in AI
systems which could then serve basis for XAI machine-generated explanations.
To the best of my knowledge, so far there is only one empirical study by
Pacer, Williams, Chen, Lombrozo, and Griffiths (2013) that has compared hu-
man intuitions on explanations related to different causal structures to auto-
mated explanation based on four approaches to automated explanation in CBN
discussed above, including MAP, MRE, and CET. They asked participants to
provide (best) explanations of evidence (Experiment 1) or to rank explanations
from best to worst (Experiment 2) and compared these results to outputs of
the four approaches to automated explanation in CBNs. One of the findings
was that human-generated explanations agree more with automated explana-
tions that on some level include causal intervention. However, the study was
looking at explaining a particular event (outcome) via another event (a node
in a CBN) that (best) explains evidence. The question as to why participants
choose a particular event as the best explanation or why they rank explanations
(causes) the way they did is left unaddressed. In the terminology introduced
in the first part of the chapter, Pacer et al. (2013) were exploring explanations
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of outcomes in a CBN, rather than the explanations of reasoning processes in
a CBN. In contrast, in what follows I focus on the explanations of inference
processes in CBNs.
3.2.1 Overview
In the case study I explored how CBN human experts explain (diagnostic, pre-
dictive, and intercausal) inferences in CBN models. To do so I asked the ex-
perts to produce explanations of the probability change (or no change) of a tar-
get node (claim/hypothesis) in a CBN after learning particular evidence. The
hope was that this would trigger the experts to provide explanations of reason-
ing processes in a CBN that lead to that change in the probability, rather than
simply selecting a set of nodes that are responsible for this change. The experts
answered questions related to the change in the probability in four different
CBNs of different complexities.
3.2.2 Methods
3.2.2.1 Participants
I recruited three independent CBN experts who actively use CBNs in their re-
search in computer science, cognitive psychology, and philosophy to partic-
ipate in the case study. All experts have many years of experience in CBN
modeling (the range is between 5 years and 40 years) and are well published
in the literature on both theoretical foundations and applications of CBNs. The
main reason for asking experts rather than non-experts (or both) to participate
in the study is that CBNs are a technical tool that requires deep knowledge
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and experience in order to understand the reasoning processes in them. Even
though non-experts are able to use this tool with some success after a few hours
of training (see Cruz et al., 2020), it is unlikely that the training provided to
non-experts would provide them with the in-depth knowledge needed to ex-
plain sometimes complex reasoning processes in CBNs. Furthermore, all three
experts have experience in communicating CBNs and their workings to the
non-expert audiences, either through lectures, conferences, or collaborations in
different academic and industry settings.
3.2.2.2 Materials
The three experts were presented with four well-known and publicly avail-
able CBN models (‘Wet grass’, ‘Chest clinic’, ‘False barrier’, and ‘Car diagno-
sis’) publicly available on an online CBN repository https://www.norsys.com/
netlibrary/index.htm. The complexity of the four CBNs is varied: the num-
ber of nodes in the CBNs ranged from 4 to 18 and the number of arcs raged
from 4 to 20. The four CBNs also differed in the target system they were mod-
eling: three of the CBNs (Wet grass, Chest clinc, and Car diagnosis) had real-
world target systems where variables in the models consisted of real-world
events (such as Rain, XRay test result, Battery voltage); one CBN (False barrier)
had a fully abstract target systemt where variables were denoted with letters
from A to D.
There are two reasons for presenting participants with CBN models that
they were already familiar with: (i) it is quite likely that the experts were pre-
viously asked to provide explanations of the reasoning processes in these four
networks, which would imply that their answer were already rehearsed and
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validated by their peers as well as non-expert audiences; and (ii) it would save
time on the part of the participants to complete the questionnaire.
The experts were given four files implementing the fully parameterized
four CBNs (in Netica and AgenaRisk formats). An example of the Wet grass
CBN model implemented in AgenaRisk a can be found in Figure 3.6. The ex-
perts were told that they should be using the four models to answer the ques-
tions in the questionnaire that accompanied the files.
Figure 3.6: An AgenaRisk implementation of the ‘Wet Grass’ CBN model used in the
case study.
The questionnaire consisted of 35 questions (28 required questions and 7
optional questions) regarding the inferences in the four CBNs. Out of these 35
questions, 8 required and 2 optional questions were about inferences in the Wet
grass model, 6 required and 1 optional question were about inferences in the
Chest clinic model, 6 required and 2 optional questions were about the False
barrier model, and 8 required and 2 optional questions were about inferences
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in the Car diagnosis model. The format of the questions was chosen such that it
probes experts’ intuitions on explanations of (diagnostic, predictive, and inter-
causal) reasoning processes in CBNs. The questions prompted the experts to
consider how learning evidence changed the probabilities of the query nodes
in a CBN model. The general format was: given the evidence X, how does
the probability of Y change compared to when that evidence was not available
and why? The questions were also aiming to elicit explanations of different
kinds of reasoning: 10 questions aimed at eliciting explanations of diagnostic
reasoning, 7 questions aimed at eliciting explanations of predictive reasoning,
10 questions aimed at eliciting explanations of combinations of diagnostic and
predictive reasoning, and 8 questions aimed at eliciting explanations of inter-
causal reasoning. The full materials can be found in Appendix B.
3.2.2.3 Procedure
The three experts were asked to consider the four CBNs in the four files. They
were told that the CBNs are already fully parameterized and that they should
use them as such to answer the questions in the questionnaire. They were also
told that the curly brackets, i.e. {}, indicate all evidence that they have available
and that they are supposed to use only the evidence in {} to update the CBN
model and answer the subsequent question. Further, they were told that some
questions were optional, but that it was preferable that they answer as many
questions as they could. Following this short introduction the experts were
presented with the questions related to the four CBNs. For example, a question
asked in relations to the Wet grass CBN model from Figure 3.6 was:
• Given evidence: {Neighbors grass = wet}
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Question: How does the probability of ‘Our Sprinkler = was on’ change
compared to when there was no evidence and why?
This meant that the experts should input {Neighbors grass = wet} as evidence
in Wet grass model and update the model to result in:
Figure 3.7: An AgenaRisk implementation of the ‘Wet Grass’ CBN model used in the
case study when it is known that the neighbor’s grass is wet.
Next, they should compare the probability of ‘Our Sprinkler = was on’ when it
was not known that {Neighbors grass = wet} (i.e. probability of ‘Our Sprinkler =
was on’ from Figure 3.6) to the probability of ‘Our Sprinkler = was on’ when it
was known that {Neighbors grass = wet} (i.e. probability of ‘Our Sprinkler = was
on’ from Figure 3.7) and write a short explanation as to why the probability
changed.
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3.2.3 Results and Discussion
Of the maximum 105 answers (35 per expert) to questions in the questionnaire
83 were received: 28 answers to question related to the Wet grass model, 20
related to the Chest clinic model, 15 related to the False barrier model, and 20
related to the Car diagnosis model. One expert provided answers to only the
required questions regarding the Wet grass and Chest clinic models.
The three independent sets of answers were subjected to an analysis by a
fourth person (also an expert in CBNs with decades worth of experience) in
order to identify both commonalities and differences across the answers. This
formed the basis of the subsequent evaluation of those answers with the fol-
lowing findings.
Firstly, I observed that the experts did provide explanations of reasoning
processes in CBNs and did not simply point to a set of nodes in a CBNs that
are ‘responsible’ for the change in probability. For example, in response to how
and why the probability of ‘Rain = rained’ changed in light of the new evidence
Expert 3 answered:
It [the probability] decreases from 20 to 10.77. Although Our Grass
= wet increases probability of Rain = rained (to 32.26), Wall = wet
reduces it because it strongly increases Our sprinkler = on, which in
turn decreases Rain = rained more than Wall=wet increases it.
Furthermore, the explanation seemed to have played a role of a link (bridge)
between the target node (claim/hypothesis) and evidence in a similar manner
that, as we have seen above, the explanation ‘A Swede is most likely not a
Roman Catholic’ connects the evidence that a person is a Swede to the claim
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they are not Roman Catholic. This is an important result as it suggests that (i)
human experts are capable of producing explanations of reasoning processes in
CBNs and (ii) these explanation have the function of a link between the target
node and evidence. It further suggests that these explanations could be used
to inform XAI researchers who explore automated explanations of reasoning
processes in AI systems.
Secondly, there was a high level of agreement across the experts’ answers.
Differences were typically more presentational than substantive. For example,
the following three statements all seek to describe the same state of affairs:
• ‘As A is true C is more likely to be true if B is true and less likely to be
true if B is false. As I do not know B these alternatives essentially cancel
themselves out and leave the probability of C unchanged.’
• ‘It does not change. P(C | A) is equal to P(C) if P(C | A, B) =
P(C | ∼A,∼B) and P(C | A,∼B) = P(C | ∼A, B) (assuming P(B) = 0.5),
which here is the case.’
• ‘According to model parameters: If A and B both true or both false, then
C has probability .75. If A true but B false, or vice-versa, then C has prob-
ability .25. When I know A is true, and prior for B is 50%, there is a 50%
that probability of C is 75% and a 50% that probability of C is 2%, there-
fore overall probability of C is 50%.’
Thirdly, causal explanations were prevalent. All three experts highly relied
on causal explanations:
The probability of rain decreases because, although the sprinkler
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and rain can both cause our grass to be wet, the wet wall is more
likely to happen when the sprinkler is on rather than rain.
Notably, in appealing to causes, it is the most probable cause that seems to be
highlighted as an explanation:
There is a decrease [in probability] because the most likely cause of
our grass being wet is the sprinkler and since the wall is dry the
sprinkler is unlikely to be on.
As we seen above, pointing to most probable cause is the way the MAP ap-
proach selects explanations. However, in contrast to MAP, the expert also pro-
vided an explanation of how the most likely cause figures in the context of
other relevant variables that can affect the change in the probability. So, sim-
ply pointing to a set of nodes is not sufficient to explain an inference process,
although it can be a part of it. Furthermore, I found that causal language was
more prevalent in explanations of inferences of the three CBNs that have real-
world domains as target systems, i.e. Wet grass, Chest clinic, and Car diagnosis,
than in explanations of inference of the False barrier. For example, some typical
explanations in related to the False barrier CBN are:
It [the probability] does not change. P(C | A) is equal to P(C) if
P(C | A, B) = P(C | ∼A,∼B) and P(C | A,∼B) = P(C | ∼A, B) (as-
suming P(B) = 0.5)), which here is the case.
Fourthly, all experts appeal to hypothetical reasoning as a way of unpacking
interactions of evidence variables:
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Wall = wet is a lot more likely if the sprinkler was on than if it rained
(as a matter of fact, if it rained, the wall is more likely to be dry than
wet). Since, Our sprinkler = was on went down, Wall = wet went
down.
This is an important finding as it suggests that XAI should focus also on ex-
plaining different possible scenarios (‘contrasts’) in accounting for evidence
and not just focusing on explaining what actually happened (see also Miller,
2019). Contrastive explanations, thus, seem natural (confirming van Fraassen’s
intuitions about explanation), and in a CBN context this emerges as discussion
of behaviour under alternative, hypothetical evidence states.
Finally, these data seem to suggest that the structure of the CBNs is ex-
ploited in order to zero in on a subset of variables that will feature in an expla-
nation. Specifically, explanations seemed to make use of the Markov blanket
discussed above. In addition to Markov blanket, experts’ descriptions mostly
followed the direction of evidence propagation, i.e. followed the directed paths
in a CBN:
The probability of Battery voltage = dead increases because failure of
the car to start could be explained by the car not cranking and the
likely cause of this is a faulty starter system. A dead battery is one
possible explanation for a faulty starter system.
This suggests that the explanatory virtue of ‘simplicity’ might, in a CBN con-
text, be conceptualised in terms of a Markov blanket and path direction, giving
some support for the EBI procedure which uses Markov nodes as featuring in
an explanation of evidence.
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In summary, I found that experts are capable of explaining inferences pro-
cesses in CBNs and that explanation here often have the function of a link or
a bridge between the target node (claim/hypothesis) and evidence. Further,
multiple features of the philosophical, psychological, and cognitive science lit-
erature are reflected in these explanations: a focus on causal explanation for a
probabilistic system; the directional nature of explanation (its asymmetry); in-
dications of pragmatic sensitivity in that hypotheticals are used to express rele-
vant ‘contrasts’; and, an emerging notion of simplicity in the use of the Markov
blanket. I also found that although existing XAI procedures for automated ex-
planation do not fully account for explaining inference processes, some of them
are a part of these explanations.
These results are still very much preliminary and further research is needed.
However, they still provide an initial sense of the kinds of explanations a hu-
man (expert) may produce and, potentially, prefer in the context of explana-
tions of reasoning in CBNs, and more generally in AI systems. More specifi-
cally, the case study makes a start at bridging between machine reasoning, and
the philosophical and psychological literatures on what counts as ‘good rea-
soning’ by eliciting explanations by human experts. The work illustrates how
concrete cases rapidly move discussion beyond abstract considerations of ex-
planatory ‘virtues’ toward specific targets more suitable for emulation by ma-
chines. At the same time, this highlights the limitations of present algorithms
for generating explanations from CBNs as we have seen is the case with the
BARD project. Nonetheless, it provides concrete direction for future algorithm
construction. And it indicates that bottom up approaches such as the one taken
are informative and should be pursued further in future.
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Needless to say, the present study represents a first attempt only, and future
work expanding on it is required. Such work, should include larger samples of
experts, although the degree of convergence observed makes fundamental dis-
agreements seem less likely. Crucially, however, it should also further broaden
the range of examples and network structures considered: it is here, that I most
expect interesting features to have been missed.
3.3 Conclusions
As AI systems come to permeate human society, there is an increasing need
for such systems to explain their actions, conclusions, or decisions. This is
presently fuelling a surge in interest in machine-generated explanation. How-
ever, there are not only technical challenges to be met here; there is also consid-
erable uncertainty about what suitable target explanations should look like.
In this chapter I have presented two ways to understand different notions
of what counts as an explanation. One of these notions involves explanation as
identification of the variables that mattered in generating a certain outcome.
In the context of computational models of explanation in CBN’s this corre-
sponds to the usual focus on explaining observed evidence via unobserved
nodes within the network. In other words, the explanation identifies a justi-
fication/hypothesis. This is the notion of explanation that has figured promi-
nently in work on computer-generated explanations as well as in psycholog-
ical and philosophical literature on explanation. The second notion of expla-
nation I considered includes explanation of the inference that links evidence
and hypothesis. In the context of CBN’s this means explaining the reasoning
processes that lead to a change (or no change) in the probabilities of the query
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nodes. In other words, the explanation of a target node (claim/hypothesis) in-
volves information about the incremental reasoning process that identifies that
hypothesis. It is this second notion of explanation that is crucial in explain-
ing decision-making processes in AI systems that would arguably increase the
transparency of and trust in the outputs of these systems. Explanation so un-
derstood constitutes a fundamental problem of human computer interaction
and only empirical research that seeks to understand the human user can lead
to fully satisfactory answers. Nonetheless, the empirical exploration of this
second notion of explanation is lacking.
The case study from this chapter aimed at filling in the gap in the empir-
ical exploration of the second notion of explanation. The findings of the case
study, although limited, suggest that people (experts) are able to provide expla-
nations of the reasoning processes in CBNs. These explanations seem to have
many features found in the philosophy and psychology literature on explana-
tion. However, some of these features such as the explanatory virtue simplicity
seemed to have been operetionalized to fit the context of CBNs. This suggests
that while the literature from philosophy and psychology is a helpful starting
point, a more context specific work would be required to address the question
of what would be to most appropriate explanation of the reasoning processes
in a particular AI domain.
The two notions of explanation discussed in this chapter do not, however,
exhaust all aspects of explanation. Explanations often include an explainer (a
human or an AI system providing an explanation) and explainee (a person re-
ceiving an explanation); in other words, explanations are also communicative
acts. The next chapter explores some of the implications of understanding ex-
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planations as communicative acts.
4
Social explanation: The effects of ex-
planation on reliability and confi-
dence
The explanations studied in the previous two chapters were of an intrapersonal
character. Namely, in Chapter 2 participants were asked to estimate an impact
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of an explanation (a variable in a CBN) on occurrence of another event (an-
other variable in a CBN) and in Chapter 3 they were asked to to provide an
explanation of reasoning processes in a CBN that they themselves would deem
explanatory. The potential social dimension of explanations was set aside and
the participants were asked to judge the impact of explanations or provide ex-
planation that they would judge as good from their own, intrapersonal per-
spective.
In Chapter 1, however, we have seen that arguments have a clear social as-
pect. They often involve providing a (rational) support for or against a position
in order to persuade other people. If arguments are in many ways compara-
ble to explanations, and explanations themselves might sometimes function as
arguments, then it is plausible and worth exploring the interpersonal context
of explanations. Indeed, even prima facie it seems that explanations do have
a social aspect as well. They often include at least two parties: an explainee, a
person who is receiving an explanation and an explainer, a person (or some-
times a machine) who is providing an explanation. For example, virtually all
education settings involve a teacher who sometimes provides explanations to
the students with the goal to increase the students’ understanding of the topic.
Experts often provide explanation on the their topics of expertise to both the
other experts and non-experts alike. An AI system may provide an explana-
tion of its decision-making processes to human users.
Some of the implications of considering arguments in a social context are
the newly emerging factors that may influence the strength of the arguments.
One of these factors, as pointed in Chapter 1, is the source’s reliability. The
research on source reliability in the context of argumentation highlighted the
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interplay between the content of an argument that the speaker is putting for-
ward and the speaker’s reliability. This interplay can only be explored if we
consider arguments as having a social dimension. Drawing parallels with ar-
guments, one would then expect that once we start exploring explanations in a
social context we would also encounter factors, such as the reliability of an ex-
plainer, that would significantly influence the impacts of explanations. In this
chapter, I thus experimentally investigate some of these factors. In particular,
I explore the potential effects of the reliability of an explainer on the beliefs of
the recipient of an explanation, i.e. an explainee.
An explainer, however, can provide different types of explanation. In the
previous chapter we have seen that there are at least two different notions of
explanation. Thus, one could study the effects of the explainer’s reliability with
respect to either notion. In this chapter I focus on one of these notions: namely,
explanations of reasoning processes. More specifically, I explore the effects of
the reliability of an explainer and the explanations understood as the links or
bridges between hypotheses/claims and evidence on explainee’s beliefs. In the
context of the 3-dimensional explanation cube, these explanation are still prod-
ucts in a sense that they are results of an explanation processes, they are made
in an interpersonal context, and they are explanations of reasoning processes
(see Figure 4.1).
The chapter proceeds as follows. First, I briefly summarize the notion of
explanation explored in this chapter, discuss the potential effects of explana-
tions, and the implications of their social character such as the reliability of an
explainer. I then present four experiments that test the effects of these explana-
tions and the reliability of an explainer on the beliefs of the explainee.
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Figure 4.1: The three dimensions of explanation.
4.1 Introduction
4.1.1 Explanations: connecting claims with evidence
In the previous chapter we have seen that one can distinguish between at least
two notions of explanation found in the literature in philosophy, psychology,
and computer science: explanations of evidence (outcome) and explanations
of reasoning processes. Although empirically under-explored, the case study
from the previous chapter suggested that people are capable of providing ex-
planation of the reasoning processes at least in the context of CBNs. Further-
more, the explanations that the experts who participated in the case study gen-
erated had a function of a link or a bridge between target nodes (hypotheses)
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and evidence, explaining how the evidence lead to a change in the probability
distribution of a target node.
In the previous chapter I have also argued that the view of explanations as
links between hypotheses (claims) and evidence (data) is not novel and that it
can be found in the argumentation literature as well as in the computer science
literature, in particular the literature pertaining to recommender systems and
expert systems. Some of the examples illustrating this included the explana-
tion ‘A Swede is most likely not a Roman Catholic’ that elucidates the relation-
ship between for example the evidence that a person is a Swede and the claim
they are not Roman Catholic. In this chapter, I will focus on explanations of
reasoning processes, in particular, those that have a function of connecting or
elucidating the connection between claims and evidence.
4.1.2 Effects of explanations
The effects of providing an explanation understood as a link between the hy-
pothesis and data or explanations of reasoning processes has generally been
under-explored in psychology and philosophy. In contrast, the effects of expla-
nations of evidence (outcome) have been extensively explored and it is plausi-
ble to think that some of these effects translate for the explanations understood
as links. Here I present a brief overview of these effects.
In Chapter 1 I have mentioned that the main goal of explanation is increas-
ing understanding. More precisely, providing an explanation of a phenomenon
may increase the recipient’s sense of understanding of what has been explained
(Hempel, 1965; Hahn, 2011; Lombrozo, 2012). However, this increase in the
sense of understanding may not result in an increase in actual understanding
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as has been pointed out by Trout (2002, 2008). Further, it has been found that
generating explanations (even incorrect ones), rather than just receiving expla-
nations, has a beneficial impact on learning (Lombrozo, 2012). Explanations
can also increase the perceptions of normality: finding plausible explanations
of, for instance, patients’ behaviour lead to the perception of the patients as be-
ing more ‘normal’ than when such an explanation was lacking (Ahn, Novick,
& Kim, 2003). It has also been found that providing an explanation of a hy-
pothetical outcome or of a past event that we are not sure if it had happened
increases the likelihood of the hypothetical outcome to occur in the future and
of the event that might have occurred in the past (Koehler, 1991, 1994; Ross,
Lepper, Strack, & Steinmetz, 1977; Sherman, Zehner, Johnson, & Hirt, 1983).
These are only some of the effects of explanations. However, the effect of
explanations that I am going to be focusing in this paper is the effect they have
on the recipients’ confidence in the claims/hypotheses. I review the literature
regarding this effect next.
4.1.2.1 Effects of explanation on confidence
Inference to the best explanation (IBE) nicely illustrates the way the expla-
nations impact confidence. The fact that some hypothesis or a claim is the
best explanation (i.e. it has the highest explanatory goodness compared to the
other rival hypothesis) increases the subjective probability (or confidence) as-
signed to that hypothesis. Douven and Schupbach (2015) suggest this is em-
pirically also the case and that people judge a hypothesis more likely (i.e. they
are more confident in the hypothesis being true) if the explanatory goodness
of that hypothesis also increases. Some of the factors that influence the ex-
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planatory goodness of a hypothesis and thus increase its subjective probability
are simplicity (Lombrozo, 2007; Lagnado, 1994; Read & Marcus-Newhall, 1993;
Thagard, 1978), breadth (Lombrozo, 2016; Read & Marcus-Newhall, 1993; Tha-
gard, 1989), consistency with prior knowledge (Thagard, 1989) and coherence
(Pennington & Hastie, 1993; Thagard, 1989) as discussed in the previous chap-
ter.
Outside the context of IBE, and closer to the notion of explanation as links
between claims and data, it has been found that asking people to provide an
explanation as to whether a particular property is true or false changes their
perceived likelihood of that property (Lombrozo, 2006). For instance, when
asked to explain the relationship between two variables A and B (e.g. why risky
people (A) are better firefighter (B)) participants’ subjective estimates of the
relationship significantly increased compared to both the control who was not
prompted to explain the relationship (C. A. Anderson, Lepper, & Ross, 1980)
and participants’ previous estimates when they were not asked to explain the
relationship (C. A. Anderson & Sechler, 1986). Here we again have a distinction
between a hypothesis or a claim (e.g. high risk takers make better firefighters)
and explanations that are provided in support for that claim (e.g. risky people
act spontaneously and because speed is essential in fighting fires these kinds
of firefighters are more successful) that increases people’s confidence in the
claim compared to the situation where people were not asked to provide an
explanation (see Koehler, 1991).
Thagard (1989) similarly argues that if we are aiming to explain evidence
(data) by arguing that the accused murdered the victim (claim or hypothesis),
the hypothesis will be more plausible if we find reasons why the accused was
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motivated to kill the victim (explanation). Here we again see how explanation
plays a part in connecting data (evidence) with the hypothesis and how find-
ing such a connection may result in the increased confidence in the hypothesis.
Pennington and Hastie (1993) have empirically explored this idea. They find
that the story summary (explanation), which is the interpretation of the evi-
dence (data) that have a narrative story form, has an impact on the confidence
in a juror’s decision: the better the story (explanation) the greater the impact
on the confidence. Finally, Brem and Rips (2000) also argue that that the per-
ceived probability of the claim may be increased as a result of there being an
explanation for that claim.
In summary, both the theoretical and experimental works suggests that
ether providing or receiving an explanation will result in the increased con-
fidence in the claim across different contexts and notions of explanation.
4.1.3 Explanations as communicative acts
Like arguments, explanations also have an important social dimension. They
are often between individuals who try to communicate understanding (Keil,
2006), and they usually take the form of a conversation where “[s]omeone ex-
plains something to someone” (Hilton, 1990, p. 65, original emphasis). Expla-
nations are then in their essence communicative acts (as highlighted by van
Fraassen’s pragmatic account discussed in the previous chapter) and, as such,
involve interpersonal exchange and include two parties: an explainer and an
explainee. In line with the literature mentioned in Section 4.1.2 one would
then expect that the explainee’s confidence in a claim would be affected by ex-
plainer’s explanation. More specifically, one would expect that the act of the
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explainer providing an explanation would increase explainee’s confidence in
the claim being explained.
The communicative dimension of explanations, however, introduces addi-
tional factors that could affect confidence. We often rely on others (e.g. experts)
to provide us with explanations regarding some phenomena. For example, ex-
perts are called upon to explain to the general public why a particular virus
is dangerous to the population. The fact that experts are providing us with
an explanation may affect our confidence in the claim that the virus is danger-
ous. Now, explanations being communicative acts implies that they introduce
information about the speaker (the explainer) that could affect the explainee’s
confidence. For example, one of the aspects of the explainer’s that could affect
explainee’s confidence is the explainer’s reliability.
The effects of the reliability of the source of information have been exten-
sively explored, both theoretically and empirically, in the context of argumen-
tation. Here, formal models of source reliability that aim at distilling the impact
of reliability on confidence that goes beyond the argument content have been
proposed by Bovens and Hartmann (2003) and Olsson and Vallinder (2013) (for
a detailed review see Merdes, Von Sydow, & Hahn, 2020). Some of these mod-
els have been empirically tested. For instance, Hahn, Harris, and Corner (2009)
varied both argument strength and the reliability of the sources and found that
both argument strength and the reliability of the source affected the partici-
pants’ confidence in the arguments, with an interaction between the two, which
was in line with some of the formal models. Similarly, Harris et al. (2016) find
that greater expertise and reliability increase the impact on one’s confidence
in claims (see also P. Collins, Hahn, von Gerber, & Olsson, 2018; P. Collins &
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Hahn, 2019; Hahn et al., 2013; Hahn, Harris, & Corner, 2016; Walton, 2007).
What is more, Jarvstad and Hahn (2011) find that perceived reliability can be
affected by evidence (data) or the report from the source, with a more likely
statement being judged to come from a more reliable source.
In this chapter I aim to explore the impact of the explainer’s reliability on
confidence in the claim both when there is an explanation for the claim and
where such an explanation is missing. In line with the argumentation literature
on argument content and reliability, one would expect to find differing impacts
of reliability when an explanation for the claim is provided compared to when
no explanation is provided.
To the best of my knowledge, the explanation literature not has experimen-
tally manipulated the impact of reliability on confidence in claims to explore
its impact. However, some limited exploratory analyses have been done. For
instance, Zemla et al. (2017) explore criteria that predict explanation quality
and find that expertise is one of the criteria that significantly predicts explana-
tion quality, with the higher (perceived) expertise leading to a better quality of
explanations. This potentially suggests that expertise positively impacts con-
fidence: the more the explainer is perceived as an expert the higher the confi-
dence in the claim. I aim to experimentally explore not only the impact of the
explainer’s reliability on the confidence in the claims, but also how providing
an explanation and reliability combine to impact the confidence the claims.
4.1.4 Everyday explanations
Before I go on to describe the experimental exploration, a brief note on expla-
nations used for this exploration. The philosophical literature on explanations
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has mainly focused on scientific explanations. In Chapter 3 we have seen that
the general motivation was to find what makes a good (or bad) explanation
in science. The psychological investigations on explanations have mainly de-
rived from the philosophical literature and studied aspects of explanations that
the philosophical literature has considered to be important in judging scientific
explanations (e.g. Lombrozo, 2007). Further, these empirical studies have too
often employed short and simple explanations with a minimal causal struc-
ture with, sometimes, a single cause and effect (for an overview see Lombrozo,
2012).
More recently, however, psychologists have looked into everyday explana-
tions to explore the sets of criteria that have been used to judge the explanatory
goodness of these kinds of explanations (e.g. Bechlivanidis et al., 2017; Zemla
et al., 2017). The aim of these studies was to explore whether the set of crite-
ria for the goodness of the scientific explanations also played a role in the case
of everyday explanations. Furthermore, exploring the explanatory criteria in
the case of the real-world explanations provided a more ecologically valid un-
derstanding these criteria. Everyday explanations are more nuanced than the
experimental stimuli often used in the psychological studies. As in this study
I aim to explore the impact of explanations on the claim that go beyond the
immediate impact of the data, everyday explanations are a more suitable ex-
perimental material for such exploration. Further, everyday explanations are
very easily immersed in the conversational form where the communicative as-
pects of explanations and the impact of reliability on the confidence are more
naturally explored. In this chapter, I thus use everyday explanations as materi-
als for the empirical investigation of the impact of explanations and reliability.
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4.2 Overview of experiments
The aim of this chapter was to explore the relationship between (everyday) ex-
planations understood as links between claims and data, the reliability of an
explainer, and the explainee’s confidence in a claim. Experiment 6 tested the
impact of explanations on the confidence in claim without any considerations
of the social aspects of explanations, such the reliability of the explainer. The
goal of this experiment was to replicate the findings from the previous litera-
ture regarding the impacts of explanations on confidence. Experiments 7a and
7b included the social aspects of explanation and tested the impact of expla-
nations not just on confidence of the claim, but also on the reliability of the
explainer. The aim here was to explore whether providing an explanation af-
fects the reliability of the explainer. Experiment 8 explored the impact of both
the explanation and reliability on the explainee’s confidence in a claim, aiming
to investigate the potential causal impact of the explainer’s reliability on the
confidence in a claim.
4.3 Experiment 6
The aim of Experiment 6 was to replicate the findings of previous studies on the
effects of explanation on people’s confidence using real-world explanations as
stimuli. Following these studies, I expected that adding an explanation would
increase people’s confidence in the hypothesis.
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4.3.1 Methods
4.3.1.1 Participants and Design
A total of 130 participants (NFEMALE = 87, MAGE = 33.8 years) were recruited
from Prolific Academic (www.prolific.ac). All participants were native En-
glish speakers currently residing in the UK, the US, or Canada whose approval
ratings were 95% or higher. They all gave informed consent and were paid £5
an hour rate for partaking in the present study, which took on average 10.5 min
to complete.
Participants were randomly assigned to either the control group where no
explanation of the claim was provided (N = 66) or the treatment group where
an explanation was provided (N = 64).
4.3.1.2 Materials
Previously (see Section 4.1.4) I argued for the suitability of everyday ex-
planation in exploring the impact of explanations on the confidence in the
claims. Thus, in all experiments in this paper I used the following scenarios
adapted from Zemla et al. (2017), who used Reddit’s Explain Like I’m Five (Eli5;
www.reddit.com/r/explainlikeimfive), Wikipedia, and HowThingsWork.com
to source these stimuli. These platforms are widely accessible to the general
population and the issues addressed on these platforms are often aimed at
the general population, covering a wide range of phenomena that one can
encounter in a daily life. The scenarios were picked from three different do-
mains: public health, social policy, and history. The scenarios were chosen with
the idea that general public would be interested in them. All scenarios had the
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same format. The first paragraph started with an introduction of up to two sen-
tences describing data/evidence (or sometimes referred to as explanandum).
This was followed by a question seeking an explanation for the explanandum.
The second paragraph described a claim that is supposed to account for the
explanandum (the no explanation condition) or it described a claim and an
explanation that accounted for the explanandum (the explanation condition).
Lastly, participants were asked a question that elicited their confidence esti-
mates in the claim. This format was very similar to the one adopted by Brem
and Rips (2000, Experiment 2).
For example, the Black Death scenario looked as follows. Note that the text
of the scenarios and the questions were the same for both the no explanation
and the explanation conditions, except for the part in the parenthesis that ap-
peared only in the explanation condition. The text in the square brackets did
not appear in either condition and is added here to point to the functions of the
different parts of the scenario.
Millions of people died from the Black Death in the 14th century.
[data] How did the Black Death come to an end? [a prompt for an
explanation]
One popular belief is that the Black Death subsided mostly through
the use of quarantines. [claim] (According to this belief, people
mostly stayed out of the path of infected individuals, rats, and fleas.
The uninfected would typically remain in their homes and only
leave when it was necessary. Those with the financial resources
would traditionally escape to the country, far away from the Black
Death-infested cities. [explanation])
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Q. How confident are you that the Black Death came to an end
through the use of quarantines? [a question eliciting participants’ con-
fidence in the claim]
The other four scenarios were concerned with the increase in China’s popula-
tion despite the one-child policy, the way medical practitioner contract Ebola,
Switzerland’s armed neutrality during World War II, and the way vaccines
build immunity.
Zemla et al. (2017) experimentally studied the quality of explanations by
asking participants to rank the explanations on the 7-point Likert scale from
‘1–Strongly disagree’ to ‘7–Strongly agree’ on how ‘good’ was the explanation.
For all five explanations used in the five scenarios they found that participants
rated them well above average in quality: the explanation from the Switzerland
scenario had an average rating of 5.4, from the Ebola scenario 6.4, form the
China scenario 5.1, from the Vaccination 5.7, and from the Black Death scenario
5.9.
For the full materials used in Experiment 6 see Appendix C.1.
4.3.1.3 Procedure
After giving an informed consent and basic demographic information, partici-
pants were shown the following instructions:
WELCOME!
You will now be presented with 5 explanations of 5 events and
phenomena found in the real world and required to answer some
questions related to the explanations.
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Please make sure you read all the information carefully before
answering the questions.
After these instructions, participants were presented with the five scenarios
and questions related to these scenarios. The order in which the scenarios were
presented was randomized for each participant. Each scenario was presented
on two pages. On the first page was the main text of the scenario. On the
second page, the text of the scenario was repeated as a reminder and partici-
pants were asked two questions: one about their confidence in the claim and
another (which was the same for all scenarios) to explain their reasoning re-
garding how they arrived at their confidence estimate. The second question
was asked to gain additional insight into participants’ reasoning.
For example, the Black Death scenario had the following text on the first page
(the additional text that appeared only in the explanation condition is in paren-
thesis):
Millions of people died from the Black Death in the 14th century.
How did the Black Death come to an end?
One popular belief is that the Black Death subsided mostly through
the use of quarantines. (According to this belief, people mostly
stayed out of the path of infected individuals, rats, and fleas. The
uninfected would typically remain in their homes and only leave
when it was necessary. Those with the financial resources would
traditionally escape to the country, far away from the Black Death-
infested cities.)
On the second page, the scenario was repeated and the questions related to
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the scenario were asked:
Reminder:
Millions of people died from the Black Death in the 14th century.
How did the Black Death come to an end?
One popular belief is that the Black Death subsided mostly through
the use of quarantines. (According to this belief, people mostly
stayed out of the path of infected individuals, rats, and fleas. The
uninfected would typically remain in their homes and only leave
when it was necessary. Those with the financial resources would
traditionally escape to the country, far away from the Black Death-
infested cities.)
Please answer the following question.
Q. How confident are you that the Black Death came to an end
through the use of quarantines?
[A slider eliciting confidence (%) on a scale from 0% to 100%.]
R. Please explain your reasoning for your answer to the question in
the box below.
[A text box.]
A percentage scale from 0% to 100% was used to elicit participants’ confidence
estimates in the claims in question. A free format type text box was used to ask
participants to explain their reasoning for the estimates they provided. Lastly,
after the participants answered questions to all five scenarios they received a
debriefing information.
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4.3.2 Results and Discussion
To analyze the data1 I built a linear mixed effect model (LMM) using the lme4
package in R (Bates et al., 2014). The only fixed effect was group (with two lev-
els: no explanation and explanation). The only random effect was the intercept
for participants. There was no random slope from the participant as the design
was fully between. No random intercept for scenarios was used as the number
of scenarios was low (i.e. 5) and including the scenarios as a random intercept
could have lead to a reduced power of the experiment (see Judd, Westfall, &
Kenny, 2017; Singmann & Kellen, 2019). Further, a random slope for scenarios
was not included as led to a singular fit model, implying that the variance of
this random effect was (close to) zero.
The LMM indicated that confidence estimates in the explanation group (Es-
timated Marginal Mean = EMM = 70.02) was significantly higher than in the
no explanation group (EMM = 58.91); t(128) = 3.96, p < .001 (see Figure 4.2a).
Further, the inclusion of the predictor for the group in the model led to a signif-
icant improvement in model fit (χ2(1) = 15, p < .001), compared to just having
an intercept as a predictor. This result is in the line with the previous literature
and provides further support that people’s confidence in claims is higher when
explanation is provided.
The effect of explanation was not only observed overall, but also within
each of the five scenarios. Figure 4.2b shows that participants’ confidence es-
timates in the explanation conditions were higher in all scenarios, suggesting
that the effect was not driven by specific scenarios. Further, the mean confi-
1Given the COVID-19 pandemic, it is worth mentioning that the data for all four experi-
ments were collected in the period between June and September 2019.


































































● No explanation Explanation
(b)
Figure 4.2: (a) The estimated marginal means (EMMs) from the LMM built for Experi-
ment 6 with 95% confidence intervals. Gray points are raw data values (jittered along
the x-axis for visibility) with violin plots showing the frequency of the raw data. (b)
The observed data means (with 95% confidence intervals) and violin plots for each
scenario broken down for each explanation conditions.
dence estimates were similar across the cover stories (in the respective expla-
nation/no explanation conditions), expert in Vaccination scenario (particularly
in the explanation condition of that scenario). From participants’ textual an-
swers where they provided reasons for choosing a specific confidence estimate
in this scenario I noticed that a number of participants have said that the claim
and explanation agreed with what they already knew about vaccination, which
led them to provide higher estimates in both the no explanation and explana-
tion conditions of this scenario. This finding hints at the importance of the
background knowledge in judging people’s confidence in claims supported by
explanations. In the next experiments I find further support for the effects of
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background knowledge.
4.4 Experiment 7a
In Experiment 6 participants were asked to provide their confidence estimates
in claims in situations where the source of these claims is left out. However,
as explanations are communicative acts they often include a speaker (an ex-
plainer) and as such could plausibly provide information about the speaker’s
reliability. The explanations then not only have an effect on confidence in the
claims but they could also have an effect on the perceived reliability of the
speaker who is providing an explanation.
The aim of this experiment was to explore the impact of an explanation on
both the confidence in a claim as well as the perceived reliability of the source
that provided the claim and explanation.
4.4.1 Methods
4.4.1.1 Participants and Design
A total of 52 participants (NFEMALE = 31, MAGE = 32.6) were recruited from
Prolific Academic (www.prolific.ac). The selection criteria and the remuner-
ation rate per hour were the same as in Experiment 6. Participants took on
average 16.4 min to complete the experiment.
Participants were randomly assigned to either the control group where no
explanation for the claim was provided (N = 24) or the treatment group where
an explanation was provided (N = 28). All participants were asked to provide
estimates regarding two dependent variables: confidence and reliability.
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4.4.1.2 Materials
To explore the communicative aspect of explanations and their impact on the
explainer’s reliability I follow Hahn et al. (2009) who have studied the impact
of reliability and the content of an argument on confidence in what is argued
for. This is also in line with Walton (2004b) who argues that a dialogue from is
an appropriate one for explanations.
The same five scenarios from Experiment 6 have been employed in this ex-
periment and further adapted to fit the form of a dialogue between two people,
an explainer and an explainee, where the explainer provided the claims and
explanations. Such a format enables us to elicit not only participants’ confi-
dence estimates in claims but also their reliability estimates in the explainer as
a source of the claims and explanations.
The adaptation of scenarios into dialogues was done in a similar manner
as in Hahn et al. (2009). For example, the Black Death scenario was adapted
in a way that it includes two people, an explainer and an explainee, where
the explainee (Jimmy) is asking questions and the explainer (Dave) is trying
to provide answers (the part in parenthesis appeared only in the explanation
condition):
Dave and Jimmy are part of a research group investigating devastat-
ing pandemics in human history. During a planning meeting they
touched upon the Black Death.
Dave: Millions of people died from the Black Death in the 14th cen-
tury. I think our research project should in part focus on how the
Black Death ended. It may give us some insight into how to deal
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with future pandemics.
Jimmy: Yes, I agree. Do you already have an idea regarding how
the Black Death came to an end?
Dave: I think the Black Death subsided mostly through the use of
quarantines.
(Jimmy: How so?
Dave: People mostly stayed out of the path of infected individu-
als, rats, and fleas. The uninfected would typically remain in their
homes and only leave when it was necessary. Those with the finan-
cial resources would traditionally escape to the country, far away
from the Black Death-infested cities.)
The other scenarios were adapted in a similar way. For full materials see
Appendix C.2.
4.4.1.3 Procedure
The procedure for this experiment was similar to the procedure for Experiment
6 in that the welcome page was shown after the participants gave informed
consent and demographic information, and each scenario was presented in a
random order on two pages. The difference lies in that participants now an-
swered two questions in each scenario: one about the confidence in the claim
and one about the reliability of the explainer. For example, after being shown
and reminded of the Black Death scenario the participants were asked:
Q1. How confident are you that the Black Death came to an end
through the use of quarantines?
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[A slider eliciting confidence (%) on a scale from 0% to 100%.]
Q2. How reliable do you think Dave is as a source of information
regarding the end of the Black Death?
[A slider eliciting reliability (%) on a scale from 0% to 100%.]
For both the confidence questions and the reliability questions participants
were asked to move the slider which was on the scale from 0% to 100%. Both
the confidence and the reliability questions were followed by free format type
text boxes where participants could explain their reasoning for selecting cer-
tain confidence/reliability estimates. Finally, participants received debriefing
information.
4.4.2 Results and Discussion
Separate analyses were conducted for each dependent variable.
4.4.2.1 Confidence
The LMM with the same random effects structure as in Experiment 6 indicated
that confidence estimates in the explanation group (EMM = 61.7) were signif-
icantly higher than in the no explanation group (EMM = 51); t(50) = 2.91,
p = .005 (see Figure 4.3a). Further, the inclusion of the predictor for the
group in the model led to a significant improvement in model fit (χ2(1) = 8.1,
p = .004), compared to just having an intercept as a predictor.
This is in line with the finding from Experiment 6 and the previous litera-
ture. The similar trend was found in all five scenarios (see Figure 4.3b).
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(b)
Figure 4.3: (a) The estimated marginal means (with 95% confidence intervals) from the
LMM built on participants’ confidence estimates in Experiment 7a. Gray points are raw
data values (jittered along the x-axis for visibility) with violin plots showing the fre-
quency of the raw data. (b) The observed data means (with 95% confidence intervals)
and violin plots for each scenario broken down for each explanation conditions.
4.4.2.2 Reliability
The LMM indicated that reliability estimates in the explanation group
(EMM = 58.39) were significantly higher than in the no explanation group
(EMM = 45.03); t(50) = 2.97, p = .005 (see Figure 4.4a). Further, the inclusion
of the predictor for the group in the model led to a significant improvement
in model fit (χ2(1) = 8.4, p = .004), compared to just having an intercept as a
predictor.
I again found the similar general trend across the five scenarios with some
variations in the magnitude (see Figure 4.4b). These variations seem to cor-


































































● No explanation Explanation
(b)
Figure 4.4: (a) The estimated marginal means (with 95% confidence intervals) from the
LMM built on participants’ reliability estimates in Experiment 7a. Gray points are raw
data values (jittered along the x-axis for visibility) with violin plots showing the fre-
quency of the raw data. (b) The observed data means (with 95% confidence intervals)
and violin plots for each scenario broken down for each explanation conditions.
respond to the level of expertise the explainer has. For instance, in the Ebola
and the Black Death scenarios the explainers were a medical practitioner and
a member of a research group investigating devastating pandemics in a hu-
man history respectively (see Appendix C.2). Plausibly both of these explain-
ers could be considered experts in their fields implying that their reliability is
high in the context of these scenarios. In contrast, in Vaccination and Switzer-
land scenarios the explainers were students discussing a student project whose
reliability in these contexts is arguably low. In the One-child policy scenario no
information on the explainer’s occupational or professional background was
provided suggesting no specific level of expertise. However, the scenario con-
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text seems to suggest that the explainer and the explainee have only touched
upon China’s one-child policy in a (casual) conversation suggesting potentially
that the explainer is a non-expert. These different levels of expertise (expert
vs. non-expert) seem to correspond to the magnitude of the difference between
the mean reliability estimates in each explanation condition: in the scenarios
where explainer is an expert (high reliability) it seems that the differences in
mean reliability estimates between the two explanation conditions are smaller
compared to these differences in the scenarios where a non-expert (low reliabil-
ity) plays a role of an explainer. In Experiment 8 I experimentally manipulate
expertise of an explainer to further explore the impact of explanation when
explainer’s reliability is at different levels.
4.4.2.3 Mediation analysis
A closer look at participants’ estimates on the two dependent variables re-
veals a strong relationship between reliability and confidence in our data (Fig-
ure 4.5a): Pearson’s correlation r = .7, t(258) = 16, p < .001. One possible ex-
planation of this relationship is that participants simply copied their confidence
estimates into their reliability estimates (or vice versa) due to, potentially, their
disengagement or misunderstanding of the task. This possibility is explored in
Experiment 7b.
Another possibility, however, is that reliability is mediating the effect of ex-
planation on confidence found both in Experiment 6 and Experiment 7a. The
initial support for the mediation is readily found in Figure 4.5b where the same
strong relationship between reliability and confidence is preserved and un-
changed when data is broken down for each explanation condition. I explore














































Figure 4.5: (a) The raw data values of participants’ reliability and confidence estimates
from Experiment 7a and a linear regression model (with the 95% confidence band). (b)
The same data and a linear regression model as in (a) broken down for each explana-
tion condition.
this possibility in more detail here.
Analyses in Sections 4.4.2.1 and 4.4.2.2 suggest that explanation has a signif-
icant effect on both confidence and on reliability. Following Baron and Kenny
(1986), to explore whether reliability mediates the effect of explanation on con-
fidence I also built a LMM model with both explanation and reliability as pre-
dictors of confidence (and same random effects structure as in the above mod-
els). If the effect of explanation on confidence in this model was reduced com-
pared to when the only predictor of confidence was explanation (as in Sec-
tion 4.4.2.1), then this would suggest that reliability is (partially or fully) me-
diating this effect. I found that when reliability is also included as one of the
predictors of confidence, the effect of explanation on confidence disappears
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Figure 4.6: Reliability as a mediator between explanation and confidence. b1, with the
related p-value, is the coefficient in a LMM with explanation as a predictor and con-
fidence as a dependent variable (Section 4.4.2.1); b2 is the coefficient in a LMM with
explanation as a predictor and reliability as a dependent variable (Section 4.4.2.2); b3
and b4 are coefficients for explanation and reliability respectively in a LMM with ex-
planation and reliability as predictors and confidence as a dependent variable (Sec-
tion 4.4.2.3). In contrast to b1, b3 is minimal and non-significant which suggests that
reliability (fully) mediates the effect of explanation on confidence.
(t(257) = 0.39, p = .69) whilst the effect of reliability on confidence is highly
significant (t(257) = 15.4, p < .001) (see Figure 4.6 for a graphical summary
of this meditation analysis). Using the “mediation” package in R (Tingley, Ya-
mamoto, Hirose, Keele, & Imai, 2014) I found that the mediation effect is signif-
icant (p = .004) and that reliability mediates around 90 percent of the associa-
tion between explanation and confidence. This suggests that a large proportion
of the effect that explanation has on confidence is mediated by reliability and
that reliability may have a causal effect on confidence. This potential causal
effect of reliability on confidence is further explored in Experiment 8 below.
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4.5 Experiment 7b
The aim of this experiment was to explore further the possibility which the
findings from Experiment 7a suggested: namely, that the strong relationship
between participants’ confidence and reliability estimates in Experiment 7a
was there because participants were simply copying their confidence estimates
into their reliability estimates (or vice versa). To that end, instead of elicit-
ing both the confidence and reliability estimates from all participants, I elicited
from them either the confidence or the reliability estimates, but not both. If
Experiment 7b’s results come out to be similar to those in Experiment 7a, then
we would more assured that the effect of explanation on confidence and reli-
ability is genuine and that reliability is to some degree mediating the effect of
explanation on confidence.
4.5.1 Methods
4.5.1.1 Participants and Design
A total of 121 participants (NFEMALE = 81, two participants identified neither
mare nor female, MAGE = 34.7 years) were recruited from Prolific Academic
(www.prolific.ac). The selection criteria and the remuneration rate per hour
were the same as in the previous experiments. Participants took on average 10
min to complete the experiment.
The design of Experiment 7b is similar to the design of Experiment 7a ex-
cept that participants in both no explanation and explanation conditions were
not asked both the question eliciting their confidence in the claim and the ques-
tion eliciting their reliability of the explainer but only one of the two questions.
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As a result participants were randomly allocated to one of 4 groups: a no expla-
nation group where only confidence rating was elicited (N = 30), a no explana-
tion group where only reliability rating was elicited (N = 30), an explanation
group where only confidence rating was elicited (N = 30), and an explanation
group where only reliability rating was elicited (N = 31).
4.5.1.2 Materials
I used the same scenarios and questions as in Experiment 7a.
4.5.1.3 Procedure
The procedure was identical to Experiment 7a except that participants were
asked only one question rather than two: they were asked either the question
about the confidence in the claim or the question about their perceived reliabil-
ity in the explainer.
4.5.2 Results and Discussion
4.5.2.1 Confidence
The LMM indicated that confidence estimates in the explanation group
(EMM = 69.62) were significantly higher than in the no explanation group
(EMM = 53.82); t(58) = 4.73, p < .001 (see Figure 4.7a). Further, the inclusion
of the predictor for the group in the model led to a significant improvement in
model fit (χ2(1) = 19.5, p < .001), compared to just having an intercept as a
predictor. This trend is also preserved in each of the scenarios (see Figure 4.7b).
These results are on par with those from both Experiment 6 and Experiment 7a
on confidence and they all follow the same trends.


































































● No explanation Explanation
(b)
Figure 4.7: (a) The estimated marginal means (with 95% confidence intervals) from the
LMM built on participants’ confidence estimates in Experiment 7b. Gray points are raw
data values (jittered along the x-axis for visibility) with violin plots showing the fre-
quency of the raw data. (b) The observed data means (with 95% confidence intervals)
and violin plots for each scenario broken down for each explanation conditions.
4.5.2.2 Reliability
The LMM with reliability as a dependent variable showed that reliability esti-
mates in the explanation group (EMM = 62.69) were significantly higher than
in the no explanation group (EMM = 52.51); t(59) = 2.33, p = .023 (see Fig-
ure 4.8a). Further, the inclusion of the predictor for the group in the model led
to a significant improvement in model fit (χ2(1) = 5.36, p = .021), compared
to just having an intercept as a predictor. These results also follow the same
general trend as those in Experiment 7a, suggesting that participants in Exper-
iment 7a did not simply copy their confidence estimates into their reliability


































































● No explanation Explanation
(b)
Figure 4.8: (a) The estimated marginal means (with 95% confidence intervals) from the
LMM built on participants’ reliability estimates in Experiment 7b. Gray points are raw
data values (jittered along the x-axis for visibility) with violin plots showing the fre-
quency of the raw data. (b) The observed data means (with 95% confidence intervals)
and violin plots for each scenario broken down for each explanation conditions.
estimates and supporting the idea that the effect of explanation on reliability is
genuine.
Zooming in on specific scenarios I found a similar general trend, i.e. par-
ticipants’ reliability estimates were on average higher in the explanation con-
dition than in the no explanation condition, except in the Vaccination scenario
where the average reliability estimate in the explanation group was lower than
in the no explanation group (see Figure 4.8b). Looking into participants’ textual
explanation of their reasoning for the estimates they provided, I again found
hints of the effects of background knowledge. Namely, 11 participants (out
of 30) in the no explanation condition of the Vaccination scenario wrote that
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the claim agreed with their personal (background) knowledge of how vaccines
work and all of them provided reliability estimates higher than 60% (this sub-
group’s average reliability estimate was 86%). Their typical explanations were
‘His [explainer’s] answer is what I would have said’ or ‘My understanding [of
how vaccines work] is the same as his [explainer’s].’ The number of partici-
pants who provided explanations similar to these and pointed to their back-
ground knowledge was only 6 (out of 31) in the explanation condition and all
their estimates were also higher than 60% (their average reliability estimate
was 84.3%). This shows how (agreement with) people’s background beliefs
and knowledge can affect their reliability estimates of a person providing an
explanation, sometimes even trumping the effects of explanation on reliability.
Together, however, results from Experiments 7a and 7b suggest that relia-
bility is mediating the effects of explanation on confidence, further implying
that reliability could also have causal effects on confidence. I explore this the
next experiment.
4.6 Experiment 8
Experiment 6 showed that explanations can affect confidence and Experiments
7a and 7b further indicated (i) that explanation also has an effect on reliabil-
ity and (ii) that explanation’s effects on confidence are mediated by reliability,
suggesting that reliability could causally affect confidence. In this experiment
I explore the this potential causal effects of reliability on confidence. Given the
findings in the previous three experiments, I expected that people’s confidence
estimates will depend on the explainer’s level of reliability.
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4.6.1 External expertise and perceived expertise
The method that I adopted in this experiment to manipulate reliability was
through changing the levels of expertise of the explainer: the higher the level
of expertise the higher the reliability. However, in the literature one can find
multiple notions of expertise. Thus, before I go on to explore the impact of re-
liability on confidence, it is worth drawing a distinction between at least two
kinds of expertise: an external expertise and a perceived expertise. External
expertise is judged by referring to a person’s externally measurable criteria: a
person’s qualifications, their track records of success or their experience of do-
ing a particular activity (see H. Collins & Evans, 2008). For example, doctors
are experts according these external criteria as they have required qualifications
and potentially relevant experience. This kind of expertise has been found to
have significant effect on people beliefs. For instance, the research on the influ-
ence of expert testimony on jurors’ decision-making suggests that the expert’s
credentials have a significant effect on jurors decisions (Krauss & Sales, 2001).
Perceived expertise, on the other hand, is not concerned with expert’s ex-
ternally measurable criteria. Rather, it has to do with an expert’s general de-
meanor, such as the internal consistency of their remarks (H. Collins & Evans,
2008). For instance, the judges and jurors would perceive an expert’s testimony
more believable if it is internally consistent and coherent compared to the one
that is less coherent, even though the judges and jurors are not themselves do-
main exerts. Zemla et al. (2017) similarly point to the distinction between exter-
nal expertise and perceived expertise and suggest that external expertise may
be mediated by a perceived expertise when it comes to the impact of expertise
on the goodness of explanations.
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In this experiment I manipulated explainers’ external expertise. The exter-
nal expertise, I believe, would have an effect on participant’s perceived exper-
tise of the explainers, which is what is being measured by asking participants
to provide their estimates of the reliability of the explainers in the scenarios
(see also Zemla et al., 2017). Experiments 7a and 7b suggested that the pres-
ence/absence of an explanation for a claim has an impact on the explainer’s
perceived reliability. I thus expected that the impact of the external expertise
will be attenuated by explanation resulting in a lesser effect of the reliability on
the confidence in claims in the conditions where the explanation for the claim
was provided.
4.6.2 Methods
4.6.2.1 Participants and Design
A total of 161 participants (NFEMALE = 112, one participant identified as neither
male nor female, MAGE = 36.5 years) were recruited from Prolific Academic
(www.prolific.ac). The selection criteria and the remuneration rate per hour
were these same as in the previous experiments. Participants took on average
14.8 min to complete the experiment.
A between-participant design was adopted and participants were randomly
allocated in one of 2 (no explanation or explanation) × 2 (reliability: low or
high) = 4 groups (NNO EXPL LOW = 40, NNO EXPL HIGH = 42, NEXPL LOW = 40,
NEXPL HIGH = 39). All participants were asked to provide estimates on two
dependent variables: confidence and reliability.
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4.6.2.2 Materials
I used the same 5 scenarios as before with some further modifications so that
the explainer’s reliability is either high or low. This was done in a way that in
the preamble of each scenario the explainer was introduced either as a domain
expert (high reliability) or a novice/lay person (low reliability). For example,
the Black Death read as follows (note that the text in parentheses appeared only
in the explanation condition):
Preamble in the low reliability condition: Dave and Jimmy are high
school students who are assigned a student project to find out as
much as they can on one of the most devastating pandemics in hu-
man history, namely the Black Death.
Preamble in the high reliability condition: Dave and Jimmy are se-
nior researchers at a well-established institute for global health and
part of the project investigating devastating pandemics in human
history. During a planning meeting they touched upon the Black
Death.
The rest of the scenario was the same for both the low and high reliability
conditions.
Dave: Millions of people died from the Black Death in the 14th cen-
tury. I think our project should in part focus on how the Black Death
ended.
Jimmy: Yes, I agree. Do you already have an idea regarding how
the Black Death came to an end?
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Dave: The Black Death subsided mostly through the use of quaran-
tines.
(Jimmy: How so?
Dave: People mostly stayed out of the path of infected individu-
als, rats, and fleas. The uninfected would typically remain in their
homes and only leave when it was necessary. Those with the finan-
cial resources would traditionally escape to the country, far away
from the Black Death-infested cities.)
The expert explainers in other scenarios were: an immunologist (Vaccination
scenario), an experienced policy-maker who specialized on East Asia (One-child
policy scenario), a medical practitioner who was a part of the Doctors Without
Border team in West Africa treating various epidemic diseases (Ebola scenario),
a history professors who have been awarded a research grant for a project on
armed neutrality in World War II (Switzerland in WWII scenario). The non-
expert explainers were: a subway operator (Vaccination scenario), a person who
has just started their undergraduate studies in philosophy (One-child policy sce-
nario), a non-medically educated person who read in the news about a team
of doctors in West Africa who contracted Ebola (Ebola scenario), a high school
student (Switzerland in WWII scenario). For full materials see Appendix C.3.
4.6.2.3 Procedure
The procedure was exactly the same as that of Experiment 7a with each partici-
pant being asked both the confidence question and the reliability question. The
main reason for including the reliability question in addition to the confidence
question was to check the success of the reliability manipulation: participants’
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reliability estimates would indicate if they have accepted high/low reliability
of the explainer that I aimed to communicate in the scenarios.
4.6.3 Results and Discussion
A separate analysis was conducted for each dependent variable.
4.6.3.1 Confidence
To test the effect of explanation and reliability on people’s confidence in state-
ments, I built an LMM with explanation and reliability as fixed effects and a
random intercept for each participant. I found a main effect of explanation
(t(157) = 3.28, p = .001) and of reliability (t(157) = 5.79, p < .001), and no in-
teraction between the fixed effects (t(157) = −1.1, p = .28). This suggests that
both explanation and reliability have (additive) causal effects on confidence.
Experiment 7a suggested that the effects of explanation were of lesser mag-
nitude when the reliability of the explainer was high. This was explored more
directly here. For the low reliability conditions I found that, the explanation
group’s confidence estimates (EMM = 60.5) were significantly higher than the
no explanation group’s ones (EMM = 48.5), t(78) = 2.74, p = .008. This was
not the case, however, in the high reliability conditions: there the explanation
group’s confidence estimates (EMM = 73.3) were not significantly higher than
the no explanation group’s ones (EMM = 67.3), t(79) = 1.81, p = .075 (see Fig-
ure 4.9a). These results suggest that the effects of explanation on confidence are
large when the reliability of the explainer is low, but that they disappear when
the reliability of the explainer is high. We can see this effect in Figure 4.10 where
as the difference in mean estimates between the two explanation conditions is

















































● Low reliability High reliability
(b)
Figure 4.9: (a) The estimated marginal means (with 95% confidence intervals) from the
LMM built on participants’ confidence estimates in Experiment 8. (b) The EMMs (with
95% confidence intervals) from the LMM built on participants’ reliability estimates in
Experiment 8.
smaller in the high reliability conditions for each cover story.
Post-hoc contrasts on the differences between the four group’s mean confi-
dence estimates provided us with a more detailed view. Specifically, I found
that there was no significant difference between the means of the explanation
and low reliability group and the no explanation and high reliability group (see
Figure 4.12a). This finding points at the capacity of adding an explanation and
increasing reliability to increase the confidence. Namely, this result suggests
that a low reliability (non-expert) explainer who provides a (good) explanation
to their claim would have the same impact on explainee’s confidence as if that
claim was provided by a high reliability (expert) explainer who did not pro-
vide any further explanation for their claim. Thus, increase in reliability and




















































































● No explanation Explanation
(b)
Figure 4.10: (a) The observed data means (with 95% confidence intervals) for partic-
ipants’ confidence estimates in each scenario in the low reliability condition. (b) The ob-
served data means (with 95% confidence intervals) for participants’ confidence estimates
in each scenario in the high reliability condition.
providing an explanation may have similar (boosting) effect on confidence.
4.6.3.2 Reliability
To test the effect of explanation and reliability on people’s reliability estimates,
I build an LMM with explanation and reliability as fixed effects and a ran-
dom intercept for each participant. I found a main overall effect of explanation
(t(157) = 2.03, p = .045) and of reliability (t(157) = 9.12, p < .001), and no
interaction between the fixed effects t(157) = −1.39, p = .17). Further, the
inclusion of the predictors for the model led to a significant improvement in
model fit (χ2(3) = 72.3, p < .001), compared to just having an intercept as
a predictor. Similarly to the above findings on confidence there was an effect
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of explanation and a highly significant effect of the reliability manipulation on
participants’ reliability estimates suggesting that participants in the high relia-
bility condition provided higher estimates regarding the explainer’s reliability
compared to those in the low reliability condition, as expected.
I further found that in the low reliability conditions, the explanation group’s
reliability estimates (EMM = 53.1) were significantly higher than no expla-
nation group’s estimates (EMM = 44), t(78) = 2.16, p = .034; and in
the high reliability conditions, the explanation group’s reliability estimates
(EMM = 73.5) were not significantly higher than no explanation group’s es-
timates (EMM = 71.8), t(79) = 0.52, p = .61 (see Figure 4.9b). This suggests
that when the reliability of the explainer is low, then that reliability could be in-
creased if the explainer also provided an explanation. However, if the explainer
is already highly reliable (an expert), then explainer additionally providing an
explanation will not significantly increase their reliability. This general effect
was also reflected when focusing of specific scenarios as well (see Figure 4.11).
Contrasts (see Figure 4.12b) show that the main driver of participants’ relia-
bility estimates was whether they were in the low or high reliability conditions:
in the low reliability condition an explainer providing an explanation did, as
expected, seem to result in participants providing higher reliability estimates
than if there was no such explanation. However, unlike in the case of partici-
pants’ confidence estimates, providing an explanation in a low reliability con-
dition did not lead to similar reliability estimates in the high reliable condition
where no explanation of their claim was provided. Instead, these reliability
estimates were fully driven by whether participants were in the low or in the
high reliability condition.






















































































● No explanation Explanation
(b)
Figure 4.11: (a) The observed data means (with 95% confidence intervals) for partic-
ipants’ reliability estimates in each scenario in the low reliability condition. (b) The ob-
served data means (with 95% confidence intervals) for participants’ reliability estimates
in each scenario in the high reliability condition.
4.7 General discussion
I carried out four experiments where I aimed to explore the relationship be-
tween explanation understood as links between claims and data, reliability, and
confidence. Experiment 6 provided evidence that explanations (of inferences)
do have a impact on our confidence; more specifically, providing an explana-
tion increases confidence in a claim. This is in line with the previous literature
on explanations of evidence and show that the same holds for the explanations
of reasoning processes. Experiments 7a and 7b introduced an aspects of ex-
planation, namely reliability, that becomes apparent only when explanation is
fully considered as a social act. These two experiments tested the impact of












































































































































































































Figure 4.12: (a) The contrasts for the different combinations of the explanation and
reliability conditions for participants’ mean confidence estimates. (b) The contrasts for
the participants’ mean reliability estimates. NE: no explanation; E: explanation; LR: low
reliability; HR: high reliability. P-value indicators: ns := p > .05, ∗ := p ≤ .05,
∗∗ := p ≤ .01, ∗ ∗ ∗ := p ≤ .001. All p-values were corrected for multiple comparisons
using Benjamini and Hochberg’s false discovery rate (FDR) procedure (Benjamini &
Hochberg, 1995).
providing an explanation on both confidence and reliability. The findings from
these experiment provide evidence that a (good) explanation increases both the
confidence in a claim (in line with Experiment 6) as well as the perceived relia-
bility of an explainer. Furthermore, these two experiments indicated that much
of the effect of providing an explanation on confidence is mediated by the re-
liability, suggesting that the reliability of an explainer may have a causal effect
on confidence in a claim. Experiment 8 explored this potential causal effect of
reliability on confidence. The findings from Experiment 8 suggested that (i)
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the effect of providing an (good) explanation on confidence is larger when the
reliability of an explainer is low than high, (ii) a non-expert providing a (good)
explanation may have very similar effect on confidence as an expert who did
not provide any further explanation for their claim, (iii) participants’ reliabil-
ity estimates were mostly guided by the level of expertise of an explainer, with
explanation only having an impact when the expertise was low, and (iv) in con-
trast to the findings regarding the effects of reliability and explanation on the
confidence estimates, a non-expert providing a (good) explanation did not lead
to a similar effect on the reliability estimates as an expert who did not provide
an explanation for their claim; rather, the reliability estimates in this case were
driven purely by the levels of expertise.
These findings complement and further add to the previous research on
explanation. For example, Koehler (1991) conducted experiments where par-
ticipants were asked to provide explanations of hypotheses and found that ex-
planation boosts confidence. In the above four experiment, I closely replicated
these findings with a different paradigm where participants were given ex-
plicit explanations without being asked to produce them. Also, these findings
on the effects of explanations of reasoning processes understood as links be-
tween claims and data replicated those from the previous studies on IBE and
explanatory virtues where focus was on the notion of explanations of evidence
(outcome) (e.g. Douven & Schupbach, 2015; Lombrozo, 2007, 2016; Lagnado,
1994). Additionally, these findings extend onto everyday explanations of real-
world events that, arguably, carry more ecological validity. The work on ev-
eryday explanations is still very much in its infancy and often limited to cor-
relations analyses of different explanatory criteria (Zemla et al., 2017). All four
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experiments included a randomized allocation of the participants to different
conditions and went beyond the correlations analyses thus further contributing
to our understanding of the impacts of everyday explanations on our beliefs.
This was also one of the first studies to empirically investigate some of the
social aspects of explanation, in particular the reliability of an explainer. It
showed the interplay between providing an explanation and the reliability of
an explainer, specifically in the context of everyday explanations. Apart from
the expected results that providing a (good) explanation that is coming from
an explainer with a high reliability, the findings suggest that in certain cases
a non-expert providing a (good) explanation may have a very similar impact
on our beliefs as an expert just claiming something true without providing an
explanation for the claim. These results seem to align with the predictions of
some of the formal models of source reliability, such as the Bovens and Hart-
mann (BH) model (Bovens & Hartmann, 2003). According to the BH model,
the higher the the reliability of a source the larger the impact of evidence on
the confidence in a hypothesis. The findings from Experiment 8 suggested that
this is the case in both the no explanation and the explanation condition. Fur-
thermore, if we slightly modify the BH model to include explanation as an
additional variable whose effect is (partially) mediated by the reliability of the
explainer, then one would expect that in such a model the impact of explana-
tion is higher when the reliability is low compared to when the reliability is
high, and given a certain plausible parametarizations of that model one could
expect that the impact of explanations when the reliability is low is similar to
the impact of the high reliability source that is missing an explanation. These
are, however, only (plausible) conjectures and call for further exploration.
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The effects of reliability on people’s beliefs although under-explored could
potentially extend to and account for some of the finding regarding the effects
of explanations in the literature. For example, Weisberg, Keil, Goodstein, Raw-
son, and Gray (2008) showed that added irrelevant neuroscience information
had a particularly striking effect on non-experts’ judgments of bad explana-
tions. Namely, non-experts judged these explanations significantly more sat-
isfying than the bad explanations without irrelevant the neuroscience infor-
mation.2 Furthermore, the Experiment 2 results from Weisberg et al. (2008)
suggested that there was no difference between the satisfaction ratings of the
good explanations without any irrelevant neuroscience information and the
bad explanations with this information. Weisberg, Taylor, and Hopkins (2015)
provide a few potential explanations of why this may be. However, another
explanation that they have not considered comes from the findings of the four
experiments presented in this chapter. Namely, if, as it seems plausible, the
presence of the irrelevant neuroscience information indicated to the partici-
pants that the explanation is coming from a reputable/reliable source with po-
tentially expertise in neuroscience, then, in line with the findings from Exper-
iment 8, one could expect that the participants’ rating of the bad explanations
would be higher when such information is present and even potentially having
similar ratings as the good explanations that lack such information.
This also suggests that there are different ways to communicate to the par-
ticipants the reliability level of the explainer or the source of explanation. In
2Similar results were found when non-experts were asked to judge the quality of research
based on the abstract of papers. Eriksson (2012) found that the non-experts judged the research
to be of higher quality if it included equations, even though the equations that did not make
sense in the context of research.
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the experiments presented in this chapter I have done that by communicat-
ing to the participants different levels of the external expertise. The results
from Experiment 8 suggest that this was successful in manipulating the par-
ticipants’ perceived reliability or expertise of the explainers. Another poten-
tial way of manipulating the perceived reliability could be through including
technical information relevant to the domain as suggested above. However,
neither of these two ways manipulate reliability directly: they both manipulate
some other factor (external expertise or the presence of technical information)
in order to affect the (perceived) reliability of the explainer. Hahn et al. (2009)
suggest a potentially more direct way to manipulate reliability. Namely, they
manipulated the reliability of the source by communicating to the participants
that the information came from a reliable source (e.g. a respected journal Sci-
ence) or from an unreliable source (e.g. a Facebook post from the Gossip Mill
Mzansi Facebook group). These and other ways to manipulate the reliability of
the source should be investigated in the future research on explanations.
Throughout this chapter we have seen hints of the effects of the prior or
background knowledge on both the confidence in claims and reliability of an
explainer. We have seen that in some scenarios (e.g. Vaccination and Ebola sce-
narios) the participants’ confidence and reliability estimates in both the no
explanation and explanation conditions were high and that the different in
their estimates between the conditions was small. The participants’ textual
responses show that they provided high estimates to the confidence and the
reliability questions in these scenarios as the claim and explanations were in
line with their prior knowledge. This suggest that the effects of explanation
and reliability may be attenuated if the effect of the prior knowledge is high.
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This is in line with the previous literature. Koehler (1991) and C. A. Ander-
son and Sechler (1986) suggest that people who already have a strong opinion
about a topic are unlikely to be influenced by an explanation. However, people
who do not have a strong opinion or do not have a formed impression about
a topic will especially be subject to the effects of explanation. In particular, the
effects of explanation are lower if people were familiar about the topic in ques-
tion. This could be because people are less likely to seek an explanation for
something that is already familiar to them (Lombrozo, 2012) and/or because
people already believe in the claim with a high degree of confidence (Thagard,
1989). Similar effect of the prior knowledge on explanation have been observed
in category learning (Williams & Lombrozo, 2013). The results from Jarvstad
and Hahn (2011, Experiment 2) suggested that the participants’ prior confi-
dence in the claims affected the source reliability judgements, with a source
being judged more reliable if it provided a statement in which participants had
higher prior confidence.
4.8 Conclusions
In this chapter I have explored the effect of one of the aspects of explanations
being communicative acts, namely the reliability of an explainer. Specifically, I
have explored the interplay between explanation understood as links between
claims and evidence and the reliability of an explainer as well as their effects
on confidence in claims. I have found that, in line with the literature, providing
an explanation affects our confidence, but that effect may be mediated by relia-
bility. Furthermore, I have found that the effects of an explanation are higher in
the low reliability contexts, and that the effect of explanation in the low reliabil-
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ity setting can be as high as the impact of a (higher) reliability of an explainer
in contexts where an explanation was not provided.
This is only one study on the effects of reliability in the context of expla-
nations understood as links between claims and evidence has been under-
explored and further studies should be conducted. Nonetheless, it provides
fruitful ground for further exploration. The reliability of an explainer, how-
ever, is only one of the aspects of explanation when considered as communica-
tive acts. Other aspects like ‘normality’ or the effects of explanation in learning
are also understudied, especially in the context of explanations of inference
processes understood as links between claims and evidence. These point to
further research avenues that could be explored.
5
General discussion
In this thesis I have explored the relationship between argument and three
notions of explanation. This exploration led into discussions regarding the
strategies one might adopt in causal-probabilistic reasoning, probability in-
terpretations, extending the algebra, goodness of explanations, and reliability.
Specifically, I examined in more detail the interplay between argument and
explanation as highlighted by the most fundamental argument scheme in the
literature, the so-called argument from sign. Here, ‘critical questions’ about
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potential alternative explanations for the ‘sign’ (evidence) that are essential to
the scheme-based tradition’s normative guidance can be recast in a normative
Bayesian framework as the phenomenon of ‘explaining away’. This led me to a
detailed investigation of strategies lay reasoners use for ‘explaining away’. In
particular, I examined strategies adopted in causal probabilistic reasoning and
their relationship with different probability interpretations. This closer look at
explaining away then led on to a fundamental, but typically overlooked, nor-
mative and descriptive ‘gap’ not just for explanation but also for argument,
namely what happens when new variables emerge, that is, the algebra must
be extended. Finally, I explored goodness of explanations and the impact of
explanations on perceived reliability.
In this chapter I restate the main findings and provide further implications
and future research directions suggested by the findings.
5.1 Brief overview of experimental data
5.1.1 Argument and explanation in causal reasoning
To explore the relationship between explanations and arguments in explaining
away, I carried out three experiments utilising a novel methodology. The find-
ings suggested that participants understood the explaining away structure and
accepted the parameters communicated to them. Despite that, the main find-
ings echoed those of the extant literature as participants systematically violated
the normative account of explaining away. Specifically, in Experiments 1 and 2
pitfalls were most evident in diagnostic reasoning and direct explaining away.
Further, findings from all three experiments suggested that deviations from
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the normative model seem to arise, at least in part, from participants utilis-
ing certain sub-optimal reasoning strategies such as the diagnostic split and
interpreting probabilities as propensities. All three experiments found that
a significant proportion of participants split the probability space among the
causes in line with diagnostic split reasoning. This was most evident when
participants reasoned with low priors. The findings from all three experiments
also suggested that a large number of participants remained at the priors when
answering diagnostic reasoning and direct explaining away questions, with
the proportions of participants who did not change their probability estimates
varying as predicted by the propensity hypothesis.
In the second part of Chapter 2 I explored people’s reasoning in structures
that extend explaining away. Specifically, I explored people’s sequential diag-
nostic reasoning in an explaining away structure with two effects. This struc-
ture also allowed for the possibility of learning the algebra in a sequential way.
The findings from Experiments 4 and 5 suggested that people are sensitive to
the different diagnosticities of the evidence in this extended explaining away
structure, both when the probabilistic information regarding diagnosticity was
communicated through numerical probability estimates and through verbal
probability expressions. However, I found that people do not follow the pre-
dictions of the normative (full) CBN model and sometimes provided estimates
that went against even the qualitative predictions of the normative model. This
suggests that although people were sensitive to the different diagnosticities of
the evidence, it is perhaps not these diagnosticities that led them to provide
specific estimates for the two causes. Additionally, results suggested that there
was no difference between the groups who were presented the full algebra
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from the beginning and the groups who were presented the algebra in a se-
quential way and that there was little support for either of the two modeling
strategies considered, i.e. the split and the full model.
The propensity interpretation and the diagnostic split were also explored in
this part of Chapter 2. The results suggested that the diagnostic split hypothe-
sis accounted for a large proportion of the responses in Experiment 4, although
some of these responses could have been due to participants’ providing .50
as their estimate to communicate that they do not know the answer. In Ex-
periment 5, the diagnostic split hypothesis account for a significantly smaller
proportion of the estimates. Overall, the propensity interpretation accounted
for a significantly smaller proportion of participants estimates in Experiments
4 and 5 compared to Experiments 1–3.
5.1.2 Explaining the argument
In Chapter 3 I discussed the theoretical background of explanations. In particu-
lar I distinguished between two notions of explanations with a focus on causal
Bayesian networks (CBNs) and reviewed the literature on explanatory virtues.
One of the upshots of the theoretical discussion was that it is not clear how cer-
tain aspects of explanations, such as explanatory virtues, map onto explaining
inferences in CBNs.
I thus conducted a case study where I explored how a human (expert)
would explain inference in CBNs. I found that experts are capable of explain-
ing inferences processes in CBNs and that their explanations often have the
function of a link or a bridge between the target node (claim/hypothesis) and
the evidence. Further, multiple features of the philosophical, psychological,
5.1 Brief overview of experimental data 305
and cognitive science literature are reflected in these explanations: a focus on
causal explanation for a probabilistic system; the directional nature of explana-
tion (its asymmetry); indications of pragmatic sensitivity in that hypotheticals
are used to express relevant ‘contrasts’; and, an emerging notion of the explana-
tory virtue simplicity in the use of the Markov blanket.
5.1.3 Social explanation
In Chapter 4 I introduced explanations as communicative acts and explored
the effects of one of the aspects of explanations understood as such, namely
the reliability of an explainer. I carried out four experiments where I aimed to
explore the relationship between explanation, reliability, and confidence. The
findings from the four experiments suggested that (i) (good) explanations (of
inferences) do have an impact on our confidence, that is, providing an expla-
nation increases confidence in a claim; (ii) a (good) explanation increases the
perceived reliability of an explainer; (iii) the effect of providing an explana-
tion on confidence is mediated by that reliability; (iv) the effects of providing a
(good) explanation on confidence is larger when the reliability of an explainer
is low than high; (v) a (good) explanation that was provided by a non-expert
may have very similar effects on confidence as a (high) reliability of an expert
who did not provide any further explanation for their claim; (vi) people’s reli-
ability estimates were mostly guided by the level of expertise of an explainer,
with explanation only having a impact when the expertise was low; and (vii)
a non-expert providing a (good) explanation did not lead to a similar effect on
the reliability estimates as an expert who did not provide an explanation for
their claim; rather, the reliability estimates in this case were driven purely by
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the levels of expertise.
5.2 Implications and future directions
5.2.1 Diagnostic split, propensity interpretation, and other
probability interpretations
The results from Chapter 2 showed that in some situations providing an expla-
nation of evidence will have a limited effect on the strength of an argument,
i.e. the posterior probability of a claim after additionally learning that there is a
competing explanation. Specifically, the majority of people will just stay at the
prior probability of the claim or split the probability space between the claim
and explanation. This, however, does not imply that people’s estimates are
always going against the normative framework. We have seen that if people
are providing estimates that are in line the propensity interpretation when the
priors are above .5 and in line with the diagnostic split reasoning otherwise,
then their estimates will be within .1 of the normative answer about 2/3 of the
time. One could, thus, argue that even though the two strategies are incom-
patible with the normative predictions, people who reason in line with the two
strategies are approximately rational most of the time.
In non-deterministic set-ups, however, the effects of the propensity hypoth-
esis and the diagnostic split seem to be significantly reduced. These are set-ups
where the presence of at least one cause entails the presence of an effect and
where the effect cannot occur when none of the causes are present; or where af-
ter learning the effect one of the causes (or both) must have happened, i.e. the
causes are exhaustive. Nonetheless, Chapter 2 presented one of the few studies
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on the potential effects of probability interpretations. It suggested that in cer-
tain argumentation contexts the effects of explanations on the strength of the
argument depend on how people interpret probabilities.
Further research should consider other argument schemes and the effects
of the propensity interpretation and/or diagnostic split reasoning in these
contexts. I have suggested that even in very simple contexts where partici-
pants were assessing the impacts of evidence on only one claim, the effects of
the propensity interpretation may be significant especially when the set-up is
deterministic, the prior probabilities are well-established, and there are clear
causal-mechanistic relations between the claim and evidence. The propensity
interpretation, however, is not the only way on can understand probabilities
(Hájek, 2012). For example, the frequency interpretation is another interpreta-
tion that is prevalent in both every day contexts (e.g. rolling an even number
on a die) and in science (e.g. traditional/frequentist statistics). Many studies
have employed a frequency format response scale to elicit probability estimates
from participants (e.g. Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995), which may have empha-
sised the frequency interpretation more and thus lead participants to provide
estimates whilst considering probabilities as frequencies. Nonetheless, studies
directly assessing the effects of probability interpretations (including the fre-
quency interpretation) are still very few.
5.2.2 Extending algebra
Both theoretical and empirical research on extending the algebra is limited, not
just for explanation but also for argumentation. The empirical results from
Chapter 2 suggested that people do not differentiate between learning that a
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certain event that we knew was possible took place and learning about the
possible existence of an event and including it into our belief system. However,
these are only first studies to explore potential effects of extending algebra.
Further research is warranted.
On the theoretical side, I have explored two possible ways to model extend-
ing algebra. The Bayesian framework, however, does not provide suggestions
or put constraints on how models should incorporate new events. Suggestions
on how to address the problem may come from some of the distance-based ap-
proaches (e.g. Eva et al., 2019). It is important to note, however, that we cannot
be aware of all possible events that could potentially exist. Thus, any approach
tackling this issues will have to be flexible enough to allow for extending alge-
bra to add new, yet unaccounted for events.
5.2.3 Explanations, arguments, and AI
In Chapter 3 I presented and explored a different notion of explanation to
that explored in Chapter 2; namely, the notion of explanations of reason-
ing/inference processes. The literature review suggested that this notion is
mostly found in the computer science, but that it is also pertinent to psychol-
ogy as it relates to explaining the argument, provided that argument can be
represented via CBNs. I have then devised a case study that provided us with
an initial sense of the kinds of explanations a human (expert) may produce
and, potentially, prefer in the context of explanations of reasoning in CBNs,
and more generally in AI systems. More specifically, the case study makes a
start at bridging between computer science, and the philosophical and psycho-
logical literature on what counts as ‘good reasoning’ by eliciting explanations
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from human experts and it provides concrete direction for future algorithm
construction. The study also pointed out that while the literature from philos-
ophy and psychology is a helpful starting point, more context specific work
would be required to address the question of what would be the most appro-
priate explanation of the reasoning processes in a particular AI domain.
The discussion on the three dimensions of explanation showed that expla-
nation also have a strong social component. In Chapter 4 I have explored one
aspect of that component, namely the reliability of the source of explanation.
The results showed the interplay between providing an explanation and the
reliability of an explainer, specifically in the context of everyday explanations.
I also pointed out that the Bovens and Hartmann (BH) model (Bovens & Hart-
mann, 2003) may be able to capture at least some aspects of this interplay as
well as the ways these findings can potentially account for some of the prior
findings regarding irrelevant information in explanations (Weisberg et al., 2008,
2015).
The findings from Chapter 4 have also pointed to the importance of back-
ground knowledge or prior beliefs in assessing the effects of explanations on
confidence or the strength of arguments. Namely, people who found that
claims and explanations aligned with their prior beliefs deemed the effects of
providing an explanation on their confidence in these claims small. This is
in line with the previous literature in psychology (C. A. Anderson & Sechler,
1986; Jarvstad & Hahn, 2011; Lombrozo, 2012; Koehler, 1991; Thagard, 1989;
Williams & Lombrozo, 2013)
The effects of background knowledge on explanation have also been
pointed out in AI literature as well (Lacave & Dı́ez, 2002; Miller, 2019). Dif-
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ferent users of an AI system can have different knowledge levels about the
domain that is modeled and/or different knowledge levels about the models
themselves. Thus, different users would require different kinds of explana-
tions that would reflect the differences in the background knowledge. If an
AI system is to produce a convincing explanation, it would need to ‘know its
audience’ and tailor explanations accordingly. Thus, studying the effects in a
more direct way should be pursued in future research.
5.2.4 Explanations and trust
The findings regarding explanations and reliability from Chapter 4 can also
inform the research on (machine-produced) explanations in AI. Because expla-
nations and source reliability jointly impact of our beliefs, these interactions are
likely to be consequential for the extent to which the conclusion of an AI system
being explained is itself perceived to be true. The literature in AI, in particular
recommender systems, has long recognized relationship between trust and ex-
planation (Zhang & Chen, 2020). The majority of research suggests that provid-
ing an explanation improves user’s trust in an AI system (Herlocker et al., 2000;
Sinha & Swearingen, 2002; Symeonidis, Nanopoulos, & Manolopoulos, 2009).
However, the situation seems more intricate as more transparent systems do
not always lead to increase in trust (Cramer et al., 2008), and sometimes poor
explanations can lead to reduced acceptance of the AI systems (Herlocker et al.,
2000). To explore the interactions between explanations and trust, in addition
to manipulation transparency of AI systems, one would also need to experi-
mentally manipulate the level of trust users have in them.
The results from Chapter 4 seem to naturally translate into the AI context.
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For example, consider the following findings: (i) providing an explanation for
a claim increases not just people’s confidence in the claim but also the perceived
reliability of the person providing an explanation as compared to when there
is no such explanation and (ii) providing an explanation has a significantly
greater impact on the confidence and reliability when people’s initial (prior)
reliability of the source is low compared to when that reliability is high. In the
context of AI, these results suggest that providing a (good) explanation of an
AI system’s decisions will arguably increase people’s confidence in/acceptance
of these decisions as well as people’s perceived the reliability/trust of the sys-
tem. In particular, the impact of providing an explanation will be greater (and
most useful) if people’s initial perceived reliability/trust of an AI system is low.
These claims, however, should be empirically explored in the context of AI.
5.2.5 Trust and fidelity
A recent surge of interest in explanations of black-box deep learning models
has significantly pushed the horizons of explainable AI, but at the same time it
has also introduced the fidelity problem. Namely, unlike explanations of CBN
where original CBN models could be used to generate explanations (either as
justification of evidence or as explanation of reasoning processes), deep learn-
ing models are not transparent enough for either a lay or an expert human user
to be able to explain the models’ outputs; rather, one resorts to explanation
models that are independent of the deep learning models to generate expla-
nations of these black-box models’ decisions after these decisions have been
made, i.e. post-hoc (Ribeiro, Singh, & Guestrin, 2016; Zhang & Chen, 2020).
The explanation models are often model agnostic as they should be able to ex-
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plain decisions of any (black-box) model. Post-hoc model agnostic explanation
models have certainly furthered the work on explanation in AI, but they have
also prompted questions regarding the degree to which the explanations gener-
ated by models reflect the real mechanisms that generated decisions of a deep
learning model: i.e. they have raised questions regarding the fidelity of expla-
nation models (Sørmo et al., 2005; Ribeiro et al., 2016). In the literature, the
trade-off between fidelity and interpretability of explanation models is often
acknowledged: the higher the fidelity of an explanation model to the black-
box model the lower the interpretability of that model and its transparency to
a human user (Ribeiro et al., 2016). This however brings trust and reliability
into the consideration. On the one hand, if higher interpretability is to increase
trust and reliability, then trust may be negatively affected by higher fidelity. On
the other hand, if users expect higher fidelity explanation models, then lower
fidelity may now negatively affect trust. This potentially interesting relation-
ship between fidelity and trust is another open issue related to the interplay
between a user and the system that should be addressed in the future research
on explanations.
5.2.6 Further research avenues
The effect of the communication on the reliability of the source/trust is not
the only way in which explanations, when considered as communicative acts,
alter beliefs about what it is that is being explained. For example, does pro-
viding an explanation constrain and/or make less ambiguous the underlying
(causal) structure of the world that the explainee had in mind before receiving
the explanation (or in the case of a CBN, does providing an explanation restrict
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the number of potential CBN structures that the explainee has mind) (c.f. Bes,
Sloman, Lucas, & Raufaste, 2012)? How does providing an explanation of an
(ab)normal event in a causal chain of events reflect on our perceptions of that
explanation (Kirfel, Icard, & Gerstenberg, 2020)? Does a detailed explanation of
a usual and obvious succession of events make that explanation less preferred
or worse compared to a less detailed explanation (Bechlivanidis et al., 2017)?
All these questions call for further investigation and can have implications for
the explainable AI project.
The three dimensions of explanation have carved the explanation space into
8 intersection points. Out of these 8 points I have explored only three of them,
and only one aspect of understanding explanations as communicative acts. In
this thesis I have not explored explanations as processes. The research on expla-
nations as processes is itself limited and it calls for further exploration, specif-
ically in social contexts where the social interaction may facilitate the cogni-
tive activity of explaining something. Similarly, considering the relationship
between arguments and explanations as processes would be particularly in-
teresting because argumentation as an activity or process includes a dynamic
between the interlocutors. It would be worthy of exploration to consider the ef-
fects of explanations as processes on arguments, particularly when one is fully
engaged with the cognitive activity of producing an explanation, but failing to
actually produce one. I also have not explored explanations of outcomes that
are products and that are made in a social context. Although potentially in-
teresting, exploring this intersection of the explanation space may prove to be
more difficult. This is because in social contexts it may be more challenging to
just provide explanations of an outcome without going into and explaining the
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inference processes that lead to that outcome.
5.3 Conclusions
In this thesis I have explored the relationships between arguments and expla-
nations. In doing so I have empirically explored the effects of probability in-
terpretations and extending algebra on the confidence or the strength of ar-
guments. I have reviewed the theoretical background on explanations from
different fields, including philosophy, psychology and computer science, and
summarized some of the findings from this review via the three dimensions of
explanation. I have also explored the effects of some of the aspects of under-
standing explanations as communicative acts, in particular the effects of the re-
liability of the source on confidence. I have suggested direct implications of the
findings for both the psychological research and the research in AI as well as a
number of avenues for further research. As one of the contentions of this thesis
is that explanations and arguments should be studied in tandem rather than in
isolation, any future research on explanation should consider arguments and
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A
Calculations and experimental mate-
rial used in studies in Chapter 2
A.1 Explaining away with one or more inhibitory
causes
Here I show that Inequality 2.2 holds even when one or both causes in the
explaining away situation are inhibitory. First, notice that P(E | Ci) < P(E) if
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and only if P(Ci | E) < P(Ci) and P(E | Ci) > P(E) if and only if P(Ci | E) >
P(Ci) (proofs omitted). Then we have that:
P(Ci | E) =
P(Ci) ∑Cj P(Cj) P(E | Ci, Cj)
∑Ci,Cj P(Ci) P(Cj) P(E | Ci, Cj)
P(Ci | E)− P(Ci) = P(Ci)
∑Cj P(Cj) P(E | Ci, Cj)−∑Ci,Cj P(Ci) P(Cj) P(E | Ci, Cj)
∑Ci,Cj P(Ci) P(Cj) P(E | Ci, Cj)
= P(Ci) P(∼Ci)
∑Cj P(Cj) P(E | Ci, Cj)−∑Cj P(Cj) P(E | ∼Ci, Cj)
∑Ci,Cj P(Ci) P(Cj) P(E | Ci, Cj)
= P(Ci) P(∼Ci)
A− B









P(E | ∼Ci,∼Cj)− P(E | Ci,∼Cj)
]
.
Therefore, P(E | Ci) < P(E) if and only if A < B and P(E | Ci) > P(E) if and
only if A > B. To see how this result corresponds to explaining away, I write
again Inequality 2.2:
P(E | Ci, Cj) P(E | ∼Ci,∼Cj) < P(E | Ci,∼Cj) P(E | ∼Ci, Cj)
It is easy to see that when, for instance, P(E | C1, C2) = 0, P(E | Ci,∼Cj) = 1
and P(E | ∼C1,∼C2) = 1, both causes are inhibitory as P(Ci | E) < P(Ci) for
both causes, but Inequality 2.2 is still satisfied. Similarly, assuming the priors
are equal, when P(E | C1, C2) = P(E | ∼C1,∼C2) = 0, P(E | C1,∼C2) = 1
and P(E | ∼C1, C2) = .1, then cause C1 is generative (P(C1 | E) > P(Ci)) but
cause C2 is inhibitory (P(C2 | E) < P(C2)). Nonetheless, Inequality 2.2 remains
satisfied.
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A.2 Normative predictions based on data from
Rottman and Hastie (2016)
Here I show that including participants’ average estimates regarding the in-
dependence of C1 and C2 from Rottman and Hastie (2016, Experiment 1b) in
the normative model leads to the explaining away effect not being normatively
warranted.
To perform the calculations I assume that P(Ci) = .25, P(E | Ci, Cj) = .75,
P(E | Ci,∼Cj) = P(E | ∼Ci, Cj) = .5, P(E | ∼Ci,∼Cj) = 0, as is stated
in the study. There is some empirical support that participants accepted
P(E | Ci, Cj) = .75 (although there is a lot of variation in participants’ esti-
mates). There is, however, no data reported on whether participants accepted
other parameters. Lastly, form the study we have that participants average
estimates regarding independence are P(Ci | Cj) = .45 and P(Ci | ∼Cj) = .35.




P(E | Ci, Cj) P(Ci | Cj) P(Cj)
P(E | Cj) P(Cj)
=
P(E | Ci, Cj) P(Ci | Cj)
P(E | Cj)
=
P(E | Ci, Cj) P(Ci | Cj)
∑Ci P(E | Ci, Cj) P(Ci | Cj)
=
.75× .45
.75× .45 + .5× .55 ≈ .55





P(E | Ci)P(Ci) + P(E | ∼Ci)P(∼Ci)
=
P(Ci)∑Cj P(E | Ci, Cj) P(Cj | Ci)
P(Ci)∑Cj P(E | Ci, Cj) P(Cj | Ci) + P(∼Ci)∑Cj P(E | ∼Ci, Cj) P(Cj | ∼Ci)
=
.25× (.75× .45 + .5× .55)
.25× (.75× .45 + .5× .55) + .75× (.5× .35 + 0) ≈ .54
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Therefore, as P(Ci | E) and P(Ci | E, Cj) are very close to each other, the amount
of explaining away is negligible with slightly going in the opposite direction to
explaining away.
A.3 The decomposition conditions for an explain-
ing away CBN with two effects
I adopt the following convention: a = 1− a.
Theorem A.1. P1(C1 | E1, E2) = P2(C∗1 | E2) if and only if (i) α1 δ1 = β1 γ1 or (ii)
α2 = β2 and γ2 = δ2.
Proof.




P1(C1)∑C2 P1(E1 | C1, C2) P1(E2 | C1, C2) P1(C2)




A1 := c1 (α2 α1 c2 + β2 β1 c2)
A2 := c1 (γ2 γ1 c2 + δ2 δ1 c2)





















P1(C1 | E1)∑C2 P1(E2 | C1, C2) P1(C2 | E1)




B1 := c1 (α1 c2 + β1 c2)·
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· [α2 c2 (α1 c1 + γ1 c1) + β2 c2 (β1 c1 + δ1 c1)]
B2 := c1 (γ1 c2 + δ1 c2)·
· [γ2 c2 (α1 c1 + γ1 c1) + δ2 c2 (β1 c1 + δ1 c1)]
Let ∆1 := P1(C1 | E1, E2)− P2(C∗1 | E2). Then
∆1 =
A1 (B1 + B2)− B1 (A1 + A2)
(A1 + A2) (B1 + B2)
=
A1 B1 + A1 B2 − A1 B1 − A2 B1
P1(E1, E2) P2(E2)
=
A1 B2 − A2 B1
P1(E1, E2) P2(E2)
=
c1 c1 c2 c2 (α1 δ1 − β1 γ1) [G1 + G2]
P1(E1, E2) P2(E2)
·
G1 := (γ2 − δ2) c1 (α2 α1 c2 + β2 β1 c2)
G2 := (α2 − β2) c1 (γ2 γ1 c2 + δ2 δ1 c2)
q
Using a similar proof strategy one can show that: (a) P1(C2 | E1, E2) =
P2(C∗2 | E2) if and only if α1 δ1 = β1 γ1 or (ii) α2 = γ2 and β2 = δ2; (b)
P1(C1 | E1, E2) = P3(C∗1 | E1) if and only if (i) α2 δ2 = β2 γ2 or (ii) α1 = β1
and γ1 = δ1; and (c) P1(C2 | E1, E2) = P3(C∗2 | E1) if and only if (i) α2 δ2 = β2 γ2
or (ii) α1 = γ1 and β1 = δ1 (proofs omitted).
It follows then that P1(C1 | E1, E2) = P2(C∗1 | E2) = P3(C∗1 | E1) if (1) α1 δ1 =
β1 γ1 and α2 δ2 = β2 γ2, or (2) α1 = β1 and γ1 = δ1, or (3) α2 = β2 and γ2 = δ2.
Similarly, P1(C2 | E1, E2) = P2(C∗2 | E2) = P3(C∗2 | E1) if (1) α1 δ1 = β1 γ1 and
α2 δ2 = β2 γ2, or (2) α1 = γ1 and β1 = δ1, or (3) α2 = γ2 and β2 = δ2. Therefore,
the order is not important and one can decompose a full CBN in smaller ones
while preserving the same probability distributions if (1) α1 δ1 = β1 γ1 and
α2 δ2 = β2 γ2; or (2) α1 = β1, γ1 = δ1, α2 = γ2, and β2 = δ2; or (3) α2 = β2,
γ2 = δ2, α1 = γ1, and β1 = δ1; or (4) α1 = β1 = γ1 = δ1; or (5) α2 = β2 = γ2 =
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δ2. (4) and (5) make E1 and E2 respectively fully undiagnostic with respect to
C1 and C2, which violates the faithfulness condition (see Neapolitan, 2003). (1)
implies that C1 and C2 are conditionally independent given E1 and that they
are also conditionally independent given E2, that is, learning E1 makes C1 and
C2 independent and learning E1 makes C1 and C2 independent. (2) and (3) both
entail (1) and are more specific versions of (1).
A.4 Order effects with mutually exclusive and ex-
haustive causes
Here I show that there are no order effects when the causes are mutually ex-
clusive and exhaustive, i.e. when P(C1, C2) = 0 and P(C1) + P(C2) = 1. I
model mutually exclusive and exhaustive causes with one node, C, that has
two values: C1 and C2.
E1 C E2
Figure A.1: CBN with mutually exclusive and exhaustive causes
P4(C = C1) = c , P4(C = C2) = c
P4(E1 | C1) = α1 , P4(E1 | C2) = β1 (A.1)
P4(E2 | C1) = α2 , P4(E2 | C2) = β2
Splitting the CBN from Figure A.1 we get two CBNs:
P5(C = C1) = c , P5(C = C2) = c
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C E1
C∗ E2
Figure A.2: ‘Split’ CBN from E1 to E2
P5(C∗ = C∗1) = P4(C1 | E1) , P5(C∗ = C∗2) = P4(C2 | E1)
P5(E1 | C1) = α1 , P5(E1 | C2) = β1 (A.2)
P5(E2 | C∗1) = α2 , P5(E2 | C∗2) = β2




2 ) = 0 and
P4,5(C
(∗)
1 ) + P4,5(C
(∗)
2 ) = 1.
Proof.
P4(C1 | E1, E2) =
P4(C1) P4(E1 | C1) P4(E2 | C1)
∑C P4(C) P4(E1 | C) P4(E2 | C)
=
c α1 α2
c α1 α2 + c β1 β2
P5(C∗1 | E2) =
P5(C∗1) P5(E2 | C∗1)
∑C∗ P5(C∗) P5(E2 | C∗)
=
P4(C | E1) P4(E2 | C)
∑C P4(C| E1) P4(E2 | C)
=
J α2
J α2 + (1− J) β2
J :=
c α1
c α1 + c β1
Let ∆2 := P4(C1 | E1, E2)− P5(C∗1 | E2). Then
∆2 =
c α1 α2 β2
[
1− c α1+c β1c α1+c β1
]
(c α1 α2 + c β1 β2)(J α2 + (1− J) β2)
= 0
q
Since P4(C2 | E1, E2) = 1− P4(C1 | E1, E2) and P5(C∗2 | E2) = 1− P5(C∗1 |
E2), then given Theorem A.2 it also true that P4(C2 | E1, E2) = P5(C∗2 | E2).
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Similarly we get that P4(C1 | E1, E2) − P6(C∗1 | E1) = 0 and P4(C2 | E1, E2) −
P6(C∗2 | E1) = 0 (proofs omitted).
A.5 Stimuli used in Experiment 4
• The full algebra condition. Step-by-step order 1 (Step-by-step order 2) {All-at-
once}. The text in the square brackets [] did not appear in the materials
presented to the participants. Rather it was added here to aid the expla-
nation of the role of each part of the experimental design.
One morning you plan to do some gardening that day in a garden just a
mile away from where you live. However, you won’t be able to proceed
with your plan and you will have to postpone gardening for another day
if it had rained last night. You slept tightly last night so do not remem-
ber hearing any rain, but you remember the weather forecast saying that
there was a 15% chance of rain overnight.
You head outside to check for signs of rain. You decide to check your
lawn and your exterior house wall which sometimes gets wet due to rain.
The situation is illustrated below:
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On the way outside you realize you have to be careful in judging whether
it rained last night on the basis of whether the lawn is wet and/or
whether the house wall is wet, since you have a lawn sprinkler that
sometimes accidentally turns on overnight. The sprinkler can also wet
the house wall and turns off early in the morning (before you wake up) if
left on overnight due to the water supply to the sprinkler being automat-
ically cut. There is a 15% chance that your sprinkler accidentally turned
on overnight.
The complete situation is illustrated below:
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[Questions about priors:]
Q1. How confident are you that it rained overnight?
Q2. How confident are you that the sprinkler turned on overnight?
From your experience you know that if it rained overnight, but
the sprinkler did not turn on overnight, then there is a high 70% chance
that the lawn is wet, and a low 20% chance that the house wall is wet in
the morning.
The same values hold if the sprinkler turned on, but it did not rain
overnight: in this case there is also a high 70% chance that the lawn is wet,
and a low 20% chance that the house wall is wet in the morning.
If it both rained overnight and the sprinkler turned on overnight, then
there is an extremely high 99% chance that the lawn is wet and a mod-
erate 60% chance that the house wall is wet in the morning.
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In case it neither rained nor the sprinkler turned on overnight, then both
the lawn and the house wall are definitely dry in the morning.
[Comprehension questions:]
What is the chance that the lawn is wet if it did not rain but the sprinkler
turned on overnight?
What is the chance that the house wall is wet if it did not rain but the
sprinkler turned on overnight?
What is the chance that the lawn is wet if the sprinkler did not turn but
it rained overnight?
What is the chance that the house wall is wet if the sprinkler did not turn
on but it rained overnight?
What is the chance that the lawn is wet if it did not rain and the sprinkler
did not turn on overnight?
What is the chance that the house wall is wet if it did not rain and the
sprinkler did not turn on overnight?
What is the chance that the lawn is wet if it rained and the sprinkler
turned on overnight?
What is the chance that the house wall is wet if it rained and the sprin-
kler turned on overnight?
YOU STEP OUTSIDE AND YOU FIRST CHECK THE LAWN. YOU
FIND OUT THAT THE LAWN IS WET. You still do not know whether
the house wall is wet.
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(YOU STEP OUTSIDE AND YOU FIRST LOOK AT THE HOUSE
WALL. YOU FIND OUT THAT THE HOUSE WALL IS WET. You still
do not know whether the lawn wall is wet.)
{YOU HEAD OUTSIDE AND YOU CHECK BOTH THE LAWN AND
THE HOUSE WALL. YOU FIND OUT THAT THE LAWN IS WET
AND THAT THE HOUSE WALL IS WET. [Test questions Q3 and Q4
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were not asked in this all-at-once condition. Only test questions Q5 and
Q6 were asked in this condition.]}
[Test questions 1:]
Q3. How confident are you that it rained overnight now that you know
that the lawn is wet (the house wall is wet)?
Q4. How confident are you that the sprinkler turned on overnight now
that you know that the lawn is wet (the house wall is wet)?
YOU THEN LOOK AT THE HOUSE WALL AND FIND OUT THAT
THE HOUSE WALL IS ALSO WET.
(YOU THEN CHECK THE LAWN AND FIND OUT THAT
THE LAWN IS ALSO WET.)
[Test questions 2:]
A.5 Stimuli used in Experiment 4 330
Q5. How confident are you that it rained overnight now that you know
that both the lawn and the house wall are wet?
Q6. How confident are you that the sprinkler turned on overnight now
that you know that both the lawn and the house wall are wet?
• The sequential algebra condition. Step-by-step order 1 (Step-by-step order 2)
{All-at-once}
One morning you plan to do some gardening that day in a garden just a
mile away from where you live. However, you won’t be able to proceed
with your plan and you will have to postpone gardening for another day
if it had rained last night. You slept tightly last night so do not remem-
ber hearing any rain, but you remember the weather forecast saying that
there was a 15% chance of rain overnight.
You head outside to check for signs of rain. You decide to check your
lawn (the house wall which sometimes gets wet due to rain).
On the way outside you realize you have to be careful in judging whether
it rained last night on the basis of whether the lawn (the house wall) is
wet, since you have a lawn sprinkler that sometimes accidentally turns
on overnight. The sprinkler (can also wet the house wall and) turns off
early in the morning before you wake up if left on overnight due to the
water supply to the sprinkler being automatically cut. There is a 15%
chance that your sprinkler accidentally turned on overnight.
The situation is illustrated below:
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([In Step-by-step order 2 participants were presented with the illustration
like the one right after Test question 1 below.])
[Questions about priors. The same questions as in the full algebra condi-
tion.]
From your experience you know that if it rained overnight, but
the sprinkler did not turn on overnight, then there is a high 70% chance
that the lawn is wet.
The same values hold if the sprinkler turned on, but it did not rain
overnight: in this case there is also a high 70% chance that the lawn is wet.
If it both rained overnight and the sprinkler turned on overnight, then
there is an extremely high 99% chance that the lawn is wet.
In case it neither rained nor the sprinkler turned on overnight, then
the lawn is definitely dry in the morning.
([In Step-by-step order 2 participants were presented with probabilities
related to the house wall.])
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[Comprehension questions 1:]
What is the chance that the lawn is wet if it did not rain but the sprinkler
turned on overnight?
What is the chance that the lawn is wet if the sprinkler did not turn but
it rained overnight?
What is the chance that the lawn is wet if it did not rain and the sprinkler
did not turn on overnight?
What is the chance that the lawn is wet if it rained and the sprinkler
turned on overnight?
([In Step-by-step order 2 participants were presented with Comprehen-
sion questions 2.])
YOU STEP OUTSIDE AND YOU CHECK THE LAWN. YOU FIND
OUT THAT THE LAWN IS WET.
(YOU STEP OUTSIDE AND LOOK AT THE HOUSE WALL. YOU
FIND OUT THAT THE HOUSE WALL IS WET.)
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([In Step-by-step order 2 participants were presented with a picture like
the one just before Test questions 2.])
[Test questions 1:]
Q3. How confident are you that it rained overnight now that you know
that the lawn is wet (the house wall is wet)?
Q4. How confident are you that the sprinkler turned on overnight now
that you know that the lawn is wet (the house wall is wet)?
To get more information on rain overnight, you decide to also check your
exterior house wall (your lawn) that can also sometimes get wet both due
to rain and due to the sprinkler being on.
The situations is illustrated bellow:
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([In Step-by-step order 2 participants were presented with like the one
just before priors.])
From your experience you know that if it rained overnight, but
the sprinkler did not turn on overnight, then there is a low 20% chance
that the house wall is wet in the morning.
The same values hold if the sprinkler turned on, but it did not rain
overnight: in this case there is also a low 20% chance that
the house wall is wet in the morning.
If it both rained overnight and the sprinkler turned on overnight, then
there is a moderate 60% chance that the house wall is wet in the morn-
ing.
In case it neither rained nor the sprinkler turned on overnight, then
the house wall is definitely dry in the morning.
([In Step-by-step order 2 participant were presented with probabilities
related to the lawn.])
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[Comprehension questions 2:]
What is the chance that the house wall is wet if it did not rain but the
sprinkler turned on overnight?
What is the chance that the house wall is wet if the sprinkler did not turn
on but it rained overnight?
What is the chance that the house wall is wet if it did not rain and the
sprinkler did not turn on overnight?
What is the chance that the house wall is wet if it rained and the sprin-
kler turned on overnight?
([In Step-by-step order 2 participant were presented with Comprehension
questions 1.])
YOU LOOK AT THE HOUSE WALL AND YOU FIND OUT THAT
THE HOUSE WALL IS ALSO WET.
(YOU CHECK THE LAWN AND FIND OUT THAT
THE LAWN IS ALSO WET.)
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[Test questions 2:]
Q5. How confident are you that it rained overnight now that you know
that the house wall (the lawn) is also wet?
Q6. How confident are you that the sprinkler turned on overnight now
that you know that the house wall (the lawn) is also wet?
{[In All-at-one condition people learnt the effects in a sequential manner
but the were told about potential existence of both effect they were told
that both effects had occurred and they were asked only Test questions
2.]}
A.6 Ratio of the posterior odds for the full and the
split model
In this section I show how one can represent the predictions of the full and the
split model as a ratio of odds that simplifies to likelihoods. For the full model
A.6 Ratio of the posterior odds for the full and the split model 337
(over which a probability distribution P7 is defined) we have the following ratio
of the odds (i, j ∈ {1, 2}):
P7(Ci | Ei)
P7(Ci | Ei, Ej)
P7(Cj | Ei)
P7(Cj | Ei, Ej)
=
P7(Ci | Ei)P7(Cj | Ei, Ej)













P7(Ei, Ej | Cj)




P7(Ej | Cj, Ei)P7(Ei | Cj)
P7(Ej | Ci, Ei)P7(Ei | Ci)
=
P7(Ej | Cj, Ei)
P7(Ej | Ci, Ei)
The probability distribution for the split model depends on the order we
learn evidence. There are thus two probability distributions (P8 and P9), one for
each order. Further, by the definition of the split model we have that P7,8(C∗i,j) =






P8,9(Ci | Ei)P8,9(C∗j | Ej)









P8,9(C∗i )P8,9(Ej | C∗j )P8,9(C∗j )
P8,9(Ej)
P8,9(C∗j )P8,9(Ej | C∗i )P8,9(C∗i )
P8,9(Ej)
=
P8,9(Ej | C∗j )
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We can see that that the ratio of odds in the full models is equal to the ratio of
odds in the split model when Ei and Ej are independent (i.e. when P(Ej | Ej) =
P(Ej)), which is exactly what the split model is assuming. In other words, the
split model ratio of odds is a special version of the full model ratio of odds
when the two effects are independent.
A.7 Stimuli used in Experiment 5
Two cover stories were used in Experiment 5. The first cover story was the rain
and sprinkler cover story used in Experiment 4 (the materials can be found in
Appendix A.5) and adapted for Experiment 5. The adaptation is reflected in
the features of the second cover story used in Experiment 5. I thus provide the
materials of only that cover story.
• The full algebra condition. Step-by-step order 1 (Step-by-step order 2). The text
in the square brackets [] did not appear in the materials presented to the
participants. Rather it was added here to aid the explanation of the role
of each part of the experimental design.
Researchers have established that sleep deprivation can be responsible
for both magnesium deficiency in the body and obesity. According to
the research, sleep deprivation often causes magnesium deficiency in the
body and sometimes causes obesity.
The research has also shown that not regularly eating magnesium-rich
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foods (such as leafy green vegetables) almost always causes magnesium
deficiency and almost never causes obesity.
The situation is illustrated below:
Your friend Tom, who you haven’t seen in a while, is known for really
liking vegetables. So, you think it is unlikely that Tom is not regularly
consuming magnesium-rich vegetables.
Also, Tom is well-known for having no troubles sleeping and you think
it is very unlikely that he is sleep deprived.
Please answer the following questions using all the information so far.
[Questions about priors:]
Q1. How confident are you that Tom is not regularly eating magnesium-
rich foods?
Q2. How confident are you that Tom is sleep deprived?
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YOU CALL TOM AND DURING THE CONVERSATION HE TELLS
YOU THAT HE IS MAGNESIUM DEFICIENT. At this point, you still do
not know whether he is diagnosed with obesity or not.
(YOU CALL TOM AND DURING THE CONVERSATION HE TELLS
YOU THAT HE WAS DIAGNOSED WITH OBESITY. At this point, you
still do not know whether he is magnesium deficient or not.)
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[Test questions 1:]
Q3. How confident are you that Tom is not regularly eating magnesium-
rich foods now that you know that he is magnesium deficient (obese)?
Q4. How confident are you that Tom is sleep deprived now that you
know that he is magnesium deficient (obese)?
AFTER A WHILE, TOM ALSO TELLS YOU THAT UNFORTUNATELY
HE BECAME OBESE (MAGNESIUM DEFICIENT).
[Test questions 2:]
Q5. How confident are you that Tom is not regularly eating magnesium-
rich foods now that you know that he is both magnesium deficient and
obese?
Q6. How confident are you that Tom is sleep deprived now that you
know that he is both magnesium deficient and obese?
• The sequential algebra condition. Step-by-step order 1 (Step-by-step order 2)
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Researchers have established that sleep deprivation can be responsible for
magnesium deficiency in the body (obesity). According to the research,
sleep deprivation often (sometimes) causes magnesium deficiency in the
body (obesity).
The research has also shown that not regularly eating magnesium-rich
foods (such as leafy green vegetables) almost always (almost never)
causes magnesium deficiency (obesity).
The situation is illustrated below:
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Your friend Tom, who you haven’t seen in a while, is known for really
liking vegetables. So, you think it is unlikely that Tom is not regularly
consuming magnesium-rich vegetables.
Also, Tom is well-known for having no troubles sleeping and you think
it is very unlikely that he is sleep deprived.
Please answer the following questions using all the information so far.
[Questions about priors:]
Q1. How confident are you that Tom is not regularly eating magnesium-
rich foods?
Q2. How confident are you that Tom is sleep deprived?
YOU CALL TOM AND DURING THE CONVERSATION HE TELLS
YOU THAT HE IS MAGNESIUM DEFICIENT.
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(YOU CALL TOM AND DURING THE CONVERSATION HE TELLS
YOU THAT HE WAS DIAGNOSED WITH OBESITY.)
[Test questions 1:]
Q3. How confident are you that Tom is not regularly eating magnesium-
rich foods now that you know that he is magnesium deficient (obese)?
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Q4. How confident are you that Tom is sleep deprived now that you
know that he is magnesium deficient (obese)?
In the meantime you remembered research on obesity (magnesium defi-
ciency). According to that research, sleep deprivation sometimes (often)
causes obesity (magnesium deficiency).
The research has also shown that not regularly eating magnesium-rich
foods almost never (almost always) causes obesity (magnesium defi-
ciency).
The situations is illustrated bellow:
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IN ANOTHER CONVERSATION TOM ALSO TELLS YOU THAT UN-
FORTUNATELY HE BECAME OBESE (MAGNESIUM DEFICIENT).
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[Test questions 2:]
Q5. How confident are you that Tom is not regularly eating magnesium-
rich foods now that you additionally know that he became obese (is mag-
nesium deficient)?
Q6. How confident are you that Tom is sleep deprived now that you
additionally know that he became obese (is magnesium deficient)?
B
Experimental materials used in the
case study in Chapter 3
Participants in the case study were told the following:
The aim of this preliminary study is to get a sense of BN experts’ intuitions
on how they explain to themselves or to other people with some familiarity
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with BNs the change in probabilities of certain variable states given some evi-
dence compared to when that evidence was unknown.
Please consider the following four Bayesian networks: wet grass, chest
clinic, false barrier, and car diagnosis. Curly brackets, i.e. {}, indicate all ev-
idence that you have and you are supposed to use only the evidence in {} to
answer the subsequent query. You can create a copy of this file or create a new
one to answer the queries, but in either case please put your name/initials to
the file. You will find that some queries are optional, but it’s preferred that you
answer as many of them as you can, time permitting of course. Please upload
your file with answers to the Dropbox folder. It would be great if you could
upload the file within next two weeks.
Accompanying these questions are four Netica and AgenaRisk files with
the four BNs already parameterized. You should these four files use to answer
the queries.
Wet Grass
Figure B.1: Wet Grass BN used in the case study.
Evidence: {Neighbour’s Grass = wet}
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Query:
1. How does the probability of ‘Our Sprinkler = was on’ change compared
to when there was no evidence and why?
2. How does the probability of ‘Wall = wet’ change compared to when there
was no evidence and why?
Evidence: {Wall = wet}
Query:
1. How does the probability of ‘Neighbour’s Grass = wet’ change compared
to when there was no evidence and why?
2. How does the probability of ‘Rain = rained’ change compared to when
there was no evidence and why?
Evidence: {Our Grass = wet, Wall = wet}
Query:
1. How does the probability of ‘Rain = rained’ change compared to when
the only available evidence was {Our grass = wet} and why?
2. How does the probability of ‘Our Sprinkler = was on’ change compared
to when the only available evidence was {Our grass = wet} and why?
Evidence: {Our Grass = wet, Wall = wet}
Query:
1. How does the probability of ‘Rain = rained’ change compared to when
there was no evidence and why?
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2. How does the probability of ‘Our Sprinkler = was on’ change compared
to when there was no evidence and why?
Optional:
Evidence: {Wall = dry}
Query:
1. How does the probability of ‘Neighbour’s Grass = wet’ change compared
to when there was no evidence and why?
2. How does the probability of ‘Our Grass = wet’ change compared to when
there was no evidence and why?
Chest Clinic
Figure B.2: Chest Clinic BN used in the case study.
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Evidence: {XRay Result = abnormal}
Query:
1. How does the probability of ‘Lung Cancer = present’ change compared
to when there was no evidence and why?
2. How does the probability of ‘Visit to Asia = visit’ change compared to
when there was no evidence and why?
3. How does the probability of ‘Dyspnea = present’ change compared to
when there was no evidence and why?
Evidence: {XRay Result = abnormal, Visit to Asia = visit}
Query:
1. How does the probability of ‘Lung Cancer = present’ change compared to
when the only available evidence was XRay Result = abnormal and why?
2. How does the probability of ‘Dyspnea = present’ change compared to
when the only available evidence was XRay Result = abnormal and why?
Evidence: {Smoking = smoker, Bronchitis = present}
Query:
1. How does the probability of ‘Lung Cancer = present’ change compared
to when the only available evidence was Smoking = smoker and why?
Optional:
2. How does the probability of ‘Dyspnea = present’ change compared to
when the only available evidence was Smoking = smoker and why?
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Figure B.3: False Barrier BN used in the case study.
False Barrier
Evidence: {A = true}
Query:
1. How does the probability of ‘C = true’ change compared to when there
was no evidence and why?
2. How does the probability of ‘D = true’ change compared to when there
was no evidence and why?
Optional:
3. How does the probability of ‘B = true’ change compared to when there
was no evidence and why?
Evidence: {D = true}
Query:
1. How does the probability of ‘A = true’ change compared to when there
was no evidence and why?
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2. How does the probability of ‘C = true’ change compared to when there
was no evidence and why?
Optional:
3. How does the probability of ‘B = true’ change compared to when there
was no evidence and why?
Evidence: {B = true}
Query:
1. How does the probability of ‘C = true’ change compared to when there
was no evidence and why?
2. How does the probability of ‘D = true’ change compared to when there
was no evidence and why?
Car Diagnosis
Evidence: {Car Starts = false}
Query:
1. How does the probability of ‘Battery Voltage = dead’ change compared
to when there was no evidence and why?
2. How does the probability of ‘Starter System = faulty’ change compared
to when there was no evidence and why?
Optional:
3. How does the probability of ‘Headlights = off’ change compared to when
there was no evidence and why?
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Figure B.4: Car Diagnosis BN used in the case study.
Evidence: {Car Starts = false, Spark Quality = very bad}
Query:
1. How does the probability of ‘Battery Voltage = dead’ change compared
to when the only available evidence was Car Starts = false and why?
2. How does the probability of ‘Starter System = faulty’ change compared
to when the only available evidence was Car Starts = false and why?
3. How does the probability of ‘Air System = faulty’ change compared to
when the only available evidence was Car Starts = false and why?
Evidence: {Car Starts = false, Spark Quality = very bad, Alternator = faulty}
Query:
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1. How does the probability of ‘Starter System = faulty’ change compared
to when the only available evidence was Car Starts = false, Spark Quality
= very bad and why?
2. How does the probability of ‘Starter Motor = faulty’ change compared to
when the only available evidence was Car Starts = false, Spark Quality =
very bad and why?
3. How does the probability of ‘Air System = faulty’ change compared to
when the only available evidence was Car Starts = false, Spark Quality =
very bad and why?
Optional:
4. How does the probability of ‘Spark Plugs = fouled’ change compared to
when the only available evidence was Car Starts = false, Spark Quality =
very bad and why?
C
Experimental materials used in stud-
ies in Chapter 4
C.1 Stimuli used in Experiment 6
The text in parenthesis appeared only on the explanation condition.
1. The Black Death scenario:
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Millions of people died from the Black Death in the 14th century. How
did the Black Death come to an end?
One popular belief is that the Black Death subsided mostly through the
use of quarantines. (According to this belief, people mostly stayed out
of the path of infected individuals, rats, and fleas. The uninfected would
typically remain in their homes and only leave when it was necessary.
Those with the financial resources would traditionally escape to the coun-
try, far away from the Black Death-infested cities.)
Q. How confident are you that the Black Death came to an end through
the use of quarantines?
2. Vaccination scenario:
Vaccination is one of the most common ways to help the immune system.
How do vaccines work?
It is often thought that vaccines cause the production of antibodies which
then strike down viruses. (According to this theory, by administering
vaccines one injects weakened versions of viruses which cannot cause an
infection. However, the immune cells called ’memory cells’ remain in the
body. When the body encounters that virus again (now in its harmful
version), the memory cells produce antibodies that kill the virus before
it’s too late.)
Q. How confident are you that vaccines build immunity by causing the
production of the antibodies?
C.1 Stimuli used in Experiment 6 359
3. China’s one-child policy scenario:
China had the one-child policy for 35 years. However, China’s popula-
tion has actually grown by about 400 million in these 35 years. Why has
China’s population increased if they have had a one-child policy for so
long?
It is believed that the reason is that the one-child policy did not apply
to everyone. (According to this belief, the policy did not apply in rural
areas. Also, ethnic minorities were allowed to have more kids. All this
resulted in China’s population actually growing.)
Q. How confident are you that China’s population has grown because the
one-child policy did not apply to everyone?
4. Ebola scenario:
Despite all the modern safety equipment and the fact that Ebola is diffi-
cult to transmit, there is still a significant number of medical practitioners
who contract Ebola. Why is that?
It is commonly thought that the main reason is the improper removal of
the protective gear. (Taking care of someone with Ebola is really difficult.
There are body fluids everywhere. So the protective gear is often com-
pletely covered with Ebola. Now, when taking off the gear one has to be
really careful not to get in contact with the outside of it since they could
contract the disease. So even if one has really good protective gear, the
improper removal can still lead to contracting Ebola.)
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Q. How confident are you that the improper removal of the protective
gear is the main reason medical practitioners contract Ebola?
5. Switzerland in WWII scenario:
Switzerland is well-known for its armed neutrality during WWII. How
has Switzerland maintained its armed neutrality during times of con-
flict like WWII?
One popular belief is that Switzerland remained neutral through a combi-
nation of military deterrence and economic concessions to Germany. (Ac-
cording to this belief, the Swiss army had a plan to retreat to the moun-
tains in case of an invasion. This would have resulted in Germans having
to spend significantly more time and resources in conquering Switzer-
land. The Swiss army also planned to destroy all major tunnels which
would have made any travel from the north to the south of the coun-
try practically impossible. On the other hand, the economic cooperation
between Switzerland and Germany was high and the Swiss significantly
extended credits to Germans. All this contributed to Switzerland success-
fully remaining neutral.)
Q. How confident are you that Switzerland maintained its armed neutral-
ity through the combination of military deterrence and economic conces-
sion to Germany?
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The text in parenthesis appeared only on the explanation condition. All partici-
pants in Experiment 7a were presented with both Q1 (the confidence question)
and Q2 (the reliability question) whereas participants in Experiment 7b were
presented either Q1 or Q2, but not both.
1. The Black Death scenario:
Dave and Jimmy are part of a research group investigating devastating
pandemics in human history. During a planning meeting they touched
upon the Black Death.
Dave: Millions of people died from the Black Death in the 14th century.
I think our research project should in part focus on how the Black Death
ended. It may give us some insight into how to deal with future pan-
demics.
Jimmy: Yes, I agree. Do you already have an idea regarding how the
Black Death came to an end?
Dave: I think the Black Death subsided mostly through the use of quar-
antines.
(Jimmy: How so?
Dave: People mostly stayed out of the path of infected individuals, rats,
and fleas. The uninfected would typically remain in their homes and
only leave when it was necessary. Those with the financial resources
would traditionally escape to the country, far away form the Black Death-
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infested cities.)
Q1. How confident are you that the Black Death came to an end through
the use of quarantines?
Q2. How reliable do you think Dave is as a source of information regard-
ing the end of the Black Death?
2. Vaccination scenario:
Robert and Michael met to discuss a student project on the ways the im-
mune system can be helped to develop a protection from a disease. Dur-
ing the conversation they touched upon vaccination.
Robert: Vaccination is one of the most common ways to help the immune
system. Should we include a section on it in the project?
Michael: Yes, we should. We then need to address how vaccines work.
Do you know anything about that?
Robert: I think vaccines build immunity as they contain the non-harmful
versions of viruses that cause the production of antibodies which then
strike down the harmful versions of viruses.
(Michael: How so?
Robert: Well the dead or weakened viruses in the vaccines that are ad-
ministered cannot cause an infection. However, the immune cells called
‘memory cells’ remain in the body. When the body encounters that virus
again, the memory cells produce antibodies that kill the virus before it’s
too late.)
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Q1. How confident are you that vaccines build immunity by containing
the non-harmful versions of viruses that then cause the harmful versions
to be eliminated?
Q2. How reliable do you think Robert is as a source of information re-
garding the workings of vaccines?
3. China’s one-child policy scenario:
Emma and Ben are discussing some of the policies the Chinese govern-
ment has imposed. During the conversation they touched upon the one-
child policy the China had for 35 years.
Emma: The one-child policy seemed like a really extreme way of regulat-
ing population size. But China’s population has actually grown for about
400 million in the 35 years. Why is that?
Ben: I think the reason is that the one-child policy did not apply to every-
one.
(Emma: How so?
Ben: Well the policy did not apply in rural areas. Also, ethnic minorities
were allowed to have more kids. All this resulted in China’s population
actually growing.)
Q1. How confident are you that China’s population has grown because
the one-child policy did not apply to everyone?
Q2. How reliable do you think Ben is as a source of information regarding
China’s one-child policy?
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4. Ebola scenario:
Maria is medical practitioner. During one of the conversation with her
friend Tom, who is not a doctor, they touched upon reasons doctors con-
tract Ebola.
Tom: Despite all the modern safety equipment and, as you said, the fact
that Ebola is difficult to transmit, there is still a significant number of
medical practitioners who contract Ebola. Why is that?
Maria: I think the main reason is the improper removal of the protective
gear.
(Tom: Right. But how does that exactly lead to contracting Ebola?
Maria: Taking care of someone with Ebola is really difficult. There are
body fluids everywhere. So the protective gear is often completely cov-
ered with Ebola. Now, when taking off the gear one has to be really care-
ful not to get in contact with the outside of it since they could contract
the disease. So even if one has really good protective gear, the improper
removal can still lead to contracting Ebola.)
Q1. How confident are you that the improper removal of the protective
gear is the main reason medical practitioners contract Ebola?
Q2. How reliable do you think Maria is as a source of information regard-
ing transmission of Ebola and the proper use of protective equipment?
5. Switzerland in WWII scenario:
Ann and Sarah met to discuss a student project on armed neutrality in
World War II. During the conversation they touched upon Switzerland.
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Ann: Switzerland is well-known for its neutrality during WWII. Should
we include a section on it in the project?
Sarah: Yes, we should. Do you know how Switzerland maintained its
armed neutrality during WWII?
Ann: I think they remained neutral through a combination of military
deterrence and economic concessions to Germany.
(Sarah: Right. Do you know anything more specific?
Ann: The Swiss army had a plan to retreat to the mountains in case of
an invasion. This would have resulted in Germans having to spend sig-
nificantly more time and resources in conquering Switzerland. The Swiss
army also planned to destroy all major tunnels which would have made
any travel from the north to the south of the country practically impos-
sible. On the other hand, the economic cooperation between Switzer-
land and Germany was high and the Swiss significantly extended credits
to Germans. All this contributed to Switzerland successfully remaining
neutral.)
Q1. How confident are you that Switzerland maintained its armed neu-
trality through the combination of military deterrence and economic con-
cession to Germany?
Q2. How reliable do you think Ann is as a source of information regard-
ing Switzerland’s armed neutrality during WWII?
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The text in parenthesis () appeared only on the explanation condition. The text
in square brackets [] appeared only in the low reliability condition and the text
in curly brackets {} appeared only in the high reliability condition.
1. The Black Death scenario:
[Dave and Jimmy are high school students who are assigned a student
project to find out as much as they can on one of the most devastating
pandemics in human history, namely the Black Death.]
{Dave and Jimmy are senior researchers at a well-established institute for
global health and part of the project investigating devastating pandemics
in human history. During a planning meeting they touched upon the
Black Death.}
Dave: Millions of people died from the Black Death in the 14th century. I
think our project should in part focus on how the Black Death ended.
Jimmy: Yes, I agree. Do you already have an idea regarding how the
Black Death came to an end?
Dave: I think the Black Death subsided mostly through the use of quar-
antines.
(Jimmy: How so?
Dave: People mostly stayed out of the path of infected individuals, rats,
and fleas. The uninfected would typically remain in their homes and
only leave when it was necessary. Those with the financial resources
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would traditionally escape to the country, far away form the Black Death-
infested cities.)
Q1. How confident are you that the Black Death came to an end through
the use of quarantines?
Q2. How reliable do you think Dave is as a source of information regard-
ing the end of the Black Death?
2. Vaccination scenario:
[Robert and Michael are subway operators. They both recently became
parents and during a coffee break they started talking about vaccination.]
{Michael recently became a father and met with Robert, an immunolo-
gist, to discuss the ways the immune system can be helped to develop a
protection from a disease. During the conversation they touched upon
vaccination.}
Robert: Vaccination is a great way to protect your child from diseases?
Michael: Yes, I am aware of that, but I always wondered how vaccines
work.
Robert: Vaccines cause the production of antibodies which then strike
down viruses.
(Michael: How so?
Robert: By administering vaccines one injects weakened versions of
viruses which cannot cause an infection. However, the immune cells
called ‘memory cells’ remain in the body. When the body encounters
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that virus again (now in its harmful version), the memory cells produce
antibodies that kill the virus before it’s too late.)
Q1. How confident are you that vaccines build immunity by causing the
production of the antibodies?
Q2. How reliable do you think Robert is as a source of information re-
garding the workings of vaccines?
3. China’s one-child policy scenario:
[Ben and Emma just started their undergraduate studies in philosophy.
They enjoy talking about global issues and during one of their conversa-
tions they touched upon the one-child policy China had for 35 years.]
{Ben and Emma are experienced policy-makers who specialize on East
Asia. During one of their meetings they discussed policies related to the
regulation of population size and they touched upon the one-child policy
China had for 35 years.}
Emma: The one-child policy seemed like a really extreme way of regulat-
ing population size. But China’s population has actually grown for about
400 million in the 35 years. Why is that?
Ben: The reason is that the one-child policy did not apply to everyone.
(Emma: How so?
Ben: The policy did not apply in rural areas. Also, ethnic minorities were
allowed to have more kids. All this resulted in China’s population actu-
ally growing.)
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Q1. How confident are you that China’s population has grown because
the one-child policy did not apply to everyone?
Q2. How reliable do you think Ben is as a source of information regarding
China’s one-child policy?
4. Ebola scenario:
[Maria and Tom read in the news that more medical practitioners from the
Doctors Without Borders team in West Africa contracted Ebola. Although
neither Maria nor Tom are medical practitioners, the news attracted their
attention and they started discussing it.]
{Maria is a medical practitioner who was part of the Doctors Without
Borders team in West Africa treating various epidemic diseases. During
one of the conversation with her friend Tom, who is not a doctor, they
touched upon reasons doctors contract Ebola.}
Tom: Despite all the modern safety equipment and the fact that Ebola is
difficult to transmit, there is still a significant number of medical practi-
tioners who contract Ebola. Why is that?
Maria: The main reason is the improper removal of the protective gear.
(Tom: But how does that exactly lead to contracting Ebola?
Maria: Taking care of someone with Ebola is really difficult. There are
body fluids everywhere. So the protective gear is often completely cov-
ered with Ebola. Now, when taking off the gear one has to be really care-
ful not to get in contact with the outside of it since they could contract
the disease. So even if one has really good protective gear, the improper
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removal can still lead to contracting Ebola.)
Q1. How confident are you that the improper removal of the protective
gear is the main reason medical practitioners contract Ebola?
Q2. How reliable do you think Maria is as a source of information regard-
ing transmission of Ebola and the proper use of protective equipment?
5. Switzerland in WWII scenario:
[Ann and Sarah are high school students and they have just been assigned
a project on armed neutrality in Wolrd War II.]
{Ann and Sarah are history professors who have just been awarded a
research grant for a project on armed neutrality in World War II. During
their planning meeting they discussed the case of Switzerland.}
Ann: Switzerland is well-known for its armed neutrality during WWII.
Should we include a section on it in the project?
Sarah: Yes, we should. Do you know how Switzerland maintained its
armed neutrality during WWII?
Ann: They remained neutral through a combination of military deter-
rence and economic concessions to Germany.
(Sarah: Do you know anything more specific?
Ann: The Swiss army had a plan to retreat to the mountains in case of
an invasion. This would have resulted in Germans having to spend sig-
nificantly more time and resources in conquering Switzerland. The Swiss
army also planned to destroy all major tunnels which would have made
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any travel from the north to the south of the country practically impos-
sible. On the other hand, the economic cooperation between Switzer-
land and Germany was high and the Swiss significantly extended credits
to Germans. All this contributed to Switzerland successfully remaining
neutral. )
Q1. How confident are you that Switzerland maintained its armed neu-
trality through the combination of military deterrence and economic con-
cession to Germany?
Q2. How reliable do you think Ann is as a source of information regard-
ing Switzerland’s armed neutrality during WWII?
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Tešić, M., Liefgreen, A., & Lagnado, D. (2020). The propensity interpretation of
probability and diagnostic split in explaining away. Cognitive Psychology,
121, 101293.
Thagard, P. (1978). The best explanation: Criteria for theory choice. The journal
of philosophy, 75(2), 76–92.
Bibliography 393
Thagard, P. (1989). Explanatory coherence. Behavioral and brain sciences, 12(3),
435–467.
Tingley, D., Yamamoto, T., Hirose, K., Keele, L., & Imai, K. (2014). Mediation: R
package for causal mediation analysis. Journal of Statistical Software, 59(5),
1–38.
Toulmin, S. E. (1958/2003). The uses of argument. Cambridge university press.
Trout, J. (2002). Scientific explanation and the sense of understanding. Philoso-
phy of Science, 69(2), 212–233.
Trout, J. (2008). Seduction without cause: Uncovering explanatory neurophilia.
Trends in cognitive sciences, 12(8), 281–282.
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1974). Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics
and biases. Science, 185(4157), 1124–1131. Retrieved from http://www
.jstor.org/stable/1738360
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1977). Causal schemata in judgments under uncer-
tainty. Retrieved from https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/
a056667.pdf
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